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Eleftherios Goulas Athina Zervoyianni 《The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance》2013,53(4):380-392
We examine the relationship between fiscal deficits and per-capita income growth in a panel of 27 European countries, allowing for perceived risks, in terms of fiscal sustainability, associated with additional government spending. Such risks are proxied by the conditional variability of manufacturing production and stock market returns and by the unconditional variability of two survey-based economic-sentiment indicators. To help clarifying how fiscal variables impact on growth and to provide a point of reference for the interpretation of the empirical results a structural growth model is first identified. We find evidence of an asymmetric relationship, in that fiscal deficits give rise to adverse growth effects if they coincide with high uncertainty regarding the prospects of the economy and no significant negative growth effects in the low-uncertainty case. 相似文献
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Using data from 25 EU countries spanning the period 1999–2017, this paper examines the relationship between working-age suicides and changes in long-term unemployment and tests for mitigating effects through the implementation of labor-market policies. The estimates suggest higher suicide risks following a rising rate of long-term unemployment. Passive support policies have a suicide-decreasing impact. Among active policies, a significant suicide-decreasing effect is found for training and direct job creation. The results have important policy implications in that they suggest that strong commitment of governments to passive or to certain types of active labor-market policies can, on average, contribute to social stability and the welfare of populations. 相似文献
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Using a New-Keynesian model subject to misspecifications, we examine how the robust monetary policy could be modified by a linear inflation contract when a central bank is opaque about its preference for model robustness. It is shown that a central bank must limit this preference and opacity about it to ensure the dynamic stability of the economy. An optimal inflation contract with a zero penalty rate provides no incentive for a central bank to be opaque. The latter must rebalance the benefit of avoiding very bad outcomes in worst case scenarios and the economic costs due to higher macroeconomic volatility. 相似文献
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Christos Constantatos Eleftherios Filippiadis Eftichios S. Sartzetakis 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2014,45(3):259-280
We show that the presence of transaction costs in emission permit markets challenges the common presumption that grandfathering permits corresponds to lump-sum transfers with no strategic effects on output. Fixed transaction-costs influence firms’ decision to participate in the permits market, while variable transaction-costs affect firms’ output choice by creating a wedge between buyers’ and sellers’ opportunity cost of using permits. Thus, permit grandfathering can be used as a strategic trade instrument even when firms are price takers in the permit markets. Grandfathered permits differ from subsidies in that the stimulus they provide is bounded exogenously and rather limited. 相似文献
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George Deltas Thanasis Stengos Eleftherios Zacharias 《The Canadian journal of economics》2011,44(3):907-929
Abstract This paper examines the joint pricing decision of products in a firm’s product line. When products are distinguished by a vertical characteristic, those with higher values of that characteristic will command higher prices. We investigate whether, holding the value of the characteristic constant, there is an additional price premium for products on the industry and/or the firm frontier, that is, for the products with the highest value of the characteristic in the market or in a firm’s product line. We also investigate the existence of price premia for lower‐ranked products and other product line pricing questions. Using personal computer price data, we show that prices decline with the distance from the industry and firm frontiers, even after holding absolute quality constant. We find evidence that consumer tastes for brands is stronger for the consumers of frontier products (and thus competition between firms weaker in the top end of the market). There is also evidence that a product’s price is higher if a firm offers products with the immediately faster and immediately slower computer chip (holding the total number of a firm’s offerings constant), possibly as an attempt to reduce cannibalization. Finally, a product’s price declines with the time it is offered by a firm, suggesting intertemporal price discrimination. 相似文献
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Eleftherios Zacharias 《The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance》2009,49(4):1225-1235
We show that the entry of a second firm in a horizontally differentiated market (ala Hotelling) may harm consumers as prices increase and consumer’s surplus possibly decrease. We first derive the price and the consumer’s surplus of a monopoly which is located at the center of the market. When a second firm enters the market the first firm repositions and the two firms locate at their equilibrium points. Although competition adds to variety and increases consumer’s surplus, the post entry increase in price may outweight the gains from extra variety and make consumers worse off. 相似文献
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This paper examines monetary and fiscal interactions in a framework where the government as Stackelberg leader worries about political costs of corruption and central bank opacity acts as a fiscal disciplinary device. Opacity could reduce (increase) inflation expectations, inflation (the output gap) and the responses of these variables to supply shocks, and would improve social welfare. Under the least favourable assumptions on the effect of corruption, i.e. ‘sanding‐the‐wheels’ or weak ‘greasing‐the‐wheels’ effect, opacity has a fiscal disciplining effect that could be reinforced by grand corruption. Intransparency increases corruption only if the ‘greasing‐the‐wheels’ effect is relatively large. 相似文献
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Using a New Keynesian model subject to misspecifications, we examine the accountability issue in a framework of delegation where government and private agents are uncertain about the central bank's preference for model robustness. We show that, in the benchmark case of full transparency, the optimal inflation targeting weight (or penalty) is decreasing with the preference for robustness. Departing from the benchmark equilibrium, the central bank has then incentive to be less transparent in order to reduce the optimal inflation targeting weight and thus to become more independent vis‐à‐vis the government. We also find that greater opacity will increase the sensibility of inflation and model misspecification to the inflation shock but will decrease that of output‐gap. Since macroeconomic volatility could be increased or decreased under more opacity, there could exist in some cases a trade‐off between the level and the variability of inflation (and output gap). Persistent inflation shocks could be associated with a higher inflation targeting weight as well as a higher sensibility of inflation and output gap to the inflation shock but a lower sensibility of model misspecification. 相似文献
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This paper analyzes the optimal commodity tax policy, in a generalized vertical differentiation model in which consumers have positional considerations. Consumers enjoy having a product which is better than that owned by others, and feel envy when others own a better product than them. We examine the impact of these positional considerations on the optimal tax and welfare when a monopoly produces two variants of such good. The standard result that the government should subsidize the product, can be reversed in our setting. In the presence of positional concerns, the optimal tax rate can be positive. Furthermore, the positional effects determine the level of the tax pass-through on prices. Finally, the tax levied on the high-quality variant affects the price of the low-quality variant and vice versa. 相似文献