连续配筋混凝土复合式沥青路面施工技术的应用

本文介绍了连续复合钢筋混凝土路面的性能、结构原理和特性,并探讨了施工过程要求以及施工要点.通过一些研究分析可以看出,使用复合式沥青路面,能够在使用过程中有着足够的承载力,并且该方法的应用还可以减小了沥青使用的结构厚度,提高了整体路面工程的抗变形能力.     

失败学习对企业绩效的影响机制研究

已有文献认为失败学习对企业绩效具有重要作用，但失败学习通过何种途径促进企业绩效提升的研究并不完善。基于失败学习理论，引入资源拼凑和机会识别作为中介变量，构建失败学习影响企业绩效的多路径模型，探索失败学习对企业绩效的驱动路径及内在机理。实证结果表明：失败学习对企业绩效具有显著积极作用，资源拼凑和机会识别分别在失败学习与企业绩效之间起中介作用，资源拼凑和机会识别在失败学习对企业绩效驱动过程中存在链式中介作用，战略柔性能够强化资源拼凑与企业绩效之间的关系，并正向调节资源拼凑的中介作用。研究结论拓展了失败学习对企业绩效的影响路径，对企业复苏和成长具有重要启示。     

Structural estimation of behavioral heterogeneity

We develop a behavioral asset pricing model in which agents trade in a market with information friction. Profit‐maximizing agents switch between trading strategies in response to dynamic market conditions. Owing to noisy private information about the fundamental value, the agents form different evaluations about heterogeneous strategies. We exploit a thin set—a small sub‐population—to point identify this nonlinear model, and estimate the structural parameters using extended method of moments. Based on the estimated parameters, the model produces return time series that emulate the moments of the real data. These results are robust across different sample periods and estimation methods.     

企业上市、专利突击与经营绩效——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据

以2009-2018年中国创业板公司为样本,考察公司上市前的专利突击现象,检验专利突击行为对专利质量和经营业绩的影响.研究发现:第一,创业板上市公司IPO前存在明显的专利突击现象,具体表现为专利申请数量在上市前激增,在上市后增长停滞;第二,创业板公司专利突击行为降低了专利质量和上市后的长期经营业绩;第三,相较于发明专利,非发明专利的上市前突击现象更明显;第四,2014年证监会关于创业板上市公司在招股说明书中对专利信息披露的有关规定改变了公司专利申请策略,申请时间前移,上市前已申请但未授权的专利占比降低.最后,企业突击申请专利会使投资者高估公司价值,从而损害投资者利益.研究结论有利于理解我国"专利泡沫"现象的制度诱因,对完善创业板制度和实现注册制转型具有借鉴意义.     

Personal Income Tax Reform in China in 2018 and Its Impact on Income Distribution

In the context of personal income tax (PIT) reform in China in 2018, this paper examines some of the major issues of concern regarding the reform and income distribution. Using the China Personal Income Tax Micro‐simulation model, the paper compares the differences between the 2011 and 2018 PIT systems, and finds that residents relying on different income sources may face a large degree of real tax rate change. Once the tax system is altered to PIT 2018, the coverage of PIT for wage earners will decrease from 46.9 to 23.4 percent, the income redistributive effect will drop from 1.95 to 1.22 percent and the PIT's role in fiscal revenue will also be negatively affected. Nevertheless, if individual income continues to grow, the share of PIT in fiscal revenue is expected to return to the 2018 level in 2022, but its income redistribution function is difficult to recover in the short term. The paper finds that the effect of PIT on income distribution depends on the tax structure. Gradual transition to an “entirely comprehensive” tax system when conditions are appropriate will achieve better income redistribution results at a lower average tax rate.     

服务型领导对辱虐管理的作用机制——基于道德许可理论的视角

以利他、服务和谦卑为特征的服务型领导受到学界的广泛关注,但服务型领导在"暖心"行为后从事的偏差行为却较少得到重视.基于道德许可理论,采用多时点配对数据进行统计分析,结果表明,服务型领导通过心理权利的中介作用对辱虐管理产生正向影响,领导行为一致性是服务型领导催生辱虐管理的"门阀":当领导行为一致性较高时,服务型领导会滋生更多的心理权利,产生更多的辱虐管理;当领导行为一致性较低时,服务型领导通过心理权利产生的辱虐管理相对减弱.研究结论对于全面认识服务型领导理论和预防服务型领导的负面效应具有重要的参考价值.     

铬渣的无害化处理和综合利用

铬渣产量大、毒性剧烈,是严重污染生态环境和危害人类健康的危险废物.本文介绍了铬渣各种无害化处理方法的解毒机理、工艺过程和应用实践,阐述了对铬渣进行综合利用的途径,并就铬渣的防治措施提出了建议.     

零售企业敏捷供应链系统CSS-SCM的研究

供应链核心在于实现供应链环节中的信息沟通，数据互换和协同工作，改造和整合企业的业务流程，因此供应链系统模型应该具有动态可重构的特点，系统主体的构成也应反映这种思想，在系统中引入“大规模定制”，“工作流”的新思想和“异构系统兼容”，“通用报表”以及“三层架构应用体系及开发手段”等新技术将使供应链系统更为“敏捷”。     

关于网络环境下工业工程应用研究的思考

分析传统IE应用现状 ,探讨国内企业与发达国家企业相比在传统IE应用方面存在差距的原因 ,提出缩小差距的解决方略 ,阐明网络环境下IE应用研究重点等。     

A MODEL OF BUREAUCRACY AND CORRUPTION*

We analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and “lemons.” Exchange is modeled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. Agents have private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with socially inefficient bribes. Bureaucracy is modeled as a group of agents who enjoy centralized production and consumption. Transaction patterns between the bureaucracy and the private sector are fully endogenous. Centralized production and consumption in the bureaucracy give rise to low power incentives for the individual bureaucrats. As a result, private agents might bribe bureaucrats, whereas they do not bribe each other. An equilibrium with corruption and an equilibrium without corruption can coexist. We discuss some welfare implications of the model.