Can we afford international human rights?

In a recent important book,The Ethics of International Business, Tom Donaldson argues that multinational corporations (as well as individuals and nationstates) must, at a minimum, respect international human rights. For a purported right to be such a fundamental right it must satisfy three conditions. Donaldson calls the third condition the fairness-affordability condition. The affordability part of this condition holds that moral agents must be capable of paying for the burdens and responsibilities that a proposed human right would impose. If this is impossible, then the purported right is not an international human right.I argue that Donaldson's affordability condition is subject to four objections which reveal its untenability as one of the conditions upon which identification of international human rights must rest. I offer another way of treating problems of affordability and capability when it comes to such rights that all moral agents must respect.George G. Brenkert is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee/Knoxville. He has recently completed a book,Political Freedom, to be published by Routledge. His current research focuses on issues in business ethics.     

Innovation, rule breaking and the ethics of entrepreneurship

This article examines a feature of the ethics of entrepreneurship that is infrequently directly discussed, viz., rule breaking. Entrepreneurs are widely said to engage in rule breaking. Many examples of this appear in popular and academic literature. But how may this be integrated into an account of the ethics of entrepreneurship? One response would be that when entrepreneurs break legal and moral rules then what they do is wrong and ought to be condemned. There is a great deal to be said for this rule model of entrepreneurial ethics. However, this view is also mistaken. Instead, this article defends a virtue-based account of the ethics of entrepreneurship in which certain instances of rule breaking, even if morally wrong, are nevertheless ethically acceptable and part of the creative destruction that entrepreneurs bring not only to the economy but also to morality.     

Thoughts on ‘management-think’

In this paper I briefly summarize Pastin's views on the problem of good business thinking (GBT) and the solution (Perspectival Analysis) which he offers. In discussing Pastin's solution I offer a number criticisms which call for further elucidation on Pastin's part. Specifically, I challenge his vagueness on which perspectives a manager must consider, the manner in which the moral components of these perspectives are to be evaluated, and whether Pastin is not in the end committed simply to an economic account of GBT. Finally, I contend that Pastin's account of GBT errors in being too intellectualistic and too individualistic. George G. Brenkert is Associate Professor at the University of Tennessee. His most important publications are Privacy, Polygraphs, and Work in Business and Professional Ethics Journal 1, No. 1 1981; Strict Products Liability and Compensatory Justice, in Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality, edited by W. Michael Hoffman and Jennifer Mills Moore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984); and Marx's Ethics of Freedom (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).     

Google,Human Rights,and Moral Compromise

International business faces a host of difficult moral conflicts. It is tempting to think that these conflicts can be morally resolved if we gained full knowledge of the situations, were rational enough, and were sufficiently objective. This paper explores the view that there are situations in which people in business must confront the possibility that they must compromise some of their important principles or values in order to protect other ones. One particularly interesting case that captures this kind of situation is that of Google and its operations in China. In this paper, I examine the situation Google faces as part of the larger issue of moral compromise and integrity in business. Though I look at Google, this paper is just as much about the underlying or background views Google faces that are at work in business ethics. In the process, I argue the following: First, the framework Google has used to respond to criticisms of its actions does not successfully or obviously address the important ethical issues it faces. Second, an alternative ethical account can be presented that better addresses these ethical and human rights questions. However, this different framework brings the issue of moral compromise to the fore. This is an approach filled with dangers, particularly since it is widely held that one ought never to compromise one’s moral principles. Nevertheless, I wish to propose that there may be a place for moral compromise in business under certain conditions, which I attempt to specify.