Got milk? The rapid rise of China’s dairy sector and its future prospects

This paper synthesizes recent research and new empirical findings to build a more comprehensive understanding of developments in China’s dairy sector. China’s tremendous rise in dairy demand has been driven by several mutually reinforcing factors: including rapid income growth, promotion by the government and dairy industry, changes in urban lifestyles, and the development of new, more sophisticated marketing channels. Domestic milk output has grown to satisfy rising demand largely by increasing the dairy herd. Substantial increases in productivity have been achieved through technology adoption, but there is evidence that the torrid growth has created inefficiencies because adaptations to marketing rules, infrastructure, and institutions have not kept pace with the changing environment. These results suggest there is ample room for future growth in both domestic milk production and dairy demand, but multinational firms and imported products will likely play and increasing role as China’s dairy market continues to develop.     

Poverty,population and environmental degradation in China

This article examines the relationship between poverty, population, and environmental degradation in China. Environmental conditions include water pollution, deforestation, destruction of grasslands, soil erosion, and salinization. The authors review China's success in controlling environmental degradation through leadership, environmental policies, and institutional capacity. Findings suggest that environmental progress is best achieved indirectly by poverty alleviation, market integration, and population control. Government policies were not very effective. Degradation occurs due to limited financial resources, poorly trained personnel, and political factors. Control of water pollution was instituted since the 1980s. The levels of pollutants have been reduced, but the type of pollutant determines the seriousness of impact. Water pollution is due to industrial wastes, agricultural run-off, and soil erosion. Since the 1970s, reforestation targets have not been met. Technical extension and monitoring of planting is not available in most areas, and private, profit seeking interests control acreage. Grassland destruction is due to deforestation, agricultural expansion, and overgrazing. Independent regional authorities have successfully managed pasture programs. Erosion is the most serious in Loess Plateau, the Red Soils area, the Northeast China Plain, and the Northwest Grasslands, which comprise 70% of total land area. In 1990, erosion control was practiced in 39% of eroded land area. Salinization has remained fairly constant. Environmental controls (direct regulation, planned recovery, and state-mandated technological improvements) are uneven. The main tool for environmental management is the State Environmental Protection Commission and its executive unit, SEPA. Problems stem from vague laws, lack of means of enforcement, lack of coordination of laws, and lack of standards, schedules, and other provisions in ordinances.     

推广转基因抗虫棉对次要害虫农药施用的影响分析

本研究的主要目的是分析在转基因抗虫棉有效控制棉花主要害虫(棉铃虫)、减少农药施用之后,可能导致的对棉花次要害虫的影响。通过多年的棉农生产跟踪调查和计量模型分析,研究结果表明,近年来棉农用来控制次要害虫的农药施用量有所增加,应引起有关部门的重视,但它的农药施用量远远小于采用转基因抗虫棉后整体减少施用的农药量;研究还发现,转基因抗虫棉在控制主要害虫农药施用量的减少,不是导致次要害虫农药施用量增加的主要原因,它仅仅能解释次要害虫农药施用增加量的一小部分。     

Targeted poverty investments and economic growth in China

In the mid-1980s, the Chinese government launched its ambitious poor area development policy, which was centered around a series of grant, credit, and Food-for-Work programs. Ironically, for the remainder of the 1980s rural poverty remained at about 90 to 100 million, or approximately 10% of the rural population. The lack of progress cannot necessarily be blamed on ineffective poor area policies, since much of the agricultural economy was mired in a deep recession between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s. By the mid-1990s substantial additional poverty reduction had been achieved. Even in the late-1980s, farmers in many poor counties did better than the national average in terms of income growth. After accounting for the effects of macroeconomic elements, what factors can help explain the differences in performance among poor regions and between poor areas and rich ones? Can part of these differences be accounted for by poor area policies, in general, or by the way local and regional officials allocate their poor area investment funds, in particular?The overall objective of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of Chinese poor area policy. Specifically, the paper seeks to meet three objectives. First, we want to understand the evolution of poor area policy since the mid-1980s, trying to deduce the true goals of central and regional poor area officials, as well as how these policies have been implemented in the provinces. Next, we want to understand the magnitude and scope of investment into poor areas, and examine if changes in these policies have affected the uses of the investment funds. Finally, we want to determine the effectiveness of the investment of poor area funds, analyzing which types of investments have generated growth, and which ones have not.     

