Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

Determinacy with nominal assets and outside money

Summary. We build a finite horizon model with inside and outside money, in which interest rates, price levels and commodity allocations are determinate, even though asset markets are incomplete and asset deliveries are purely nominal.Received: 2 July 2003, Revised: 1 December 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: D50, E40, E50, E58.Correspondence to: J. Geanakoplos     

The disposition effect and loss aversion: Do gender differences matter?

This paper analyzes gender differences in the disposition effect in an experiment based on Weber and Camerer (1998). The results emphasize that female investors realize less capital losses, have significantly higher disposition effects and are more loss averse than men.     

Product innovation for the people's car in an emerging economy

As product offerings of multinational enterprises (MNEs) continue to primarily serve the relatively well-to-do consumers in emerging economies, innovations to meet the unique affordability and acceptability criteria of masses at the base of the pyramid (BoP) continues to remain a daunting challenge. The academic literature is sparse on comprehensive in-depth studies about the intricate processes involved in shaping and managing technology development for the masses. Focusing on product innovation by Tata Motors of India with the Nano—the world's cheapest car, our case study aims to understand how the innovator's choices regarding the use of technology, product design and organizational practices for new product development enabled it to meet the challenge of innovation for India's masses. Drawing on Christensen's work on disruptive innovations, our analysis shows how frugal use of resources through a new combination of existing component technologies created a new modular product to achieve the unique price–performance requirements demanded by the BoP. Our findings show that collaboration with suppliers for component design and their early integration in the design phase substantially lowered costs and helped eliminate unnecessary frills whilst incorporating features valued by mass markets. Our study has important managerial implications for MNEs and provides critical insights into the processes for a new blueprint for an untapped market segment in the automobile industry.