Genetics,Alzheimer’s Disease,and Long-Term Care Insurance

Abstract

This paper applies a model of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) developed by Macdonald and Pritchard (2000) to the question of the potential for adverse selection in long-term care (LTC) insurance introduced by the existence of DNA tests for variants of the ApoE gene, the ε4 allele of which is known to predispose one to earlier onset of AD. It computes the expected present values (EPVs) of model LTC benefits with respect to AD for each of five ApoE genotypes, weighted average EPVs with and without adverse selection, and sample underwriting ratings. The paper concludes that adverse selection could increase costs significantly in a small LTC insurance market only if current population genetic risk is not much smaller than that observed in case-based studies, and if carriers of the ε4 allele are very much more likely to buy LTC insurance. Finally, the paper considers the cost of a combined retirement package, providing both pension and LTC insurance, and shows that it can reduce adverse selection.     

Human Resourcing in Practice: Managing Employment Issues in the University

Participant observation in two universities is used to throw light on processes of sensemaking engaged in by managers concerned with human resourcing issues. Analysis of managerial sensemaking in the case study organizations is carried out using concepts from earlier sociological theorizing about human resource or personnel management, treating these theoretical ideas as resources for use in the researchers' own sensemaking. It is shown that theoretical 'sense' can be made of the managerial or 'lay' sensemaking in the universities in terms of a need to handle various tensions which are inherent in all employment management work in industrial capitalist societies. And it is argued that there is clear continuity between what is currently occurring and has occurred in the past. This interpretation is shown to differ from that of an alternative approach in social science sensemaking, that which uses the notion of a new paradigm of 'HRM'.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES

Because the break-up of conglomerates typically produces substantial increases in shareholder wealth, many commentators have argued that the conglomerate form of organization is inefficient. This article reports the findings of a number of recent academic studies, including the authors' own, that examine the causes and consequences of corporate diversification. Although theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification can have benefits as well as costs, several studies have documented that diversified firms trade at a significant discount from their single-segment peers. Estimates of this discount range from 10–15% of firm value, and are larger for “unrelated” diversification than for “related” diversification. If corporate diversification has generally been a value-reducing managerial strategy, why do firms remain diversified? One possibility, which the authors label the “agency cost” hypothesis, is that top executives without substantial equity stakes may have incentives to maintain a diversification strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. But, as top managers' ownership stakes increase, they bear a greater fraction of the costs associated with value-reducing policies and are therefore less likely to take actions that reduce shareholder wealth. Also, to the extent that outside blockholders monitor managerial behavior, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that diversification will be less prevalent in firms with large outside blockholders. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that companies in which managers own a significant fraction of the firm's shares, and in which blockholders own a large fraction of shares, are significantly less likely to be diversified. If agency problems lead managers to maintain value-reducing diversification strategies, what is it that leads some of these same firms to refocus? The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external mechanisms that reduce agency problems. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that decreases in diversification appear to be precipitated by market disciplinary forces such as block purchases, acquisition attempts, and management turnover.     

The Role of Water in Manufacturing

Water's role in manufacturing technologies has received limited attention. A KLEM model of the sector's technology is extended to include two facets of water use: intake and recirculation. Three annual cross-sectional surveys on plant-level water use are pooled and combined with census data to estimate this extended model for the Canadian manufacturing sector over the period 1981–1991. While Canada's water allocation regulations influence private water withdrawals, statistical tests support representing water intake as a variable input. Water intake is found to be a substitute for water recirculation, energy, labour and capital. The relationship between water intake and recirculation is stronger when water intake is process-related rather than related to cooling and steam production. Technological change has been biased in the direction of increased water intake and decreased water recirculation.     

Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments

We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an individual.