Repetition, reputation, and raiding

I develop a multitarget takeover model with bid revisions, inwhich bidders desire a reputation for having low valuations.Such a reputation increases the likelihood that future targetswill accept low premium bids. Bidders develop reputation byusing low take-it-or-leave-it offers. Consequently, tender premiums,bid revision rates, and success rates are lower for continuingbidders than for those considering only a single target. Successrates vary within a series, and reputation building is morelikely with highly correlated target valuations. I provide anexploratory empirical analysis consistent with lower premiumsfrom continuing bidders and discuss some resulting implicationisregarding 'raiders', conglomerates, and resistance strategies.     

Renegotiation and the impossibility of optimal investment

In a model with asymmetric information and external equity financingit is impossible to achieve socially optimal investment becauseof renegotiation possibilities. The contractual solution suggestedby Dybvig and Zender (1991) is not dynamically consistent -the manager's contract would be renegotiated, resulting in inefficientinvestment. Moreover, no other compensation contract that wouldinduce the manager to invest efficiently survives renegotiation.Contracts that pay the manager based on the stock price, whileproducing suboptimal investment as in Myers and Majluf (1984),are robust to renegotiation.     

Boom and bust patterns in the adoption of financial innovations

We develop a dynamic model of the adoption of financial innovations.Each period, firms decide whether or not to adopt an innovationof uncertain value, and the profitability of each period's adoptionsreveals information about the innovations's value. We show thatcharacteristics of financial innovation waves cited by criticsas evidence of irrational excess are, in fact, consistent withfully rational behavior. We also show that social welfare isenhanced when more firms adopt innovations of questionable valueand that financial intermediaries have an incentive to encouragesuch adoption.     

Stock price distributions with stochastic volatility: an analytic approach

We study the stock price distributions that arise when pricesfollow a diffusion process with a stochastically varying volatilityparameters. We use analytic techniques to derive an explicitclosed-form solution for the case when volatility is drivenby an arithmetic Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (or AR1) process. We thenapply our results to two related problems in the finance literature:(i) options pricing in a world of stochastic volatility, and(ii) the relationship between stochastic volatility and thenature of 'fat tails' in stock price distributions.     

Recovering risk aversion from option prices and realized returns

A relationship exists between aggregate risk-neutral and subjectiveprobability distributions and risk aversion functions. We empiricallyderive risk aversion functions implied by options prices andrealized returns on the S&P500 index simultaneously. Theserisk aversion functions dramatically change shapes around the1987 crash: Precrash, they are positive and decreasing in wealthand largely consistent with standard assumptions made in economictheory. Postcrash, they are partially negative and partiallyincreasing and irreconcilable with those assumptions. Mispricingin the option market is the most likely cause. Simulated tradingstrategies exploiting this mispricing show excess returns, evenafter accounting for the possibility of further crashes, transactioncosts, and hedges against the downside risk.     

Value of public goods from sports stadiums: the CVM approach

Many state and local governments have subsidized the construction of arenas and stadium for the use of professional sports teams. They often justify the subsidies by claiming the projects generate valuable public goods and positive externalities, though such benefits are difficult to measure. This article reports an application of the contingent valuation method (CVM) to measure the value of public goods generated by two proposed projects in Lexington, Kentucky: a new basketball arena for the University of Kentucky and a minor league baseball stadium. Neither project would generate sufficiently valuable public goods to justify public financing. Although the results cannot be generalized to other cases, they do shed light on some of the main issues involved, and they demonstrate the feasibility of applying CVM to the evaluation of the subsidized stadiums.     

Price experimentation and security market structure

We examine the role of market makers in facilitating price discovery.We show that a specialist may experiment with prices to inducemore informative order flow. thereby expediting price discovery.Market makers in a multiple-dealer system, unlike a specialistsystem, do not have the incentives to perform such costly experimentsbecause of free-rider problems. Consequently, the specialistsystem may provide open markets where competition fails butat the cost of wider bid-ask spreads. We analyze the effectof experimentation on the bid-ask spread and provide an exploratoryanalysis of intraday specialist data that is consistent withour price experimentation hypothesis.