A note on incentive incompatibility under franchising

This note provides a formal demonstration of the incentive incompatibility problem that exists in franchisor — franchisee relationships. It is shown that incentive incompatibility exists with respect to both price and quality. Several contractual mechanisms designed to mitigate the incompatibility problem are examined.     

Effective regulation versus tacit collusion in the long-distance market: an empirical analysis

Regulatory decisions often must be made in an atmosphere of uncertainty, and arguments presented by the affected parties frequently add to, rather than resolve, that uncertainty. Here, we examine several of the deregulatory decisions affecting the long-distance market that were rendered by the FCC over the two-decade period following the divestiture of AT&T. Our purpose is to provide empirical evidence relevant to some of the arguments regarding market conditions that were presented during that period. Findings suggest that some of the more prominent allegations are not supported by the data.      

Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage

We consider the incentive of a dominant firm that supplies a necessary input to a Bertrand-competitive differentiated products downstream industry to: (1) vertically integrate forward, and (2) raise its downstream rivals' costs through non-price activities which we characterize generally as 'sabotage'. We examine these incentives both in the absence and presence of a regulatory constraint on the upstream price. We find that, while an incentive for vertical integration is present regardless of the existence of the regulatory constraint, the incentive for sabotage emerges only in the presence of binding input price regulation. Welfare effects are also explored.     

Entry and product quality under price regulation

Spence (1975, footnote 5, p. 420) has shown that, in equilibrium, a price-regulated monopoly will supply a socially suboptimal level of quality. This tendency to undersupply quality has been used to justify an expansion of regulatory controls to the quality dimension in certain regulated industries (e.g., electricity and telecommunications). In this paper, we examine the effects of entry on equilibrium product quality in an industry which is price-regulated. A generalized conjectural variation model is used which allows both monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures. Using this model, we find that regulation generally leads to a socially nonoptimal (either too high or too low) level of quality, where the direction of the resulting departure from optimal quality depends upon the conjectures that firms form. Spence's result is obtained as a special case. We then demonstrate that a policy that encourages (or, at least, does not discourage) entry into the regulated market will cause equilibrium quality to move in a social-welfare-improving direction, regardless of the direction of the original distortion.     

The Simple Welfare Economics of Network Externalities and the Uneasy Case for Subscribership Subsidies

The goal of universal service has dominated the telecommunications policy landscape for at least the past half century. This policy objective has been promoted with cross subsidies from long-distance telecommunications services to subscribers to local telecommunications service. The economic rationale for these cross subsidies is network externalities. In this paper, we show that: (1) the presence of network externalities, even if substantial in overall magnitude, does not generally justify a subscribership subsidy, even a well-designed one; and (2) the empirical realities of telecommunications markets make it unlikely that subscribership subsidies of any kind will increase social welfare.     

A diffusion model of long-run state economic development

Most empirical studies of state economic development have been relatively short-term in nature. Here, we examine the causes of growth over a more substantial period of time covering almost six decades. Particular emphasis is placed on the so-called convergence hypothesis. A two-stage methodology originally employed to model the diffusion of new technologies is applied. Results tend to confirm the general convergence of state per capita incomes over time. That is, a large share of the observed variation in state economic growth is explained by initial period incomes, with lower income states growing relatively more rapidly. In addition, we find that low taxes and comparatively strong support for higher education foster more rapid growth.     

Rent seeking and the allowed rate of return: A recursive model

In this paper, we estimate a three-equation recursive model of the rate-of-return phase of the regulatory hearing process. Separate equations are estimated for the firm's requested rate of return, the staff's recommended rate of return, and the commission's approved rate of return. The sample used in this estimation contains 122 observations of actual rate cases that were decided between 1980 and 1984. There are 73 electric companies and 37 states represented in this sample. The model differs from prior work in this area by (1) incorporating a separate equation to explain the commission staff's recommended rate of return, and (2) including the regulated companies' actual expenditures on the hearing process as a variable in all three equations.     

Regulatory policies toward local exchange companies under emerging competition: guardrails or speed bumps on the information highway?

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides a fundamental shift in the policy parameters within which regulators are to implement telecommunications policy. Within the parameters established by the Act, however, considerable discretion remains on the part of those charged with the task of implementing the law. In this paper, we identify a set of policy guideposts based on sound economic principles that can be used by regulators to implement the Act. Specifically, these competition-enabling policies will foster the goals of promoting and protecting competition.     

Suicide as an indicator of quality of life: evidence from dialysis patients

Quality of life has been measured in many different ways for patients with chronic medical conditions. What is unique about the approach used here is that it uses suicide rates as a relatively objective measure of quality of life within the population of dialysis patients. Using a Heckman selection model, we estimate the relative suicide rates across patients undergoing both hemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis. Our empirical results show that patients on hemodialysis have relatively lower suicide rates after controlling for other factors. Specifically, our results indicate that 141 fewer suicides will occur for every 1,000 patients shifted from peritoneal to hemodialysis. Prior estimates of the higher costs of the latter modality yield an estimated expenditure of $42,043 per suicide avoided.     

The medical community's opposition to organ markets: Ethics or economics?

A severe shortage of cadaveric human organs for transplantation exists in the U.S. The obvious cause of this shortage is our current public policy which proscribes payment for such organs. Support for this policy and opposition to the formation of organ markets has been quite strong among transplant suppliers (both hospital and physician groups). This paper critically evaluates the ethical arguments advanced to buttress this policy position and presents an alternative economic explanation based upon profit-maximizing behavior. The model we develop is based upon monopsony in organ procurement with a kinked (and possibly discontinuous) organ supply function.