Comments on Jeff R. Crump's ‘The end of public housing as we know it: public housing policy,labor regulation and the US city’

Jeff Crump's discussion of housing policy in the United States is highly polemic but not very analytic or informative. Crump argues that federal housing policy is attempting to move people out of public housing and into the private housing market and the lowwage labor force. However, he fails to support his argument with credible evidence. My comments point out the most egregious of Crump's claims. I start with Crump's most extreme contentions that housing policy is coercing public housing residents into the low‐wage labor force. I then question his dismissive attitude toward the problems confronted by residents of distressed public housing and policies designed to help low‐income families move out of impoverished neighborhoods. I subsequently show how Crump exaggerates the extent to which federal housing policy is clearing central cities of subsidized low‐income housing. I conclude with a few words on the serious issues that a more informed critique of US housing policy could have raised. L'exposé de Jeff Crump sur la politique du logement aux Etats‐Unis relève principalement de la polémique, plus que de l'analyse ou de l'information. Selon lui, la politique fédérale tente de déplacer la population des logements sociaux vers les marchés de l'habitat privé et de la main‐d'?uvre à bas salaires. Toutefois, il n'apporte aucune preuve crédible à son propos. Ma réaction porte sur ses arguments les plus insignes, en commençant par ses allégations extrémistes selon lesquelles la politique du logement contraint les habitants des logements publics à des emplois peu rémunérés. Je remets ensuite en cause son dédain à l'égard des difficultés que rencontrent les résidents des logements sociaux insalubres, sans oublier les politiques prévues pour aider les familles à faibles revenus à quitter les quartiers pauvres. En conséquence, à mon avis, Crump exagère la mesure dans laquelle la politique fédérale élimine des centres‐villes les habitats à loyer modéré subventionnés. En quelques mots, ma conclusion porte sur les questions graves qu'aurait pu soulever un commentateur mieux documenté sur la politique du logement aux Etats‐Unis.     

The Dynamics of Productivity: A Decompostion Approach Using Distribution Functions

In this paper we use a micro panel data set of Spanish manufacturing firms to measure the contributions of continuing firms and turnover to total factor productivity growth over the period 1990–1997. The paper proposes an approach to the decomposition of productivity growth that is based on the estimation of productivity distributions. We characterize the dynamics of productivity distributions defining counterfactual distributions and using non-parametric methods. The results we obtain indicate that incumbent firms are the main factor contributing to the change in the productivity distribution. Net entry contributes positively to TFP growth. Finally, changes in the relative weights of incumbent, entering and exiting firms produce a counter-cyclical movement of productivity.     

Trade Union Derecognition in Britain, 1988–1994

Since the initial studies of derecognition, many articles have focused on the issue, by and large pointing to a slow increase in derecognition. However, a small number have indicated it is actually much larger. This paper shows that derecognition is even greater than these suggest and that its nature has changed. The paper looks at the contexts of this rise but argues that derecognition should not yet be seen as a major problem facing the unions.     

Distinguishing external from internal scale effects: The case of public infrastructure

The recent applied production theory literature focusing on the economic performance of firms has increasingly recognized the importance of scale effects on costs and therefore efficiency. These scale effects may include short run returns due to fixity of privately demanded inputs (i.e., capital, long run internal returns to scale, and external factors affecting costs. Since these different types of scale effects can be thought of as shifts in and movements along cost curves, the different cost effects of such factors can be identified in a framework which explicitly takes them into account in the definition ofscale.In this article we formalize such a framework, and then use it to measure short run, long run (internal) and external scale effects from fixity of private capital, nonconstant returns to scale and public infrastructure. We then use these measures to identify the impacts of these different scale factors on productivity growth. The focus on public infrastructure as an important external scale factor is motivated by the current theoretical and policy interest in this issue; we show how a structural production theory model provides a rich basis for the analysis of the cost effects of infrastructure investment.     

Data-driven tree structure for PIN models

Probability of informed trading (PIN) models characterize trading with certain types of information through a tree structure. Different tree structures with different numbers of groups for market participants have been proposed, with no clear, consistent tree used in the literature. One of the main causes of this inconsistency is that these trees are artificially proposed through a bottom-up approach rather than implied by actual market data. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a method that infers a tree structure directly from empirical data. More precisely, we use hierarchical clustering to construct a tree for each individual firm and then infer an aggregate tree through a voting mechanism. We test this method on US data from January 2002 for 7608 companies, which results in a tree with two layers and four groups. The characteristics of the resulting aggregate tree are between those of several proposed tree structures in the literature, demonstrating that these proposed trees all reflect only part of the market, and one should consider the proposed empirically driven method when seeking a tree representing the whole market.

     

TAXATION IN MATCHING MARKETS

We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. This allocative inefficiency can be nonmonotonic, but is weakly increasing in the tax rate under linear taxation if each worker has negative nonpecuniary utility of working. We adapt existing econometric methods for markets without taxes to our setting, and estimate preferences in the college-coach football market. We show through simulations that standard methods inaccurately measure deadweight loss.