Rental markets for cultivated land and agricultural investments in China

The purpose of this paper is to empirically track the progress and consequences of the emergence of cultivated land markets in China since 2000. We draw on a set of nationwide, household‐level panel data (for 2000 and 2008) and find that the markets for cultivated land rental have emerged robustly. According to our data, 19 of China's cultivated land was rented in farm operators in 2008. We also find that the nature of China's cultivated land rental contracts has become more formal and lengthened the period of time that the tenant is able to cultivate the rented‐in plots. While there may be benefits for lessors and tenants, our data show that there are falling rates of investment in organic manure. The farmers in our sample have reduced organic manure use from 13 tons/ha in 2000 to 5 tons/ha in 2008. Part of this fall is due to the rise of cultivated land rental markets. The analysis, however, does not find that improved property rights in cultivated land rental affect investment largely because property rights have largely been established by 2000, the first year of our sample. Our results, however, also show that there are forces that appear to be mitigating the negative consequences of rising cultivated land rental. After holding constant initial rental rates and other factors, we find that the gap between investment in organic manure in own land and rented‐in land is narrowing. One interpretation of our findings is that if policymakers can find ways to even further strengthen the rights of lessors and tenants as well as lengthen contract periods, farmers—even those that rent—will invest more in their land, because they will be able to capture the returns to their investments.     

Marketing China's milk: A case study of the sales activity of dairy farmers in greater Beijing

Small farmer participation in marketing chains in emerging commodity markets and the determinants of their marketing channel choices are the center of many recent empirical and theoretical papers in the literature. The dairy sector is emerging in China. There are many fundamental questions about how farmers make dairy marketing decisions in China at the farm gate level that are unanswered. This makes the dairy sector in China a good place to study farmers in emerging marketing chains. Based on three sets of unique data collected in the mid-2000s in Greater Beijing, the analyses show that small farmers were the major producers of milk. There is no evidence that small farmers are being excluded from emerging marketing channels. One of the differences of China's dairy sector in the mid-2000s is that its marketing chain itself had many different types of agents that procure milk — and few of them were large; most were individual entrepreneurs. The high level of the competiveness may be the reason that individual agents do not have monopoly power and why small farmers can operate in the system.     

Incentives to managers or participation of farmers in China's irrigation systems: which matters most for water savings,farmer income,and poverty?

The overall goal of our article is to better understand which matters for water savings, farmer income and poverty in China's irrigation systems: incentives to managers or participation of farmers. To pursue this goal, the article has three objectives. First, we track the evolution of water management reform, examining the practice of providing incentives to managers, and increasing the participation of farmers. Second, we identify the impact of water management reform on crop water use. Specifically, we want to measure whether or not incentives to managers and farmer participation in water management institutions affect the performance of the irrigation system. Because we also are interested in the potential results of water management reform, the article explores how changes in incentives and farmer participation affect farmer income and poverty. Based on a random sample of 51 villages and 189 farmers in four large irrigation districts in Ningxia and Henan provinces, both in China's Yellow River Basin, our results show that the two major forms of water management reform, water users' associations (WUAs) and contracting, have begun to systematically replace traditional forms of collective management. Our analysis demonstrates, however, that it is not the nominal implementation of the reform that matters, but rather it is the creation of new management institutions that offer water managers monetary incentives that lead to water savings. In contrast to the original design of China's reform policies, participation of farmers has not played a role in saving water. Importantly, given China's concerns about national food production and poverty alleviation, the reductions in water, at least in our sample sites, do not lead to reductions in income and do not increase the incidence of poverty.