Miscounselling in the German Insurance Market—Utility-Orientated Implications for the Meaning of Miscounselling

Miscounselling results from the fact that consumers have difficulty matching their needs and preferences with the characteristics of the products and have to rely upon an intermediary. The ideal contract can be found by applying the theory of the consumer by Lancaster and, thus, using different amounts of the contract characteristics. Using a spatial representation of the contractual alternatives yields a model framework. The main question is how to differentiate between advice that improves the consumers’ situation and those that are wrong in order to define an accuracy level for the liability rule imposed by the Insurance Contract Act. After identifying the relevant variables via case studies, it is possible to state a general definition of miscounselling: miscounselling can be defined as the provision of any additional information that does not help to reduce the utility loss referring to an initial situation. Considering this definition, one can think about rewording the current liability rule.     

Informal Caregiving and the Retirement Decision

The probability of providing informal care grows with one's own age. While labor market effects due to caregiving are moderate, they could be concentrated in the years close to retirement. Therefore, I investigate whether care in the previous year leads to retirement in the year after by using German Socio‐Economic Panel data from 2001 to 2009 and discrete‐time hazard models. The effect of care on the retirement decision is indeed much higher than its effect on the labor or working hours of middle‐aged individuals. Women are affected to a larger extent but the retirement decision of men also reacts to their caregiving obligations.     

Maintaining a Reputation for Consistently Beating Earnings Expectations and the Slippery Slope to Earnings Manipulation

This paper investigates whether maintaining a reputation for consistently beating analysts' earnings expectations can motivate executives to move from “within GAAP” earnings management to “outside of GAAP” earnings manipulation. We analyze firms subject to SEC enforcement actions and find that these firms consistently beat analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts in the three years prior to the manipulation period and continue to do so by smaller “beats” during the manipulation period. We find that manipulating firms beat expectations around 86 percent of the time in the 12 quarters prior to the manipulation period (versus 75 percent for control firms) and that manipulation often ends with a miss in expectations. We document that executives of manipulating firms face strong stock market and CEO pressure to perform. Prior to the manipulation period, these firms have high analyst optimism, growing institutional interest, and high market valuations, along with powerful CEOs. Further, we find that maintaining a reputation for beating expectations is more important than CEO overconfidence and is incremental to CEO equity incentives for explaining manipulation. Our results suggest that pressure to maintain a reputation for beating analysts' expectations can encourage aggressive accounting and, ultimately, earnings manipulation.     

Informal home care and labor-force participation of household members

In Germany, informal home care is preferred to professional care services in the public discussion as well as in legal care regulations. However, only minor importance is ascribed to the opportunity costs caregivers face. Therefore, this article explores the influence home care has on the labor supply of caregivers who cohabitate with the care recipient. I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel from 2001 to 2007, which allows researchers to merge the characteristics of both groups for the first time. Owing to diverging gender roles, I examine female and male caregivers separately. The results show that having an individual in need of care in the household does not decrease labor supply to an economically relevant quantity. As providing care might be endogenous to the labor-supply decision, I test for endogeneity by using characteristics of care recipients as instruments and I additionally test for sample attrition. Moreover, the panel structure allows me to control for unobserved heterogeneity.     

When hubs forget,lie, and play favorites: Interpersonal network structure,information distortion,and organizational learning

The interpersonal network structure of an organization directly influences the diffusion and recombination of ideas and can thus facilitate or impede organizational learning. Most interpersonal networks have ‘hubs’—individuals who have significantly more connections than does the average member. This raises important questions about how hubs influence organizational learning outcomes. Does the presence of hubs improve or impair performance? What happens if hubs forget or misrepresent information that is transmitted through the network? Using simulation models, we find that moderately hubby networks outperform both very hubby and democratic networks. We also find that moderate amounts of information omission or misrepresentation can be surprisingly beneficial to performance, though the patterns of their effects are strikingly different. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Quality and Welfare in a Mixed Duopoly with Regulated Prices: The Case of a Public and a Private Hospital

Abstract. Hospital markets are often characterized by price regulation and the existence of different ownership types. Using a Hotelling framework, this paper analyses the effect of heterogeneous objectives of hospitals on quality differentiation, profits and overall welfare in a price‐regulated duopoly with exogenous symmetric locations. In contrast to other studies on mixed duopolies, this paper shows that, in this framework, privatization of the public hospital may increase overall welfare. This holds if the public hospital is similar to the private hospital or less efficient and competition is low. The main driving force is the single‐regulated price which induces under‐provision (over‐provision) of quality of the more (less) efficient hospital compared with the first best. However, if the public hospital is sufficiently more efficient and competition is fierce, a mixed duopoly outperforms both a private and a public duopoly due to an equilibrium price below (above) the price of the private (public) duopoly. This medium price discourages over‐provision of quality of the less efficient hospital and – together with the non‐profit objective – encourages an increase in quality of the more efficient public hospital.     

An approach to the display and analysis of multiobjective problems

In all operations research applications, the problem of implementation rests on the information conveyed to the decision maker. The presentation of results is a critical link in the success of a project. An ineffective transfer of information will reduce the chance of decision maker acceptance. This final step in the analysis is particularly difficult in multiobjective analyses, where the amount of relevent information increases with each performance measure.This paper will describe an alternative to the typical graphical approach to multiobjective display, which is adaptable to any number of objectives. A real world example is given and some theoretical insights are developed.     

Commentary on “Resource use and development across permeable project boundaries in open network contexts”

The purpose of this commentary is to analyze the paper “Resource use and development across permeable project boundaries in open network contexts”. Focus lies on commenting on the value of the paper in light of existing research on business networks. The paper is analyzed from a general, theoretical and empirical perspective. The conclusion of the commentary is that there are important contributions of the paper. It clearly adds to our understanding of resource use and development in business networks as it introduces a context involving several actors in a system of open innovation.