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1.
We examine the determinants of the choice between rate-of-return regulation and incentive regulation in the United States telecommunications industry. We find that a state is more likely to select incentive regulation in any year: (1) when it has employed incentive regulation in the past; (2) when the Republican party controls both the executive and the legislative branches of the state government, but the Democratic party has controlled these branches historically; and (3) as the firms earnings under rate-of-return regulation increase toward the industry average. We also find that appointed regulators are more likely than their elected counterparts to revert to rate-of-return regulation. 相似文献
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Regulatory incentive policies and abuse 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We examine the incentives for abuse under rate-of-return (ROR) and incremental surplus subsidy (ISS) regulation. Abuse consists of expenditures by the regulated firm that provide private benefits, but do not reduce production costs. We show that ISS regulation provides efficient incentives for owners of the regulated firm to limit abuse by subordinates. We also prove that abuse by owners of the firm will generally be greater (smaller) under ROR regulation than under ISS regulation when consumer demand for the regulated product is inelastic (elastic). Furthermore, we show that to limit abuse and improve welfare under ROR regulation, it can be advantageous to ignore available information about consumer demand. 相似文献
3.
On the Merits of Vertical Divestiture 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
David E. M. Sappington 《Review of Industrial Organization》2006,29(3):171-191
This paper demonstrates that vertical divestiture may increase consumer welfare even when the divestiture eliminates substantial scope economies and precludes only limited sabotage. More generally, the merits of vertical divestiture are shown to vary with: (1) the type and the intensity of competition in the retail market; (2) the locus of scope economies under vertical integration; and (3) the relative social values of consumers’ surplus and profit. 相似文献
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We examine how a project owner optimally selects a project operator and motivates him to deliver an essential noncontractible input (e.g., effort) when potential operators are privately informed about their limited wealth. Truthful revelation of wealth is induced by promising a higher probability of operation and, if necessary, a greater share of realized profit the larger the nonrefundable bond that a potential operator posts. The project owner benefits when total wealth is widely dispersed among potential operators. Under plausible conditions, limited knowledge of wealth is not constraining for the project owner. 相似文献
7.
Using Subjective Risk Adjusting to Prevent Patient Dumping in the Health Care Industry 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
We examine how to procure health care services at minimum cost while preventing suppliers from refusing to care for high-cost patients. A single risk-adjusted prospective payment is optimal only when it is particularly costly for the supplier to discover likely treatment costs. Cost sharing is optimal when these screening costs are somewhat smaller. When screening costs are sufficiently small, screening is optimally accommodated and subjective risk adjusting is implemented. Under subjective risk adjusting, the supplier classifies patients according to his personal assessment of likely treatment costs, and payments are structured accordingly. Optimal procurement policies are contrasted with prevailing industry policies. 相似文献
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We examine a setting where a different regulatory commission controls the activities of a firm in each of two periods. Each commission is concerned primarily with the welfare of contemporary consumers. We examine the efficacy of three different regulatory charters in resolving the intertemporal conflicts that arise between commissions. These charters specify the extent to which the second-period commission is bound to promises made by its predecessor. 相似文献
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Review of Industrial Organization - 相似文献
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