Should all Choices Count? Using the Cut-Offs Approach to Edit Responses in a Choice Experiment

Should we give equal weight to all responses in a choice experiment? Previous Choice Modelling papers have considered the issue of the internal consistency of choices—such as the extent to which strictly-dominated options are chosen. In this paper, a different focus is employed, namely the extent to which people choose options which violate their stated upper or lower limits for the acceptable levels for individual attributes. Since hypothetical over-statement of WTP has been a focus in stated preference studies, we concentrate on violations of stated upper limits of WTP, and explore the effects of “editing” such choices using a variable censoring rule and alternative approaches to re-classifying choices. The empirical case study is a choice experiment on eco-tourists in Rwanda. Our main conclusion is that the suggested approach offers a useful way of imposing consistency on choices, and that editing choices in this manner has an appreciable impact on estimated willingness to pay. However, issues remain with regard to explaining why people apparently violate their stated maximum willingness to pay.     

Customer satisfaction and service domains: a further development of PROSERV

Quality & Quantity - This paper aims to represent that levels of customer satisfaction of tourist accommodation are an important prerequisite when the goal is building a loyal relationship with...     

Buyer–Supplier and Supplier–Supplier Alliances: Do They Reinforce or Undermine One Another?

abstract    Previous research has portrayed buyer–supplier and supplier–supplier alliances as important mechanisms to foster learning and exchange efficiencies. Controversy remains, however, as to how these alliances interact. While some propose they reinforce one another (e.g. learning in horizontal ties generates positive spillovers to vertical ties), others propose a negative interplay (e.g. when increasing vertical-tie intensity, suppliers may weaken horizontal ties to avoid retaliation from buyers who wish to preserve bargaining power). We empirically test these competing views using survey data from the Brazilian auto-parts industry. In an attempt at reconciliation, we propose that the positive or negative interaction between vertical and horizontal alliances depends on the level of technological uncertainty of goods exchanged. Vertical ties seem to inhibit horizontal ties when technological uncertainty is low; when technological uncertainty is higher, vertical and horizontal ties do not seem to have any meaningful form of interaction. We discuss implications for theory and practice.     

Going short‐term or long‐term? CEO stock options and temporal orientation in the presence of slack

Research summary: We draw on behavioral agency theory to explain how decision heuristics associated with CEO stock options interact with firm slack to shape the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategies (temporal orientation). Our findings suggest CEO current option wealth substitutes for the influence of slack resources in encouraging a long‐term orientation, while prospective option wealth enhances the positive effect of slack on temporal orientation. Our theory offers explanations for non‐findings in previous analysis of the relationship between CEO equity based pay and temporal orientation and provides the insights that CEO incentives created by stock options (1) enhance the effect of available slack upon temporal orientation and (2) can both incentivize and de‐incentivize destructive short‐termism, depending upon the values of current and prospective option wealth. Managerial summary: We explore how compensation design can play a role in affecting the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategic projects. When the CEOs have accumulated option wealth, they are more likely to invest in the long term. Yet when they have a large number of recently granted options with the potential to generate significant wealth in the event of successful risk taking, the CEO is more likely to prefer the short term in order to achieve personal wealth gains more quickly. The more liquid assets the firm holds, the weaker both of the aforementioned effects. An implication for boards is that they should anticipate CEO short‐termism if the CEO has been granted new options, underlining the potential negative consequences of option compensation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.