The political economy of direct legislation: direct democracy and local decision–making

Local and regional governments account for an important share of total government spending and, given the decentralization trend in OECD nations, this is likely to increase. How should this spending be governed? This article argues that direct democracy is best suited to organize decision–making at the state and local level. To support this, we present the main theoretical arguments on why and how referenda and initiatives affect fiscal policy outcomes. The basic argument concerns voter control. Under representative democracy, citizens only have direct control at election time. With referenda and initiatives, citizens can selectively control their representatives on specific policies whenever they deviate sufficiently from citizens' preferences. As a result, fiscal policy outcomes are likely to more closely reflect voter preferences. We empirically test this on Swiss data since Switzerland provides a 'natural laboratory' for local governance. The governance structures of Swiss cantons and localities with respect to fiscal issues range from classic parliamentary democracy to pure direct democracy, and an important part of spending and taxation is controlled at these levels. Specifically, we estimate an econometric model of fiscal behaviour using data from 1986 to 1997 for the 26 Swiss cantons, and 1990 data on 134 local communities. It is shown that mandatory referenda on fiscal issues at both levels have a dampening effect on expenditure and revenue, and at the local level also on public debt. Combining this with existing empirical evidence leads to a relatively uncontested result, namely that elements of direct democracy are associated with sounder public finances, better economic performance and higher satisfaction of citizens.     

Response to Seitz and Tödter, 'How the P* Model Rationalizes Monetary Targeting: A Comment on Svensson'

Seitz and TÎdter argue, counter to Svensson, that the P * model provides a rationale for money-growth targeting. In particular, they argue that 'money growth targeting is a special form of inflation forecast targeting based on a "limited" information set. In contrast to "full information" inflation forecast targeting, money growth targeting is likely to be more robust under changing conditions of the real world'.
However, money-growth targeting is better described as a special case of inflation targeting, namely when money growth is considered to be the only predictor of future inflation. But there is overwhelming empirical evidence that there are not only other, but also better, predictors of future inflation than money growth, which makes inflation-forecast targeting superior to money-growth targeting. Inflation-forecast targeting is indeed more robust (in the sense of using available information and allowing judgemental adjustments in a flexible way) than monetary targeting.
In particular, in the P * model, the real money gap is a better predictor of future inflation than money growth, as demonstrated theoretically by Svensson and empirically by Gerlach and Svensson (the empirical finding is also confirmed by Trecroci and Vega). Therefore, inflation-forecast targeting is superior also within the P * model. Under `changing conditions of the real world', for instance after the formation of a monetary union, money growth is likely to be particularly unreliable as a predictor of future inflation, making monetary targeting especially unsuitable and non-robust.     

The development of IB as a scientific field

International business (IB) is today an established field in business studies with two professional associations and numerous academic publications. However, it is much younger than many other fields in the management area. Although economists were focusing on international issues even before, it was not until after the Second World War that IB started to emerge as a scientific field. The purpose of this paper is to analyse this development from the early days up to the present time. In so doing, using a theoretical framework, it focuses on the organizing of the field, i.e. how early informal contacts eventually led to the formation of formal organizations, the launching of journals, and with the passage of time the publishing of handbooks. The paper provides empirical evidence of all these steps. In this way it presents data on significant contributions to the field.     

THE HEALTHCARE VOUCHER: EMERGENCE,FORMATION AND DISSEMINATION

Market‐inspired healthcare reforms have been introduced in Sweden: Freedom of Choice in Healthcare in 1989 and the National Healthcare Guarantee in 2005. After the general election 2006 the idea of the Healthcare Voucher has followed. Built on a theoretical framework composed of Foucault's concept of 'discursive formation' supported by Butler's concept of the ‘performativity of discourse’ the purpose is to analyse the emergence, formation and dissemination of this idea into healthcare in Sweden. The Voucher is disseminated in a form reminiscent of a chain linking a series of texts, referring to each other and building on each other's formulations strengthening each other's messages. It circulates under designations such as healthcare voucher and money and seems to be disseminated by being combined with 'freedom of choice' forming the theme customer choice. The Healthcare Voucher then becomes a means of being able to realise an idea of a political nature, building markets in healthcare. The paper offers a way of analysing how ideas influence the policy agenda, in particular for the voucher/s. Distinctions could be made between the voucher idea and 'money following the patient' in quasi markets. A critical issue in introducing choice and competition, not explored here, is the issue of ‘cream skimming’.     

The impact of referendums on the centralisation of public goods provision: a political economy approach

The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. The political economy argument against centralisation of Besley and Coate (J Public Econ 87:2611–2637, 2003) does therefore not apply. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy under reasonable assumptions. In the case of non-cooperative centralisation, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.     

The dynamic organizational contexts of executive succession: Considerations and challenges

Given the increasing changefulness of organizational circumstances, the change and transition role of executives takes on increasing prominence. This essay describes the dynamic context related to the organizational life cycle, evolutionary and planned change, and cultural transformation. Executive roles that provide guidance for executive assessment and development, and especially for selection, are explicated.