Empirical analysis of factors promoting the Japanese 3G mobile phone

This paper aims to specify factors promoting the 3G mobile in Japan. The factors are represented by value-added services such as FeliCa, which enables e-payment, data roaming services, and full music downloads. Panel data from the three main carriers, which occupy over 90% of the Japanese mobile market, is utilized. In order to control network effects as well as the endogeneity of variables, the Arellano–Bond dynamic panel estimation is adopted. As a result, the launch of the iPhone 3G, FeliCa, data roaming, full music downloads, and the flat rate are revealed to have affected the diffusion of the 3G mobile in Japan. The results, reflecting the importance of value-added services, can be applied not only to the next generation mobile development, but also to the promotion of 3G networks in other countries.     

One-sided provision of a public good through bargaining under representative democracy

We examine a trade-off between strategic delegation and the internalization of interregional externalities through bargaining in the context of political economy. We show that in the case of one-sided provision of a public good, if the public good produced by one region generates a sufficiently significant spillover to another region, then interregional negotiation increases the total surplus of the entire economy.     

Interregional negotiations and strategic delegation under government subsidy schemes

We examine the strategic delegation problem in the context of interregional negotiations under the subsidy policies of a central government. It is well known that when such negotiations are delegated to representatives, each region in a country elects its representative strategically, resulting in inefficient negotiation outcomes. This study focuses on a common subsidy policy called a cost-matching grant to examine whether an optimal grant exists that restores the efficiency of negotiation outcomes. Our results show that the central government obtains this optimal grant if the manipulability of the negotiation breakdown outcome is sufficiently weak. The strength of the manipulability is important because introducing a grant generates a new kind of manipulation of negotiation breakdown outcomes. However, when a new representative is elected after a negotiation breaks down, the new manipulability is negated. Hence, the central government always obtains the optimal cost-matching grant.     

Voluntary Participation in International Environmental Agreements and Authority Structures in a Federation: A Note

Environmental and Resource Economics - We examine how a voluntary participation decision in international environmental negotiations affects the endogenous authority structure in a federation. In...     

A Note on Computation of Implied Volatility

This is a note on computation of the implied volatility in theBlack–Scholes formula to evaluate an accuracy of the computation.