Testing Part of a DSGE Model by Indirect Inference

We propose a way of testing a subset of equations of a DSGE model. The test draws on statistical inference for limited information models and the use of indirect inference to test DSGE models. Using the numerical small sample distribution of our test for two subsets of equations of the Smets–Wouters model we show that the test has accurate size and good power in small samples, and better power than using asymptotic distribution theory. In a test of the Smets–Wouters model on US Great Moderation data, we reject the specification of the wage‐price but not the expenditure sector. This points to the wage‐price sector as the source of overall model rejection.     

Co-movement in Stock Prices in Emerging Economies: The Case of the Caricom Region

The Grand Anse Declaration of 1989 recognised the need for financial integration within the emerging economies that comprise the CARICOM region, as a way of furthering the wider process of economic integration and, indeed, economic development in that region. Using co-movement as a measure of financial integration, this paper investigates the co-movement in stock prices among the Barbados, the Jamaica and the Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchanges, the three major exchanges within the CARICOM region. It also examines how integrated these exchanges are with the New York Stock Exchange. The GARCH-Copula methodology and, to a lesser extent, estimated correlation coefficients, are used to attain this objective. There appears to be co-movement in stock prices and returns within the CARICOM stock markets and significant dependence structures between the returns of the three CARICOM stock markets. However, there is considerably less evidence of integration between the CARICOM markets and the New York Stock Exchange.     

The Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle: Why the Swiss Do Not Want to Tax the Rich

In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to impose a tax on the super rich in a popular vote and thereby fund a redistributive policy. However, a large majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’     

Large scale infrastructure investment and economic performance – a case study of Oresund

We analyse the effect of a large scale infrastructure investment, namely the construction of the Oresund bridge, on the local and supra-regional economy. We employ the synthetic control method to construct counterfactual regions that mimic the trajectory of Malmo and Southern Sweden without treatment. Our results point to a positive effect. However, placebo tests in space and time only reveal statistical significance at a larger regional level. The results suggest that spillover effects are eminent.     

'High-performance' Management Practices, Working Hours and Work–Life Balance

The effects of selected high‐performance practices and working hours on work–life balance are analysed with data from national surveys of British employees in 1992 and 2000. Alongside long hours, which are a constant source of negative job‐to‐home spillover, certain ‘high‐performance’ practices have become more strongly related to negative spillover during this period. Surprisingly, dual‐earner couples are not especially liable to spillover — if anything, less so than single‐earner couples. Additionally, the presence of young children has become less important over time. Overall, the results suggest a conflict between high‐performance practices and work‐life balance policies.     

Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.     

Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives

This paper provides a first study of the optimal design of active monitors'exit options in a problem involving a demand for liquidity and costly monitoring of the issuer. Optimal incentives to monitor the issuer may involve restricting the monitor's right to sell her claims on the firm's cash-flow early. But the monitor will then require a liquidity premium for holding such an illiquid claim. In general, therefore, there will be a trade off between incentives and liquidity. The paper highlights a fundamental complementarity between speculative monitoring in financial markets (which increases the informativeness of prices) and active monitoring inside the firm: in financial markets where price discovery is better and securities prices reflect the fundamentals of the issuer better, the incentive cost of greater liquidity may be smaller and active monitoring incentives may be preserved. The paper spells out the conditions under which more or less liquidity is warranted and applies the analysis to shed light on common exit provisions in venture capital financing.     

What Role Taxes and Regulation? A Second Look at Open Market Share Buyback Activity in the UK

This paper re-examines the evidence on open market share repurchase activity reported by Rau and Vermaelen (2002) for the UK. Using data from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC), Rau and Vermaelen conclude that the level of repurchase activity is trivial. They attribute the low repurchase volume to regulatory restrictions that limit companies' ability to take advantage of an undervalued stock price and conclude that the bulk of repurchase activity that does occur is driven by the desire to generate tax credits for pension funds. Using data collected from a variety of sources, we find that the SDC substantially understates UK open market buyback activity. Based on our more comprehensive dataset we conclude that (a) pension funds' tax considerations are not the primary cause of UK share repurchases and (b) despite the prevailing regulatory environment, underpricing still represents an important determinant of repurchase activity.     

Understanding the Economic Factors Influencing Farm Policy Preferences

A survey conducted in Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, and Nebraska elicited producers' preferences for various farm policy changes. This permitted examination of the diversity of preferences that single-state studies have not allowed. Five policy choices, including deficiency payments, loan programs, crop insurance, export programs, and disaster payments were examined. Logit model results predicting producer preferences for each of the five dichotomous policy choices are reported. Explanatory variables based on expected utility theory such as risk aversion, price and yield variability, and price–yield correlation are significant in various models.