OCCUPATIONAL EARNINGS BEHAVIOR AND THE INEQUALITY OF EARNINGS BY SEX AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES*

This paper examines differences in earnings by occupations, and within occupations by sex and by race, on the basis of the 1/100 Public Use Samples of the 1960 and 1970 U.S. Population Censuses. It employs interval analysis to establish 32 categories of occupations with similar characteristics. Little relation was found between mean earnings of occupational groups and the degree of earnings inequality within them. When the figures are examined by sex, it was found that men, on average, earned over twice as much as women in both years, but women's earnings were more unequally distributed (as measured by the Gini coefficient). Women are concentrated in the traditional “female” occupations, which tend to be those at the bottom of the earnings scale, and men have a monopoly of the higher paid occupations. But mean earnings for men exceeded those for women in all occupational groups except one, even in the primarily female occupations. Standardizing first for occupational distribution and then for earnings by occupation, it was found that earnings differences between males and females within occupation had a greater impact on the overall male-female earnings ratio than did differences in occupational distribution by sex. In contrast, when the figures are examined by race, the change in occupational distribution (primarily the movement of blacks out of farming and of blacks and Spanish speakers out of personal services) was the major factor. There was also a considerable degree of earnings inequality within demographic groups. The degree of inequality was in the main reduced when the demographic groups were subdivided into occupations, but it was still substantial. Additional factors like time worked, schooling, and experience must be taken into consideration in understanding this phenomenon.     

Identifying Discretionary Fiscal Policy Reactions with Real‐Time Data

We propose a method of identifying discretionary fiscal policy reactions using real‐time data. Automatic stabilizers should depend on true GDP, while discretionary fiscal policy is contingent on the information that policy makers have in real time. We can compute a real‐time measurement error by comparing the first release of GDP data with later revisions. Discretionary fiscal policy is influenced by this measurement error, whereas automatic fiscal policy is not. We use this identification approach to test the central identifying assumption of Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) seminal structural vector autoregression (VAR). According to this assumption, fiscal policy makers do not react to GDP developments contemporaneously in a discretionary fashion. We find that government expenditure is adjusted upward if GDP growth in real time is lower than true GDP. This suggests that fiscal policy makers use short‐term funds to buy goods and services in response to their perception of GDP dynamics.     

Cooperation Norms in Multiple‐Stage Punishment

We analyze the interplay between cooperation norms and people’s punishment behavior in a social‐dilemma game with multiple punishment stages. By combining multiple punishment stages with self‐contained episodes of interaction, we are able to disentangle the effects of retaliation and norm‐related punishment. An additional treatment provides information on the norms bystanders use in judging punishment actions. Partly confirming previous findings, punishment behavior and bystanders’ opinions are guided by an absolute norm. This norm is consistent over decisions and punishment stages and requires full contributions. In the first punishment stage, our results suggest a higher personal involvement of punishers, leading to a nonlinearity defined by the punishers’ contribution. In later punishment stages, the personal‐involvement effect vanishes and retaliation kicks in. Bystanders generally apply the same criteria as punishers in all stages.     

Original Issue High Yield Bonds: Aging Analyses of Defaults,Exchanges, and Calls

This paper presents an aging analysis of 741 high yield bonds and finds default, exchange, and call percentages substantially higher than reported in earlier studies. By December 31, 1988, cumulative defaults are 34 percent for bonds issued in 1977 and 1978 and range from 19 to 27 percent for issue years 1979–1983 and from 3 to 9 percent for issue years 1984–1986. Exchanges are also a significant factor although they often are followed by default. Moreover, a significant percentage of high yield debt, 26–47 percent for 1977–1982, has been called. By December 31, 1988, approximately one third of the bonds issued in 1977–1982 has defaulted or been exchanged, and an additional one third had been called. On average, only 28 percent of these issues are still outstanding. There is no evidence that early results for more recent issue years differ markedly from issue years 1977 to 1982.     

Forward Foreign Exchange Rates,Expected Spot Rates,and Premia: A Signal-Extraction Approach

In this paper, we implement a methodology to identify and measure premia in the pricing of forward foreign exchange that involves application of signal-extraction techniques from the engineering literature. Diagnostic tests indicate that these methods are quite successful in capturing the essence of the time-series properties of premium terms. The estimated premium models indicate that premia show a certain degree of persistance over time and that more than half the variance in the forecast error that results from the use of current forward rates as predictors of future spot rates is accounted for by variation in premium terms. The methodology can be applied straightforwardly to the measurement of unobservables in other financial markets.     

TRENDS IN AMERICAN LIVING STANDARDS AND INEQUALITY, 1959–2007

We analyze the trends from 1959 to 2007 using an expanded measure of income called the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well‐Being (LIMEW). LIMEW is different in scope from the official U.S. Census Bureau measure of gross money income (MI) in that our measure includes non‐cash transfers, public consumption, imputed income from wealth, and household production and nets out personal taxes. While the annual growth rates of median LIMEW and MI are very close over the whole period (0.67 and 0.63 percent), median LIMEW grew much faster than median MI after 1982 and much slower before. The Gini coefficient of MI is uniformly higher than that of LIMEW but both show about the same change from 1959 to 2007. Decomposition analysis shows that changes in inequality are driven to a large extent by non‐home wealth in LIMEW and earnings in MI. While the racial gap in MI declined somewhat over the 1990s and 2000s, the racial gap in LIMEW actually widened a bit. Over the same years, while there was little change in the gap in MI between the elderly and non‐elderly, the LIMEW of the elderly actually overtook that of the non‐elderly.     

SCHOOLING AND OCCUPATIONAL EARNINGS*

This paper investigates the relation between schooling and earnings across and within occupations. Across occupations earnings are positively related to mean education. Within occupations the variance in schooling levels is generally substantial, but within two thirds of the occupations no relation between schooling and earnings is observed, while in the remaining third the pattern of sensitivity varies considerably. The sensitivity of earnings to education is greater for white males than white females and substantially greater for whites than blacks. When the white sample is divided into age cohorts, the degree of sensitivity of earnings to schooling is found to be greater for younger cohorts than older ones, except for the youngest cohort in 1970. In the conclusion, a structural interpretation of the distribution of earnings is proposed to account for the findings.