TAX REFORMS IN EAST ASIAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: Motivations, directions, and implications

This first presents an overview of the level and structure of taxation in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. It then briefly reviews the available literature on tax reform, country by country. It finally gives a comparative analysis, focusing primarily on tax mix and tax structure, and the importance attached to tax administration.     

On characterizing the probability of survival in a large competitive economy

We consider a Walrasian exchange economy in which an agent is characterized by a utility function, a random endowment vector, and a function that specifies the minimum expenditure necessary for survival at a given price system. If at any equilibrium price system, the income of the agent is no more than the minimum expenditure for survival, it is ruined. The main results characterize the probability of ruin when the number of agents is large. The implications of stochastic dependence among agents are explored.     

Equilibrium prices in a random exchange economy with dependent agents

Summary. This paper presents a model of a Walrasian exchange economy in which the preferences and endowments of the agents are random. Stochastic interaction among the agents is formally described in terms of dependency neighborhoods. The main result is a characterization of the distribution of market-clearing prices in a large economy. Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: May 6, 1999     

Random iterates of monotone maps

In this paper we prove the existence, uniqueness and stability of the invariant distribution of a random dynamical system in which the admissible family of laws of motion consists of monotone maps from a closed subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space into itself.     

Trade under temporary equilibrium: Evolution in a loglinear world

The paper develops a model of a competitive world in which several countries are engaged in the production, consumption, and exchange of many commodities over time. Each agent produces a single good, and trades it for the required inputs and consumption goods. The plans of the agents are based on an optimization exercise involving a constrained maximization of a discounted sum of one period utilities. All the relevant functional relationships are assumed to be loglinear. The principal results deal with the existence and characterization of the sequence of temporary equilibria.     

Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of “petty corruption” by government officials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic “tracks,” and the information among the participants. Entrepreneurs apply, in sequence, to a “track” of two or more bureaucrats in a prescribed order for approval of their projects. Our first result establishes that in a one-shot situation no project ever gets approved. This result leads us to consider a repeated interaction setting. In that context we characterize in more detail the trigger-strategy equilibria that minimize the social loss due to the system of bribes, and those that maximize the expected total bribe income of the bureaucrats. The results are used to shed some light on two much advocated anti-corruption policies: the single window policy and rotation of bureaucrats.