Carbon Trading with Imperfectly Observable Emissions

The Kyoto Protocol foresees emission trading but does not yet specify verification of (uncertain) emissions. This paper analyses a setting in which parties can meet their emission targets by reducing emissions, by investing in monitoring (reducing uncertainty of emissions) or by (bilaterally) trading permits. We derive the optimality conditions and carry out various numerical simulations. Our applications suggest that including uncertainty could increase compliance costs for the USA, Japan and the European Union. Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union might be able to gain from trading due to higher permit prices. Emissions trading could also lower aggregate uncertainty on emissions.     

Hospital competition under pay‐for‐performance: Quality,mortality, and readmissions

Health outcomes, such as mortality and readmission rates, are commonly used as indicators of hospital quality and as a basis to design pay‐for‐performance (P4P) incentive schemes. We propose a model of hospital behavior under P4P where patients differ in severity and can choose hospital based on quality. We assume that risk‐adjustment is not fully accounted for and that unobserved dimensions of severity remain. We show that the introduction of P4P which rewards lower mortality and/or readmission rates can weaken or strengthen hospitals' incentive to provide quality. Since patients with higher severity have a different probability of exercising patient choice when quality varies, this introduces a selection bias (patient composition effect) which in turn alters quality incentives. We also show that this composition effect increases with the degree of competition. Critically, readmission rates suffer from one additional source of selection bias through mortality rates since quality affects the distribution of survived patients. This implies that the scope for counterproductive effects of P4P is larger when financial rewards are linked to readmission rates rather than mortality rates.     

Visitors’ acceptance of negative ecological impacts in national parks: comparing the explanatory power of psychographic scales in a Norwegian mountain setting

Even in protected areas, it is inevitable that any human use will produce some impact on natural resources. This study identifies visitors’ tolerance of potential negative ecological impacts from tourism activities and facilities in a Norwegian national park context, based on park visitors’ expressed degree of acceptance of negative effects on particular species of wildlife (wild reindeer and raptors) and on vegetation. Attitudes were analysed using psychographic scales, reflecting respondents’ nature orientations, their specific facility desires, their preferences in a wilderness setting and their concerns about human interaction with the natural environment. Fourteen research hypotheses were tested. Findings demonstrated that the psychographic scales explained more variation in attitudes than most social background and trip characteristics. Higher levels of education among visitors were strongly associated with increased ecological concern; age and gender were not. There was generally strong ecological awareness and eco-centrism among park visitors in general, with a small proportion of wilderness purists. Better trail conditions, signposting and interpretation were sought. But park visitors were also found to possess a complex mixture of needs and drivers. The study found significant potential for strategic alliances between tourism and conservation interests, and key value issues for park governance systems.     

AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH TO NATIONAL ACCOUNTING: AN OUTLINE

This article deals in an axiomatic manner with problems of definition, classification, and measurement in the national accounts. It argues that the elementary units which must be classified in national accounting are economic objects (real and financial), rather than transactions. The article defines briefly a set of postulates, and shows that the structure of a simple system of national accounting can be derived from them. There are twenty postulates—certain of them establishing basic categories such as sector, time, economic object, value (price); others establishing relations between categories (for example the notion of ownership); and others describing operations in which economic objects can be involved, such as production, final consumption, change of ownership, and change of debtor and creditor (in the case of financial objects). It is shown that the system of postulates makes it possible to consider a large number of accounting concepts (flows or stocks) as classes (baskets) of real objects (e.g., exports, real capital) or financial objects (e.g., payments, total debt of a sector). These concepts can be defined without reference to prices, although prices are necessary to measure them. Other concepts cannot be defined in this way in this system of postulates, for example value added, foreign balance, saving, net worth. However, it is possible to define magnitudes of the latter type and measure them in terms of value: for example, value added can be defined as the difference between the value of receipts and the value of outlays of a sector. In this way it is possible to establish algebraic relations among the national accounting concepts. (This article is a summary of certain parts of the doctoral thesis of the author, published in Norwegian in 1955.)     

Hospital Competition and Quality with Regulated Prices*

We analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices, considering the effect of both introducing competition (monopoly versus competition) and increasing competition through either lower transportation costs (increased substitutability) or a higher number of hospitals. With semi‐altruistic providers and a fairly general cost structure, we show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous. In contrast to the received body of theoretical literature, this is consistent with, and potentially explains, the mixed empirical evidence.     

AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH TO NATIONAL ACCOUNTING: AN OUTLINE

Reprinted from The Review of Income and Wealth 12: 179–189 (1966) This article deals in an axiomatic manner with problems of definition, classification, and measurement in the national accounts. It argues that the elementary units which must be classified in national accounting are economic objects (real and financial), rather than transactions. The article defines briefly a set of postulates, and shows that the structure of a simple system of national accounting can be derived from them. There are twenty postulates–certain of them establishing basic categories such as sector, time, economic object, value (price); others establishing relations between categories (for example the notion of ownership); and others describing operations in which economic objects can be involved, such as production, final consumption, change of ownership, and change of debtor and creditor (in the case of financial objects). It is shown that the system of postulates makes it possible to consider a large number of accounting concepts (flows or stocks) as classes (baskets) of real objects (e.g., exports, real capital) or financial objects (e.g., payments, total debt of a sector). These concepts can be defined without reference to prices, although prices are necessary to measure them. Other concepts cannot be defined in this way in this system of postulates, for example value added, foreign balance, saving, net worth. However, it is possible to define magnitudes of the latter type and measure them in terms of value: for example, value added can be defined as the difference between the value of receipts and the value of outlays of a sector. In this way it is possible to establish algebraic relations among the national accounting concepts. (This article is a summary of certain parts of the doctoral thesis of the author, published in Norwegian in 1955.)     

Rent-seeking in a unionised monopoly

A unionised monopoly firm, benefitting from some kind of anti-competitive regulation, and its corresponding trade union have a common interest in spending resources to protect the monopoly rents created by the regulation. In the present paper, a situation in which the unionised monopoly is challenged by a consumer organisation fighting for deregulation is analysed as a standard Tullock rent-seeking contest. With unequal sharing of monopoly rents, the free-riding incentives among the rent-defending players turn out to be overwhelming, in the sense that the unique Nash equilibrium is characterised by zero effort contribution by the player with the lower valuation of the contested prize. This implies that being “strong”, in terms of bargaining strength, is not necessarily an advantage for neither player in a unionised monopoly that is threatened by deregulation. Received: June 2000 / accepted: January 2001     

Injury Prevention and Safety Promotion course in a Russian Master of Public Health programme

The Global Burden of Disease Studies describe and emphasise injury as a major and increasing component in the panorama of global ill health. Russia has the one of the highest injury rates in Europe. When a Master in Public Health programme was planned and started in 2007 in Arkhangelsk, Russia, under the auspices of University of Troms?, Norway, a course on Injury Prevention and Safety Promotion was included. A take-over programme (training-the-trainers) was implemented within the course. The present paper describes the course content, the students and their background, the training-the-trainers programme, the evaluation procedure and its results. So far, 53 students have passed the course, 77% being female. The majority of students were medical doctors (51%), psychologists (11%), pedagogues (9%), dentists (6%) and nurses (6%). The take-over programme has functioned well by gradually using students of excellence as teachers. In 2012, the take-over programme is completed and only Russians teach. Evaluation by students of the course content, organisation and pedagogic approach was useful for improvements.     

ARE COOPERATIVES MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN INVESTOR‐OWNED FIRMS? CROSS‐INDUSTRY EVIDENCE FROM PORTUGAL

We analyse empirically whether cooperatives and investor‐owned firms differ in terms of productive efficiency. Using rich Portuguese panel data covering a wide range of industries, we apply two different empirical approaches to estimate potential differences in productive efficiency. The results from our benchmark random‐effects model show that cooperatives are significantly less productive, on average, than investor‐owned firms, both at the aggregate level and for most of the industries considered. However, the results derived from a System‐GMM approach, which is our preferred empirical strategy, are much less conclusive, and we cannot conclude that cooperatives are generally less efficient that investor‐owned firms. With either approach, though, we find no evidence that cooperatives are more productive than investor‐owned firms in any industry.     

National pricing with local quality competition

We study the incentives of national retail chains to adopt national (uniform) prices across local markets that differ in size and competition intensity. In addition to price, the chains may also compete along a quality dimension, and quality is always set locally. We show that absent quality competition, the chains will never use national pricing. However, if quality competition is sufficiently strong there exist equilibria where at least one of the chains adopts national pricing. We also identify cases in which national pricing benefits (harms) all consumers, even in markets where such a pricing strategy leads to higher (lower) prices.