Are the Japanese Selfish,Altruistic or Dynastic?

I analyse a variety of evidence for Japan and, where available, for the United States on bequest practices, the importance and nature of bequest motives, bequest division, the willingness of individuals to help others, etc., in order to shed light on which model of household behaviour applies in the two countries. My results suggest that the selfish lifecycle model is the dominant model of household behaviour in both countries but that it is far more applicable in Japan; that the dynasty model is also more applicable in Japan but is not of dominant importance even there; and, conversely, that the altruism model is far more applicable in the USA. JEL Classification Numbers: D12, D64, D91, E21.     

Corporate Cash Holding in Asia

In this paper, we analyze the determinants of corporate saving in the form of changes in cash holdings for 11 Asian economies using firm‐level data from the Oriana Database for the 2002–2011 period. We find some evidence that cash flow has a positive impact on the change in cash holdings (i.e. that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive) and that the positive impact of cash flow on the change in cash holdings is larger and more significant in the case of smaller and presumably more constrained firms than in the case of larger and presumably less constrained firms in both developed and developing economies. Both of these findings corroborate the importance of financial constraints in Asian firms. In addition, we find that the cash flow sensitivity of cash declined after the global financial crisis and that Tobin's q has a positive impact on the change in cash holdings, especially in the case of larger and presumably unconstrained firms.     

Explaining Foreign Holdings of Asia's Debt Securities: The Feldstein–Horioka Paradox Revisited*

In this paper, we find that home bias is still present in all economies and regions, especially in the case of short‐term debt securities, but that there are substantial variations among economies and regions in the strength of home bias, with the eurozone economies, the USA and developing Asia showing relatively weak home bias and advanced Asia, especially Japan, showing relatively strong home bias. We then examine trends over time in foreign holdings of debt securities and find that capital has been flowing from the USA and the eurozone economies to both advanced Asia (especially Japan) and developing Asia, and that foreign holdings of debt securities have been increasing in advanced as well as developing Asia but for different reasons. The main reason in the case of advanced Asia (especially Japan) appears to be higher risk‐adjusted returns, whereas the main reason in the case of developing Asia appears to be the growth of debt securities markets combined with relatively weak home bias and (in the case of short‐term securities) lower exchange rate volatility. Finally, we find that since the global financial crisis, foreign holdings of debt securities have declined (i.e. that home bias has strengthened) in all economies and regions except developing Asia, where they have increased (except for a temporary decline in 2008) but where their share is still much lower than the optimal share warranted by the capital asset pricing market model.     

WHY DO CHILDREN TAKE CARE OF THEIR ELDERLY PARENTS? ARE THE JAPANESE ANY DIFFERENT?

We conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis of why children live with (or near) their parents and provide care and assistance to them using microdata from a Japanese household survey, the Osaka University Preference Parameter Study. We find that the Japanese are more likely to live with (or near) their elderly parents and/or to provide care and attention to them if they expect to receive a bequest from them, which constitutes strong support for the strategic bequest motive, but that their caregiving behavior is also heavily influenced by the strength of their altruism toward their parents and social norms.     

Do the Retired Elderly in Europe Decumulate Their Wealth? The Importance of Bequest Motives,Precautionary Saving,Public Pensions,and Homeownership

We use microdata on a large number of European countries from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to examine the wealth accumulation (saving) behavior of the retired elderly in Europe. We find that less than half of the retired elderly in Europe are decumulating their wealth and that the average wealth accumulation rate of the retired elderly in Europe is positive though relatively moderate (6.6 percent over a 3-year period). These findings suggest that the Wealth Decumulation Puzzle (the tendency of the retired elderly to not decumulate their wealth or to decumulate their wealth more slowly than expected) applies in the case of Europe. Moreover, our regression results suggest that bequest motives, generous public pension systems, and the reluctance of retired elderly homeowners to sell or borrow against their owner-occupied housing are the primary explanations for the existence of the Wealth Decumulation Puzzle in Europe.     

The determinants and long-term projections of saving rates in Developing Asia

In this paper, we present data on trends over time in domestic saving rates in twelve economies in Developing Asia during the 1966–2007 period and analyze the determinants of these trends. We find that domestic saving rates in Developing Asia have, in general, been high and rising but that there have been substantial differences from economy to economy, that the main determinants of these trends appear to have been the age structure of the population (especially the aged dependency ratio), income levels, and the level of financial sector development, and that the impacts of income levels and the level of financial sector development have been nonlinear (convex and concave, respectively). We then project future trends in domestic saving rates in Developing Asia for the 2011–2030 period based on our estimation results and find that the domestic saving rate in Developing Asia as a whole will remain roughly constant during the next two decades despite rapid population aging in some economies in Developing Asia because population aging will occur much later in other economies and because the negative impact of population aging on the domestic saving rate will be largely offset by the positive impact of higher income levels.     

The causes of Japan's ‘lost decade’: The role of household consumption

In this paper, I analyze the causes of the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy in the 1990s and find that the stagnation of investment, especially private fixed investment, was the primary culprit. I then investigate the causes of the stagnation of household consumption during the 1990s and find that the stagnation of household disposable income, the decline in household wealth, and increased uncertainty about the future are among the contributing factors. Finally, I consider whether demand side factors or supply side factors were more important as causes of the prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy in the 1990s and conclude that the former (especially misguided government policies) were probably more important.     

A possible explanation of the ‘Exchange Rate Disconnect Puzzle’: a common solution to three macroeconomic puzzles?

Meese and Rogoff (1983) and subsequent studies find that economic fundamentals are apparently not able to explain exchange rate movements, but we argue that this so-called ‘Exchange Rate Disconnect Puzzle’ arose because researchers such as Meese and Rogoff (1983) did not use the right fundamentals and because they did not allow for the forward-looking nature of exchange rate determination. Further, because they apparently were not aware that financial markets by themselves could not equalize interest rates across countries, they did not properly appreciate that the exchange rate is strongly influenced by agents’ expectations of aggregated differences in local returns. Thus, we believe that the same underlying explanation provided by Ford (2015) and Ford and Horioka (2016a, 2016b) for the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) Puzzle and the PPP Puzzle – namely that financial markets alone cannot achieve net transfers of financial capital and cannot equalize real interest rates across countries – also helps explain why previous attempts to connect changes in the exchange rate to economic fundamentals have not been successful and so can also be said to contribute to solving the Exchange Rate Disconnect Puzzle.