Can investors time their exposure to private equity?

Private equity performance, both for buyouts and venture capital, has been highly cyclical: periods of high fundraising have been followed by periods of low performance. Despite this seemingly predictable variation, we find modest gains, at best, to pursuing realistic, investable strategies that time capital commitments to private equity. This occurs, in part, because investors can only time their commitments to funds; they cannot time when commitments are called or when investments are exited. There is a high degree of time-series correlation in net cash flows even across commitment strategies that allocate capital in a very different manner over time.     

Bundling and Menus of Two-Part Tariffs

Inducing self-selection among different segments of consumers is an important issue in pricing. Some firms induce self-selection by offering a menu of two-part tariffs (e.g., different rate plans) and letting consumers select the tariff and quantity they prefer. Other firms induce self-selection by offering a menu of price-quantity bundles (e.g., different package sizes) and letting consumers select only from among these bundles. We show that bundling is more profitable absent cost considerations. Social welfare may be higher or lower with bundling.     

All–Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards

We study all–pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.     

以史为鉴，美国经济或尚未转危为安

【美国《华尔街日报》5月5日】金融系统最痛苦的时刻或许已经过去，但美国经济的麻烦或许才刚刚开始。     

Incentive Effects of Rate-of-Return Regulation in Hong Kong: Reply

Journal of Regulatory Economics -     

Snapshot samples

We consider a coverage model where an initial event that occurs at some point in time triggers an activity of random duration that leads to some subsequent event. A snapshot sample is constructed at a fixed point in chronological time either by sampling only subjects where the initial event has occurred but the subsequent event has yet to occur (active subjects), or by sampling only subjects where both the initial and subsequent events have occurred (inactive subjects). The biases inherent in snapshot sampling can be neatly characterized by the properties of two random variables: the history (defined as the time the initial event occurs as measured into the past from the chronological point of sampling), and the active time (defined as the length of time between the initial and subsequent events). Though snapshot samples are biased, recognizing the biases enables correct inferences to be drawn from snapshot-sampled data. Considering only the case where and are independent random variables, this paper presents the probability models associated with snapshot sampling, demonstrates the problems that can occur, offers procedures for overcoming these problems, and applies the methods to interesting data sets.     

Regulatory Monitoring and the Impact of Bank Holding Company Dividend Changes on Equity Returns

This paper examines the impact of announcements of dividend changes by bank holding companies (BHCs) on equity returns. Many empirical studies of dividend behavior reveal positive market responses to dividend increases, which have been interpreted as confirmation of the signalling theory of dividend behavior. These studies typically focus on “large” changes, however. We argue that BHCs allow for a stronger test of signalling theory because regulatory monitors, in effect, “certify” dividend signals. Consequently, even “small” dividend increases should result in positive abnormal equity returns. Using the event study methodology, our results generally confirm this hypothesis for a sample covering the period 1973–1987.     

COORDINATING PRODUCTION AND DISPOSAL OF COMMODITY STOCKPILES WITH APPLICATION TO AUSTRALIA'S WOOL INDUSTRY

Following the dismantling of a price-support program, a central bureaucracy is left with a commodity stockpile to dispose. It happened with wheat and feed grains in the U.S. in 1986 and wool in Australia in 1991. It soon may happen in Europe with grains, manufactured dairy products and other commodities which have supported prices. Obvious policies include privatising the stockpile, disposing of the stockpile by a central bureaucracy and quarantining the stockpile from the market. Each policy imposes constraints on disposal based, perhaps, on judgments of political acceptability to producers and government. In this article, optimal rules for production and disposal are derived and solved and a new policy is proposed. Then the model is applied to the disposal of Australia's wool stockpile. Results show that centralised disposal will almost always be preferred to privatisation of the stockpile. Centralised disposal is also preferred to quarantining the stockpile if interest rates are high, but quarantining is preferred if interest rates are low. Centralised disposal and quarantining are not optimal, however. Optimal production and disposal combines the efficiency of privatisation with the market power of centralised disposal. To achieve this, the property rights to the stockpile can be redefined using payment-in-kind certificates and individual transferable entitlements. The payment-in-kind certificates assign ownership of the stockpile to individual producers who then make both production and disposal decisions. The individual transferable entitlements allow the industry to produce efficiently and extend market power from the central bureaucracy to producers. For the Australian wool stockpile, optimal production and disposal would benefit the industry by an estimated $2.7 billion.