Costs, Institutional Mobility Barriers, and Market Structure: Advertising Agencies as Multiproduct Firms

What accounts for the diversity and limited concentration that has long characterized the organization of the advertising agency industry? This question is addressed by treating an advertising agency as a multiproduct firm. The firm's product line or service mix is defined in terms of the set of different media categories where an agency places the advertising messages that it creates on behalf of its clients. Evidence is presented indicating that the structure of demand and costs in the advertising agency industry conforms to the conditions that MacDonald and Slivinski showed were required for an industry to sustain an equilibrium with diversified firms. Building on this framework, we formulate a set of three hypotheses relating to the realization of product-specific scale and scope economies. The first two hypotheses posit that given low fixed costs and minimal entry barriers, both media-specific scale and scope economies are available and can be exploited by relatively small-size agencies. The third hypothesis suggests that large agencies may experience diseconomies of scope as a consequence of excessive diversification induced by two pervasive industry institutional phenomena: (1) “bundling” of agency services to match client demand for a mix of media advertising, and (2) “conflict policy,” which prohibits an agency from serving competing accounts and operates as a mobility constraint. Utilizing a multiproduct cost function, we estimate media-specific scale and scope economies for a cross section of 401 U.S. agencies in 1987. The results obtained support the set of three hypotheses outlined above. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the restructuring currently underway in this industry.     

The Lévy LIBOR model

Models driven by Lévy processes are attractive because of their greater flexibility compared to classical diffusion models. First we derive the dynamics of the LIBOR rate process in a semimartingale as well as a Lévy Heath-Jarrow-Morton setting. Then we introduce a Lévy LIBOR market model. In order to guarantee positive rates, the LIBOR rate process is constructed as an ordinary exponential. Via backward induction we get that the rates are martingales under the corresponding forward measures. An explicit formula to price caps and floors which uses bilateral Laplace transforms is derived.     

Beitragsfinanzierung im „demografiegestressten“ Rentensystem möglich

Wirtschaftsdienst - Trotz des demografischen Wandels ist ein beitragsfinanziertes Rentensystem in Deutschland möglich und wünschenswert. Ein Rentenniveau von beispielsweise 50 % kann auch...     

Disentangling location-based advertising: the effects of location congruency and medium type on consumers' ad attention and brand choice

Research on location-based advertising (LBA) suggests that the merits of LBA lie in the fact that consumers can be targeted with location-congruent ads on their personal mobile devices. However, LBA consists of two underlying constructs: a mobile (vs. point-of-sales) advertising medium and location congruency (vs. location incongruency). This study aims to disentangle these underlying constructs by showing that they differentially affect the efficacy of an ad. Using a virtual reality lab experiment, this study shows that location-congruent ads result in increased choice for the target brand as compared to location-incongruent ads, independent of medium type. However, in location-incongruent situations, mobile ads attracted more attention than point-of-sales display ads. The advantages of LBA thus do not seem to emanate from medium type, but rather from the congruency between the ad and product location. When the ad is received at a different location than the product, the mobile medium is able to enhance consumers' ad attention.     

New Economic Indicators for Australia, 1949-84

This article attempts to identify and describe the main characteristics of Australia'a business cycles during the period 1949 to 7984 with the aid of leading, coincident, and lagging indicators, using the methodology of the International Economic lndicator project at the Center for lnternational Business Cycle Research, Columbia University, New York. The methodology to identify Australia's classical cycle and growth cycle chronologies is discussed. Reviews are made of the lead-lag patterns of, first, both chronologies in relation to the specific cycles of the individual coincident indicators, and second, the growth chronology in relation to the leading and lagging indicators. Australia's growth cycle chronology is compared with the chronology of other countries, notably of United States, United Kingdom, and Japan. The general uses of an indicator analysis are reviewed. An appendix compares the reference cycle chronologies previously available for Australia and the indicators used to obtain them.     

On the economics of nonprofit sellers: Output policies in community hospitals

In applications of the theory of the nonprofit firm it is commonly assumed that output and sales are equal. This paper proposes that the nonprofit firm may plan to produce, and actually produce, an output larger than it sells. We call such a strategy an "excess output" production policy. The policy can lead to chronic excess capacity, and it always implies that seller average revenue exceeds unit costs evaluated at the level of sales. Using the nonprofit community hospital as an example, the paper examines the characteristics of excess output policies and the possibilities for controlling their performance impacts. Data on a sample of U.S. community hospitals are used to test for the existence of excess output policies in the hospitals are used to test for the existence of excess output policies in the hospital sector. The results give qualified support for the conclusion that some hospitals follow excess output production policies.     

Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control?

This paper analyzes the incentives of large shareholders to monitor public corporations. We investigate the hypothesis that a liquid stock market reduces large shareholders' incentives to monitor because it allows them to sell their stocks more easily. Even though this is true, a liquid market also makes it less costly to hold larger stakes and easier to purchase additional shares. We show that this fact is important if monitoring is costly: market liquidity mitigates the problem that small shareholders free ride on the effort of the large shareholder. We find that liquid stock markets are beneficial because they make corporate governance more effective.