Wage differentials in a dynamic theory of the firm

The behavior of a profit-maximizing firm in a market characterized by uncertain wage differentials for a homogeneous occupation is studied. The firm must make a number of interdependent decisions at every moment of time. It must choose a wage rate, a level of vacancies and the rate at which it will fill them, and the scale of production. Individual behavior plays an important role in the model. Individuals must decide whether to quit their current job to search for a better position if they are employed and whether to accept any forthcoming offers if they are unemployed. The model is set up as a dynamic optimization problem. The determinants of the firm's relative wage rate are its turnover costs, price of output, the aggregate vacancy-unemployment ratio, and other individual and market variables. It is shown that a firm faced with an excess supply of willing applicants will not lower its wage. This introduces an inflationary bias into the market when changes in the unemployment rate are considered.     

Valuation of bankrupt firms

This study compares the market value of firms that reorganizein bankruptcy with estimates of value based on management'spublished cash flow projections. We estimate firm values usingmodels that have been shown in other contexts to generate relativelyprecise estimates of value. We find that these methods generallyyield unbiased estimates of value, but the dispersion of valuationerrors is very wide - the sample ratio of estimated value tomarket value varies from less than 20% to greater than 250%.Cross-sectional analysis indicates that the variation in theseerrors is related to empirical proxies for claimholders' incentivesto overstate or understate the firm's value.     

Life in the pits: competitive market making and inventory control

We use futures transaction data to investigate cross-sectionalrelationships between market-maker inventory positions and tradeactivity. The investigating documents strongly that traderscontrol inventory throughout the trading day. Despite this evidenceof inventory management, typical inventory control models predictthat market-maker reservation prices are negatively influencedby inventory. Surprisingly, our evidence shows, as a strongand consistent empirical regularity, that correlations betweeninventory and reservation prices are positive. We interpretthe evidence as consistent with active position takeing by futuresmarket floor traders.     

The 2010 HMGs Ten Years Later: Where Do We Go From Here?

Review of Industrial Organization - In this article, which is part of the Symposium on the Tenth Anniversary of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, we suggest a number of improvements that...     

Deregulating Self-Regulated Shared Atm Networks

The development of shared ATM networks raises important issues of competition, cooperation and standardization. Sharing necessarily involves cooperation among competing ATM owners and card issuing financial institutions. Networks adopt rules that regulate members' pricing decisions also involve issues of standardization and competition. In particular, most networks make ATM owners sell at wholesale by mandating of interchange fees to replace retail market competition among ATM owners. Networks argue that these rules are necessary to present consumers with a standardized product instead of the chaos of the marketplace and to maintain the integrity of the complementary products offered by members. These are, of course, similar to the standardization and compatibility issues raised in other networks contexts. The paper analyzes the need for this system of fixed interchange fees and sets out a proposal to replace the current system with free market price competition by ATM owners.     

Testing for deliberate underpricing in the IPO premarket: a stochastic frontier approach

We reevaluate the IPO underpricing phenomenon using the stochasticfrontier methodology. The advantage of the stochastic frontieris that it can be used to measure the level of deliberate underpricingin the premarket without using after-market information. Thisis accomplished through the estimation of a systematic one-sidederror term that measures 'inefficiency' or the difference betweenthe maximum predicted offer price and the actual offer price.Data for the analysis are comprised of 1,035 IPOs of commonstock issued by firm commitment between 1975 and 1984. IPOsappear to be deliberately underpriced in the premarket in bothhot-market and nonhot-market periods. Moreover, the determinantsof the maximum IPO price have different effects in the two timeperiods.