Political Institutions and Policy Volatility

Checks and balances that limit the discretion of policy-makers reduce the volatility of government expenditure and revenue. While this assumption is at the heart of a large body of empirical work, the association between political institutions and policy volatility has itself been the focus of only limited empirical testing. The results presented here support the existence of this link, allow for a comparison between two prominent measures of checks and balances and provide insight into the relative impact of checks and balances on the volatility of nine different types of fiscal policy both during times of macroeconomic stability and upheaval.     

Spinning gold: The financial returns to stakeholder engagement

We provide direct empirical evidence in support of instrumental stakeholder theory's argument that increasing stakeholder support enhances the financial valuation of a firm, holding constant the objective valuation of the physical assets under its control. We undertake this analysis using panel data on 26 gold mines owned by 19 publicly traded firms over the period 1993–2008. We code over 50,000 stakeholder events from media reports to develop an index of the degree of stakeholder conflict/cooperation for these mines. By incorporating this index in a market capitalization analysis, we reduce the discount placed by financial markets on the net present value of the physical assets controlled by these firms from 72 percent to between 37 and 13 percent. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political hazards,experience, and sequential entry strategies: the international expansion of Japanese firms, 1980–1998

We find support for the role of experiential learning in the international expansion process by extending the stages model of internationalization to incorporate a sophisticated consideration of temporal and cross‐national variation in the credibility of the policy environment. Using a sample of 3857 international expansions of 665 Japanese manufacturing firms, we build on the concepts of uncertainty and experiential learning, to show that firms that had gathered relevant types of international experience were less sensitive to the deterring effect of uncertain policy environments on investment. One implication of our results is that research on international strategy should emphasize understanding the political institutions that constrain or enable political actors, just as entry mode research has done. A second implication is that research in the stages model of internationalization should give the same weight to the policy environment as a source of uncertainty to a firm, as it has given to cultural, social and market institutions. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The institutional environment for multinational investment

This article posits that the effect of political hazards onthe choice of market entry mode varies across multinationalfirms based on the extent to which they face expropriation hazardsfrom their potential joint-venture partners in the host country(the level of contractual hazards). As political hazards increase,the multinational faces an increasing threat of opportunisticexpropriation by the government. Partnering with host-countryfirms that possess a comparative advantage in interactions withthe host-country government can safeguard against this hazard.However, as contractual hazards increase, the potential benefitto the joint-venture partner of manipulating the political systemfor it's own benefit at the expense of the multinational increasesas well, thereby diminishing the hazard-mitigating benefit offorming a joint venture. A two-stage bivariate probit estimationtechnique is used to test these hypotheses on a sample of 3,389overseas manufacturing operations by 461 firms in 112 countries.     

The Institutional Environment for Telecommunications Investment

This paper demonstrates that a structurally derived, internationally comparable index of checks and balances on executive discretion created by variation in political structures and party systems affects relative rates of basic telecommunications infrastructure deployment in 147 countries during the period 1960–1994. Models of infrastructure investment that omit the political characteristics of a prospective host country confound countries whose economic and demographic characteristics point to rapid demand growth for infrastructure services with those that create a potential trap for investors due to a higher probability of arbitrary change in the policy environment. The econometric analysis exploits both cross-sectional and temporal variation in the panel. A robust covariance-matrix estimator based on that developed by Newey and West is used to compute valid standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity and within unit-serial correlation, two common characteristics in the error-term structure of panel datasets.     

ESG,Material Credit Events,and Credit Risk

A growing body of research has extended the analysis of the materiality of ESG criteria from the perspective of equity investors to creditors. Past research and analysis have demonstrated the link between better management of ESG criteria and better management of risk overall. Despite this growing consensus and consistent evidence that ESG performance is correlated with credit risk, no empirical evidence has yet linked ESG performance to cost or expense variances or revenue shortfalls that could explain these correlations. The authors attempt to address this lack of mechanism‐based empirical evidence by citing and then building on a number of well‐publicized cases with analysis of two major ESG issues—indigenous land claims and biodiversity—as they affect the global project finance and agriculture sectors. Broadening these single‐sector results, the authors use a novel dataset providing systematic coding of material events reported in the media across a variety of empirical settings to produce the first large‐sample empirical evidence of the mechanisms linking ESG performance to credit risk.     

The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth

This article forges an explicit link between an objective measure of political constraints and variation in cross-national growth rates. It derives a new measure of political constraints from a simple spatial model of political interaction that incorporates information on the number of independent branches of government with veto power and the distribution of preferences across and within those branches. The derived variable is found to have a statistically and economically significant impact on growth rates using simple ordinary least squares, three-stage least squares and generalized method of moments estimation techniques.     

‘The Institutions and Governance of Economic Reform'1

This articls uses the reform of New Zealand's state-owned enterprises from 1984–1995 to highlight two lessons for public sector reform from New Institutional Economics. First, failure to apply agency, property rights and transaction cost theory in tandem can lead to time-consuming pauses and policy shifts in a reform programme. Second, a discriminating alignment between the institutional environment and the regulatory governance structure chosen is crucial for successful privatization in industries characterized by economies of scale, large non-redeployable investments and extremely political output such as telecommunications and electricity.