Elicitation using multiple price list formats

We examine the properties of a popular method for eliciting choices and values from experimental subjects, the multiple price list format. The main advantage of this format is that it is relatively transparent to subjects and provides simple incentives for truthful revelation. The main disadvantages are that it only elicits interval responses, and could be susceptible to framing effects. We consider extensions to address and evaluate these concerns. We conclude that although there are framing effects, they can be controlled for with a design that allows for them. We also find that the elicitation of risk attitudes is sensitive to procedures, subject pools, and the format of the multiple price list table, but that the qualitative findings that participants are generally risk averse is robust. The elicitation of discount rates appear less sensitive to details of the experimental design. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C9, D81, D91 An erratum to this article is available at .     

Management Buyouts and Firm–Level Productivity: Evidence from a Panel of UK Manufacturing Firms

This paper presents an empirical investigation of the productivity effects of UK management buyouts (MBOs) over the period 1986–1997. It is the first study to use an augmented production function approach in order to determine and quantify: the Hicks–neutral productivity, the marginal productivity of labour, and the marginal productivity of capital effects of MBOs. The main findings are consistent with MBOs providing incentive and control systems that lead to improved firm–level productivity in the post–buyout organisation via reduced agency costs, debt bonding, and monitoring by buyout specialists.     

The measurement and decomposition of nonuse values: A critical review

We critically review the literature that claims that existence values, or nonuse values in general, are a large and measurable component of total value for certain environmental resources. Our concern is not with the question “do nonuse values exist?” For some individuals they surely do. Rather, our concern is with two interrelated questions: are there operationally meaningful theorems which might lead to the specific measurement of nonuse values, and do we in fact have a body of credible evidence which shows that nonuse values, particularly components of any nonuse value, are “large”? We find nothing in the way of operationally meaningful hypotheses which would permit the estimation of values attributable to specific motives of individuals. We find no credible basis for claims related to either the measurement of existence and other motive-related values or claims for the “large” relative size of such values. In short, we question the conventional wisdom that such values are measurable and that they are significant as a component of total value.     

Expected utility theory and the experiments

The experimental evidence against expected utility theo or unconvincing. When one modifies the experiments to mi tends to support traditional theory.Dewey H. Johnson Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of South Carolina. I am grateful for comments from seminar participants at the University of Melbourne, University of South Carolina, University of Stockholm, and the University of Western Ontario. John Hey provided a firm, but sympathetic, editorial hand.     

Risk aversion, liquidity, and endogenous short horizons

We analyze a competitive model in which different informationsignals get reflected in value at different points in time.If investors are sufficiently risk averse, we obtain an equilibriumin which all investors focus exclusively on the short term.In addition, we show that increasing the variance of informationlesstrading increases market depth but causes a greater proportionof investors to focus on the short-term signal, which decreasesthe informativeness of prices about the long run. Finally, wealso explore parameter spaces under which long-term informedagents wish to voluntarily disclose their information.