Interest group politics in a federation

The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996–2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups. Our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter-state externalities.     

On Microfoundations of the Dual Theory of Choice

We show that Yaari's dual theory of choice under risk may be derived as an indirect utility when a risk-neutral agent faces financial imperfections. We consider an agent that maximizes expected discounted cash flows under a bid-ask spread in the credit market. It turns out that the agent evaluates lotteries as if she were maximizing Yaari's dual utility function. We also generalize the dual theory of choice for unbounded lotteries.     

Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments: Theory and Evidence from Russia

External shocks may cause a decline in the productivity of fixedcapital in certain regions of an economy. Exogenous obstaclesto migration make it hard for workers in those regions to reallocateto more prosperous regions. In addition, firms may devise "attachment"strategies to keep workers from moving out of a local labormarket. When workers are compensated in kind, they find it difficultto raise the cash needed for migration. This endogenous obstacleto migration has not yet been considered in the literature.The article shows that the feasibility of attachment dependson the inherited structure of local labor markets: attachmentcan exist in equilibrium only if the labor market is sufficientlyconcentrated. Attachment is beneficial for both employers andemployees but hurts the unemployed and the self-employed. Ananalysis of matched household-firm data from the Russian Federationcorroborates the theory.     

Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia

This paper develops a model in which costly barter is used by firms to protect working capital against outside creditors. Although creditors could agree to postpone debt payments and to avoid destroying the firm's working capital, if the firm cannot commit not to divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante incentives to use barter. We show that the greater is the debt overhang, the more likely is the use of barter, with and without the possibility of debt restructuring. Empirical evidence from Russian firm-level data is shown to be consistent with the model's predictions. J. Comp. Econ., December 2002, 30(4), pp. 635–656. New Economic School, CEFIR, CEPR, and WDI, Nakhimovsky pr. 47, Moscow 117418, Russia; Sloan School of Management, M.I.T., 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142; and ROSES–CNRS and CEPR, Maison des Sciences économiques, 106–112 Bd de l'Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E41, G34, P31.     

Determinants of interregional mobility in Russia

The paper studies the determinants of internal migration in Russia. Using panel data on gross region‐to‐region migration flows in 1992–99, we estimate the effect of economic, political and social factors. Although overall migration is rather low, it turns out that its intensity does depend on economic factors even controlling for fixed effects for each origin–destination pair. People move from poorer and job scarce regions with worse public good provision to those which are richer and prospering better both in terms of employment prospects and public goods. Migration is, however, constrained by the lack of liquidity; for the poorest regions, an increase in income raises rather than decreases outmigration. Our estimates imply that up to a third of Russian regions are locked in poverty traps.     

Imperfect competition in financial markets and capital structure

We consider a model of corporate finance with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries. Firms can finance projects either via debt or via equity. Because of asymmetric information about firms’ growth opportunities, equity financing involves a dilution cost. Nevertheless, equity emerges in equilibrium whenever financial intermediaries have sufficient market power. In the latter case, best firms issue debt while the less profitable firms are equity-financed. We also show that strategic interaction between oligopolistic intermediaries results in multiple equilibria. If one intermediary chooses to buy more debt, the price of debt decreases, so the best equity-issuing firms switch from equity to debt financing. This in turn decreases average quality of equity-financed pool, so other intermediaries also shift towards more debt.     

Whistle‐Blowing and Incentives in Firms

Whistle‐blowing is an important mechanism of corporate governance. We show that whistle‐blowing has negative effects on productive efficiency by undermining the incentives within a corporate hierarchy. In our model, a top manager intends to overreport earnings; a division manager may have evidence about the intended overreporting. We show that the division manager is more likely to have such evidence when the performance of his own division is low. Top management may offer a bribe to prevent the manager from blowing the whistle. This provides the division manager with an additional payoff when his division’s output is low. Therefore, potential whistle‐blowing undermines the division manager’s incentives to exert effort, which results in a less efficient outcome.     

Dictators and oligarchs: A dynamic theory of contested property rights

In an economy with weak economic and political institutions, the major institutional choices are made strategically by oligarchs and dictators. The conventional wisdom presumes that as rent-seeking is harmful for oligarchs themselves, institutions such as property rights will emerge spontaneously. We explicitly model a dynamic game between the oligarchs and a dictator who can contain rent-seeking. The oligarchs choose either a weak dictator (who can be overthrown by an individual oligarch) or a strong dictator (who can only be replaced via a consensus of oligarchs). In equilibrium, no dictator can commit to both: (i) protecting the oligarchs' property rights from the other oligarchs and (ii) not expropriating oligarchs himself. We show that a weak dictator does not limit rent-seeking. A strong dictator does reduce rent-seeking but also expropriates individual oligarchs. We show that even though eliminating rent-seeking is Pareto optimal, weak dictators do get appointed in equilibrium and rent-seeking continues. This outcome is especially likely when economic environment is highly volatile.