DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY: ROBUST RULES IN MONETARY POLICY

We argue that in seeking to insure against model uncertainty, monetary policy makers are often ready to trade ex post performance for greater certainty in the outcome. They thus look for rules that although not optimal ex post, have certain properties that qualify them as robust. We apply first, Gul's approach of ‘disappointment’ aversion to describe policy makers' aversion to uncertainty and then define the properties the notion of ‘robustness’ entails. With these two tools we then link the desirability of such robust rules to the degree of policy makers' aversion to uncertainty. We thus show that provided such robust rules exist, a larger degree of disappointment aversion leads to a greater emphasis on robustness in policy implementation.     

The Costs of Increasing Transparency

In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (Amer Econ Rev 92(5): 1521–1534, 2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always beneficial to social welfare. Svensson (Amer Econ Rev 96: 448–451, 2006) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not all that likely. In that respect, therefore, increasing ‘transparency’ remains most of the times beneficial to social welfare. In this paper, we extend the Morris and Shin attempt by setting it up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives of which we model explicitly, and the private sector. We show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency in the manner described previously in the literature, and point the differences in their gains. Following that, we then introduce the fact that increasing transparency comes at some costs and show how both players face incentives to free ride on each other as a result. The presence of costs thus alters the way in which greater transparency is attained.

Is the European union a natural currency area, or is it held together by policy makers?

Is the European Union a Natural Currency Area, or Is It Held Together by Policymakers? — In 1999, EMU started with 11 members, but with considerable uncertainty about the depth of the convergence between them. The optimal currency area literature stresses the need for shocks which are symmetric and of similar size across countries. Our results show that symmetries in the core are only marginally stronger than those in the periphery; and that these symmetries have been increasingly maintained by policy interventions. Consequently, Europe may evolve into an optimal currency area; but the symmetries will be policy-induced rather than a market phenomenon. This suggests a fragility which could be reflected in the value of the new currency.     

The Single Currency and Labour Market Flexibility: a Necessary Partnership?

This paper examines the macroeconomic consequences of rigidities in the European labour markets, and shows that attempts to impose a single monetary regime on economies with different structures can lead to a breakdown in co-ordination. Such breakdowns can occur when expenditure-switching effects are dominated by the income effects of greater policy discipline. Market flexibility should therefore be given greater importance than the process of policy formulation in the 'New Europe'     

The Great COVID-19 Divergence: Managing a Sustainable and Equitable Recovery in the EU

Intereconomics - The COVID-19 pandemic has led to the biggest global recession since the Second World War. Forecasts show the European Union underperforming economically relative to the United...     

An independent central bank faced with elected governments

The literature argues that the benefits of an independent central bank accrue at no cost to the real side. In this paper, we argue that the lack of correlation between monetary autonomy and output variability is due to the proactive role of fiscal policy when faced with rigid monetary objectives. Few of the attempts to measure these correlations actually allow for a changing fiscal role. Yet, when an independent authority handles monetary policy, fiscal and wage/social protection policies remain instruments in the hands of elected governments. We find that, so long as the two authorities pursue their goals independently of each other, a conflict arises that becomes stronger as preferences diverge. We also find that the establishment of a conservative central bank encourages more divergent preferences among the public (as reflected in the government that is elected). The election of more interventionist governments then makes it harder for either authority to reach its own preferred objectives, unless cooperation is possible.     

Central Bank independence: Low inflation at no cost? A numerical simulations exercise

The independent nature of the Central Bank is often associated with achieving low and stable inflation. Further to that the merits of independence are stretched to achieving low(er) output variability when compared to a government run monetary policy. In this paper we use the Alesina (1989) and Alesina and Gatti (1995) model to examine how often an Independent Central Bank can achieve an improvement on both counts. To do that we run numerical simulations where we change the ex ante probability of elections (and hence the degree of electoral uncertainty) with a view to determining how the private sector’s perceptions affect the level of output variability. Our conclusions agree with the Alesina and Gatti assertion that there will exist occasions when all political parties will be better off by consenting to the running of monetary policy by an independent institution but more often than not this comes at some cost to output. On theoretical grounds therefore, the trade-off between inflation and output variability (à la Rogoff) is still a valid one.     

The EU Response to US Trade Tariffs

The greatest challenge for the EU in trying to identify an optimal response is understanding the motives behind the US strategy.The rhetoric, and more recently also actions, of the current US administration on trade and the global multilateral system are a real threat to the process of globalisation. While the costs are not immediate, they will materialise and they will be hard to revert.     

Europeanization or globalization? Transnational wage bargaining and the distribution of activity in European labor markets

This paper investigates the impact of globalization on labor markets, in terms of wage inflation and the distribution of activity across regions. Specifically, we study the effects of aggregation in the labor markets on the distribution of employment and inflation pressures, where there are differences in market structures and transmission mechanisms underpinned by relatively immobile labor. To demonstrate these ideas, we take the European experience as a “laboratory” to show what can be expected from globalization in the labor markets in practice. Using models of wage leadership vs. locational competition, we examine the extent and strength of aggregation effects on labor market costs using a sample of data from 1983 to 2007 which covers the period of the creation of the Euro. We find that the aggregation effect has decreased significantly since the start of EMU, improving the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. At the same time, while Germany played an important role in the run-up to EMU in terms of wage leader, its role has now decreased and been replaced by globalization forces. This implies increased locational competition in terms of wage formation. We demonstrate this with the emerging role of the US as the benchmark for wage setting in Europe.