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排序方式: 共有74条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
This paper constructs a model with four groups of households who have preferences over labor supply, consumption of polluting (energy related) and non-polluting (non-energy) goods, and emissions. It quantifies the model for the French economy and computes its optimal tax equilibria under nine second-best tax regimes. We find that the redistributive role of environmental taxes requires the polluting goods to be taxed at a rate much below their marginal social damage. These goods may even require an outright subsidy if the society values equality ‘a lot’. Secondly, if environmental taxes that have an exclusively externality-correcting role, they benefit all types—although the gains are rather modest. The gains and losses become more substantial when environmental taxes have a redistributive role as well. Third, setting the environmental tax at its Pigouvian level, rather than its optimal externality-correcting-cum-redistributive level, benefits the high-income group at the expense of the low-income groups. Fourth, nonlinear taxation of polluting goods, and nonlinear commodity taxation in general, is a powerful redistributive mechanism. Fifth, introducing environmental taxes in the current French tax system, with its suboptimal income taxes, results in substantial welfare gains for the highest income group and a sizable loss for the least well-off persons. 相似文献
2.
This paper presents a simple model which illustrates the possible policy- and welfare-implications of endogenous product selection in the postal sector. The cost of a unit of mail depends on its "quality" (e.g., speed of delivery) and on the type and location of the addressee (firms, urban households, and rural households). Senders have inelastic demands and differ in their willingness to pay for quality. Addressees are passive but their utility may affect social welfare. Two operators play a two-stage game, first choosing qualities and then prices. We first show that the equilibrium with two private (profit maximizing) operators results in an inefficient provision of quality. Then, we consider the mixed (Nash) equilibrium with one private and one (welfare maximizing) public operator. If the budget constraint of the public firm is not binding, this equilibrium is shown to be first-best efficient even if social welfare accounts for the utility of addressees. If the budget constraint is binding, the mixed equilibrium is not efficient but yields a higher level of welfare than the private equilibrium. Finally, we study the impact of minimum quality standards within our setting. 相似文献
3.
Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker's past earnings) as opposed to the non‐contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size. 相似文献
4.
Raymundo M. Campos‐Vazquez Emmanuel Chavez Gerardo Esquivel 《The World Economy》2017,40(12):2639-2675
This paper analyses the relationship between mean income and the income of the rich. Our methodology closely follows that of Dollar and Kraay (Journal of Economic Growth, 2002, 7, 195), but instead of looking at the bottom of the distribution, we focus on the top. We use panel data from the World Top Incomes database, which collects top income data from several countries using tax returns as the raw source. We define the “rich” as earners in the top 10%, 1%, 0.1% and 0.01% of the income distribution. Using data since 1980, we find that economic growth is good for the rich in the sense that the mean income of the top decile of the distribution grows in the same proportion as that of the whole population. However, we also find that the income of earners in the top percentile of the distribution and above grows faster than average income: therefore, economic growth is really good for the really rich. We also find that during economic downturns the average income of top earners responds proportionally less to changes in mean income than during economic expansions. Our results are consistent with the increase in inequality that has been recently observed at the top part of the distribution in many countries, and they are robust to different specifications, country samples and time observations. 相似文献
5.
Helmuth Cremer Firouz Gahvari Pierre Pestieau 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2012,114(4):1437-1459
When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics, such as productivity and longevity, the population should be partitioned into two groups: those who do not receive an inheritance and those who do. The first tagged group receives a Mirrlees second‐best tax schedule; the second group, when its type is fully revealed, faces a first‐best tax schedule. Receiving an inheritance makes high‐ability types worse off and low‐ability types better off. High‐ability individuals face a bequest tax of more than 100 percent, while low‐ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller, as well as larger, than 100 percent, and it might even be negative. 相似文献
6.
Georges Casamatta Helmuth Cremer Pierre Pestieau 《International Tax and Public Finance》2001,8(4):417-431
We assume that individual voters differ not only according to age but also productivity. In the steady state, workers with wages in the intermediate range join the retired persons to form a majority and vote for a positive level of social security. When a shock decreases population growth, entrenched interests can constrain majority voting decisions and prevent reforms in the name of entitlements. We show that from a Rawlsian viewpoint it may be desirable to rely on these entitlements to protect the low wage earners of the transition generations. However, when the possibility of fixing a basic pension is introduced, it constitutes a better instrument than entitlements. 相似文献
7.
8.
Uncertainty, Commitment, and Optimal Taxation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper examines the optimal tax design problem in the presence of wage uncertainty. The wage has a continuous distribution, individuals are ex ante identical, preferences are separable in labor supply and goods, public policy aims at providing the population with social insurance, and the only restriction on the tax instruments is that emanating from lack of public observability of realized wages and labor supplies. We show that optimal tax structures depend crucially on whether it is labor supply or goods that consumers have to commit to before the resolution of uncertainty. Specifically, we prove that, in the absence of commitment, the social insurance problem collapses to the traditional optimal tax problem. Second, if labor supply is precommitted, it would be possible to effect a first-best outcome. Third, commitment to goods would make indirect taxation a useful instrument of tax policy even in the presence of a general income tax; it requires differential tax treatment of committed and noncommitted goods. Finally, if preferences are separable between the two types of goods, precommitted goods must be taxed at a uniform rate lower than that on the noncommitted goods. 相似文献
9.
10.
David Bardey Helmuth Cremer Jean-Marie Lozachmeur 《Review of Industrial Organization》2014,44(4):327-345
We study competition in two-sided markets with a common network externality rather those than with the standard inter-group effects. This type of externality occurs when both groups benefit, possibly with different intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satisfies a homogeneity condition then platforms’ profits and price structures have some specific properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to the other, according to the homogeneity degree. Prices are affected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers. In the specific but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platforms’ profits do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This result differs from those of the two-sided models, which deal with standard positive inter-group network externality. 相似文献