Daylight saving effect

Kamstra et al. [Kamstra, M.J., Kramer, L.A., Levi, M.D., 2000. Losing sleep at the market: the daylight saving anomaly. The American Economic Review 90, 1005–1011] argue that the mean weekend return following the changes in daylight saving time is less than the mean weekend return throughout the rest of the year. Opposing studies, such as Pinegar [Pinegar, J.M., 2002. Losing sleep at the market: comment. The American Economic Review 92, 1251–1256), reason that the observed results depend upon methodology. We extend the ongoing discussions by providing further evidence for equity markets and bond markets in Germany and across Europe. We further demonstrate that the daylight saving effect does not serve as a potential rationale for the weekend effect.     

The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch – A Conceptual Framework

Criminal investigation and prosecution of politicians, top civil servants and other public figures are topics frequently discussed in the media. The nature of the investigating or prosecuting authority varies between countries – from the general public prosecutor, through magistrates to independent counsels or parliamentary investigation commissions. This paper analyzes the role and status of public prosecutors within the separation of powers-concept. Prosecutors are usually part of the executive and not the judicial branch, which implies that they do not enjoy the same degree of independence as judges, and are ultimately subordinated to the directives of the minister of justice or the government. Conflicts of interest may hence arise if members of government can use the criminal process for their own or partisan interests. The incentives of public prosecutors in different jurisdictions are compared.     

On the Delegation of Powers: With Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe

Elected politicians can choose to decide themselves or to delegate competence. Delegation can occur in the constitutional stage, but is most common in the post-constitutional stage. Furthermore, domestic delegation can be distinguished from international delegation. The authors propose to analyze both delegation decisions within a unified framework and apply it to eight countries of Central and Eastern Europe that have experienced substantial constitutional change recently. The main differences among these countries with regard to delegation are portrayed, their origins are traced and their effects analyzed.     

Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators

The economic effects of federalism are unclear: some papers find that federalism has strong positive effects on a number of economically relevant variables, others find negative effects. The results often crucially hinge on the proxies for federalism used. In this paper, we critically survey the existing indicators for both federalism and fiscal decentralization. We argue that federalism is a constitutional institution, whereas decentralization is the outcome of a policy choice, and that the two ought to be systematically distinguished because decentralization can also occur in nonfederally structured states. We further argue that institutional details are very important with regard to federalism and that dummy variables usually capture only very specific aspects of these institutional details. We use factor analysis to test whether the latent variables behind the observed indicators support these assumptions. More than two important factors are derived, implying that a more fine-grained differentiation beyond simply “‘federalism” and “decentralization” might be in order. The correlations of the most important proxies for various aspects of federalism and decentralization with a number of quasi-exogenous variables, as well as with institutional variables, are usually rather modest.     

Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions

The newly emerging subdiscipline of constitutional economics is dominated by adherents to social contract theory although this approach has been severely criticized many a time. In recent years, an alternative approach in which constitutions are conceptualized as conventions has emerged. It is argued here that this alternative approach is a step in the right direction but still does not go far enough. The central hypothesis of the paper is that conceptualizing constitutions as based on spontaneously arisen institutions can help to solve some of the problems left unanswered by the constitutions-as-conventions view.     

Integriertes Innovationscontrolling

Die Kosten für Innovationen nehmen immer bedeutendere Ausma?e an, die immer weniger mit den erst in der Projektdurchführung ansetzenden traditionellen Instrumenten des Innovations- und Projektcontrollings in den Griff zu bekommen sind.     

Einzelbesprechungen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

With or without you: market quality of floor trading when screen trading closes early

Most stock markets are characterized by a number of parallel operating trading systems which interact intensively with each other. Usually, smaller trading platforms take the leading domestic main market as a benchmark in the price discovery process and for closing open trading positions. But what happens if the smaller trading systems suddenly have to act without this benchmark platform? We examine the effects of the reduction of the daily business hours of a screen based main trading system while a parallel floor based trading system keeps on operating. We provide evidence that liquidity improves while informed trading and informational efficiency of prices decrease at the floor based trading system as a result of the no longer operating main market. While prior research on parallel trading focuses on changes due to a growing number of trading venues, we present the first evidence on market effects when the main trading platform reduces trading hours.