Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation

A 2×2 game is played repeatedly by two satisficing players. The game considered includes the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as games of coordination and common interest. Each player has anaspirationat each date, and takes an action. The action is switched at the subsequent period only if the achieved payoff falls below aspirations; the switching probability depends on the shortfall. Aspirations are periodically updated according to payoff experience, but are occasionally subject to trembles. For sufficiently slow updating of aspirations and small tremble probability, it is shown that both players must ultimately cooperate most of the time.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers C72, D83.     

Information,Certification and Demand for Food Safety: Evidence from an In‐store Experiment in Mumbai

Is demand for safe food in developing countries low because of limited ability to pay, or because of lack of consumer awareness and absence of credible certification? To answer this question we conducted a controlled market experiment in Mumbai, India, selling grapes with credible certification labels alongside unlabeled grapes while providing randomly selected consumers with information on salient features of food safety certification. We confirm that informed consumers are more likely to purchase labeled grapes, controlling for prior information and attitudes, and using two (intensive versus extensive) information treatments. Policies related to information/certification could be an important component of improving public health by mobilising latent demand for food safety and hence supply of safer food for the public.