Monetary Policy Coordination and the Level of National Debt

This paper uses the Canzoneri-Henderson benchmark framework of monetary policy coordination in interdependent economies to analyze how high levels of national debt affect monetary policy interactions. Using a two-country model, I first study how central banks interact in a flexible exchange-rate regime. I find that a low-debt country is better off interacting with a country with high debt, when both economies are affected by an aggregate inflationary shock. I also consider a political dependence scenario, in which central banks are subject to political pressure. In the case of a debt-burdened country, the political incentive to reduce interest payments on debt will spur a Gordon–Barro like inflation bias. However, under a flexible exchange-rate regime, the low-debt country will not be affected. Under a monetary union instead, political pressure may affect the low-debt country as well, and possibly create an inflation bias even greaterthan in the flexible exchange-rate regime. This scenario presents another example of how Rogoff's counterproductive monetary cooperation may arise under European Monetary Union.     

Disinflation and the supply side

This paper studies the dynamics associated with permanent and temporary reductions in the devaluation rate. The analysis uses an intertemporal optimizing model of a small open economy with imperfect capital markets and endogenous labor supply. With a constant capital stock, the model predicts an initial reduction in real wages and an expansion in output. Consumption falls on impact but increases afterward. In addition, with a temporary shock, a current account deficit emerges and a recession sets in at a later stage. With endogenous capital accumulation, numerical simulations show that the model is also capable of predicting a boom in investment.