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1.
A conceptual framework of anonymity in Group Support Systems 总被引:2,自引:2,他引:0
Joseph S. Valacich Leonard M. Jessup Alan R. Dennis J. F. Nunamaker Jr. 《Group Decision and Negotiation》1992,1(3):219-241
As the development and use of automated systems for collaborative work grows, the need for a better understanding of these systems becomes more important. Our focus is on one type of system, a Group Support System (GSS) and, in particular, on one important aspect of a GSS—anonymity. A conceptual framework for the study of anonymity in a GSS is presented, which describes the general classes of variables and their relationships. These variables include the factors that influence anonymity in a GSS, types of anonymity, and the effects of anonymity on a message sender, receiver, group process, and outcome. Each of these variables is discussed with working propositions presented for important group process and outcome measures. The objectives of this article are to highlight the importance and complexity of anonymity, to act as a guide for empirical investigations of anonymity, and to influence future GSS development and use. 相似文献
2.
Corporate investment myopia: a horserace of the theories 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
This paper tests two theories of corporate investment myopia which predict a distortion in investment policy with respect to the standard net present value rule. The theories are confronted with the empirical evidence, allowing the theories to compete to explain investment behavior. Research and development expense is used to proxy for long-term investment in a pooled, cross-sectional time-series regression. I find that research and development expense is decreasing in the age of the Chief Executive Officer. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that agency costs are lower when the firm invests myopically, rather than follow a standard net present value rule. 相似文献
3.
4.
Leonard L. Berry 《Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science》1995,23(4):236-245
Relationship marketing is an old idea but a new focus now at the forefront of services marketing practice and academic research.
The impetus for its development has come from the maturing of services marketing with the emphasis on quality, increased recognition
of potential benefits for the firm and the customer, and technological advances. Accelerating interest and active research
are extending the concept to incorporate newer, more sophisticated viewpoints. Emerging perspectives explored here include
targeting profitable customers, using the strongest possible strategies for customer bonding, marketing to employees and other
stakeholders, and building trust as a marketing tool. Although relationship marketing is developing, more research is needed
before it reaches maturity. A baker’s dozen of researchable questions suggests some future directions.
holds the J. C. Penney Chair of Retailing Studies, is a professor of Marketing, and is director of the Center for Retailing
Studies at Texas A&M University. He is a former national president of the American Marketing Association. His research interests
are services marketing, service quality, and retailing strategy. He has published numerous journal articles and books, includingDelivering Quality Service: Balancing Customer Perceptions and Expectations (Free Press, 1990),Marketing Services: Competing Through Quality (Free Press, 1991), andOn Great Service: A Framework for Action (Free Press, 1995). 相似文献
5.
Zusammenfassung Es wird eine optimale Strategie im Sinne des minimalen erwarteten Verlustes für die beiden Entscheidungeny>y
o undyy
o aufgrund der Messungen einer mitY positiv korrelierten, einfacher und/oder billiger zugänglichen ZufallsvariablenX abgeleitet. Dabei wird angenommen, daßX undY nach einer bivariaten Normalverteilung mit bekannten Parametern verteilt sind und die Entscheidungyy
o getroffen wird, wennx größer ist als ein zu bestimmendesx
o, und die Entscheidungy>y
o, wennx gleich oder kleiner als diesesx
o ist. Für die Bestimmung des optimalenx
o werden zunächst die Kosten für die beiden Fehlentscheidungen jeweils als konstant vorausgesetzt, in einem weiteren Ansatz wird jedoch für die Mißklassifikationyy
o eine mity exponentiell wachsende Risikofunktion angenommen. Um die relative Häufigkeit der zu erwartenden Fehlklassifikationen abschätzen zu können, wird schließlich die bedingte WahrscheinlichkeitP(x>x
o,y) errechnet.
Summary An optimal strategy, with minimum expected risk, for the decisionsy>y o oryy o is constructed on the basis of the measurement of a variableX, which is positively correlated withY and can be measured more easily and/or with smaller expense. A bivariate normal distribution with known parameters is assumed forX andY. For the observationsx a limitx o is aimed at, so that the decisionsy>y o oryy o are taken ifx>x orxx o respectively. Optimal values ofx o are first calculated under the assumption of constant losses for the two misclassifications (x>x o ifyy o andxx o ify>y o). In a further approach the loss for a wrong decisionyy o is assumed to increase exponentially withy. Finally the conditional probabilityP (x>x o\y) is calculated to get an assessment of the relative frequencies of wrong decisions to be expected.相似文献
6.
Does the competition mode influence the delegation decisions of the firm owners? By constructing a vertical negotiation game model, we find that under Cournot competition in the downstream market, the downstream firm's owner will not choose delegation, whereas under Bertrand competition, the downstream firm's owner will choose delegation. If the product substitution is relatively large, the adoption of delegation management by the owners of downstream firms under Bertrand competition will bring higher profits. It further shows that compared with the situation of no delegation, delegation management may reverse the social welfare ranking under Bertrand and Cournot competitions. 相似文献
7.
Julien Van Den Broeck Fernand Broeckx Leonard Kaufman 《Journal of Productivity Analysis》1990,1(1):43-78
We propose to introduce some economic performance variables of the firms and relate these with the corresponding frontier efficiency measures of 13 industries of the Belgian manufacturing sector in 1978. In order to find groups of similar firms by applying a cluster technique, we assume that this relationship is of a product life cycle nature.In the light of the product life cycle scheme itself and variations of it we can consider the possible explanatory variables of technical inefficiency in each group of firms as sources which intensify or slow-down the economic performance of the firm under consideration. Some cautious characterization of the top and bottom level clusters is formulated and linked to the efficiency issue.This paper was processed by N. R. Adam 相似文献
8.
The notion of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium suffers from three inherent difficulties. First, given the equilibrium strategies of other players, there are many best replies. Second, the equilibrium is unstable. Third, comparative statics results are counterintuitive. We demonstrate that these difficulties all have their origin in von Neumann and Morgenstern′s expected utility. In contrast, players with "quadratic utility" have unique best replies and the Nash equilibrium appears to yield intuitive comparative statics results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. 相似文献
9.
We examine the effects of public ownership and regulatory agency independence on regulatory outcomes in EU telecommunications.
Specifically, we study regulated interconnect rates paid by entrants to incumbents. We find that public ownership of the incumbent
positively affects these interconnect rates, and suggest that governments influence regulatory outcomes in favor of incumbents
in which they are substantially invested. However, we also find that the presence of institutional features enhancing regulatory
independence from the government mitigates this effect. In order to study regulatory independence, we introduce a new cross-country
time-series database—the European Union Regulatory Institutions (EURI) Database. This database describes the development of
institutions bearing on regulatory independence and quality in telecommunications in the 15 founding EU member states from
1997 to 2003
*We thank Laurent Pipitone for superb research assistance. Geoff Edwards thanks the Sasakawa Foundation and the Institute
of Management, Innovation and Organization at the Haas School of Business for generous financial assistance, and London Business
School for non-financial support. Leonard Waverman thanks the Global Communications Consortium for support 相似文献
10.
As financial pressures on non-profits rise, fund raisers are constantly searching for alternative income sources. Life insurance may be one of them. 相似文献