Substitutes for legal protection: corporate governance and dividends in Victorian Britain1

Companies in Victorian Britain operated in a laissez‐faire legal environment from the perspective of outside investors, implying that such investors were not protected by the legal system. This article seeks to identify the alternative mechanisms that outside shareholders used to protect themselves by examining the dividend policy and governance of over 800 publicly traded companies at the beginning of the 1880s. We assess the importance of these mechanisms by estimating their impact on Tobin's Q. Our evidence suggests that dividends and well‐structured and incentivized boards of directors may have played a role in protecting the interests of outside investors.     

Announcement or Contribution? The Relative Efficiency of Manipulated Lindahl Mechanisms

The private provision mechanism is individually incentive compatible but inefficient. The Lindahl mechanism is efficient but not incentive compatible. We analyze the outcome of the manipulated Lindahl mechanism. When the demand announcements of participants are unrestricted the Lindahl mechanism suffers from multiple equilibria. If the government removes the multiplicity by restricting the functional form of announcements the resulting Lindahl equilibrium can be made approximately efficient. Approximate efficiency is achieved by announcements that are one-dimensional regardless of the number of participants in the mechanism. This is in contrast to mechanisms that achieve exact efficiency but require announcements whose dimensionality increases at the same rate as the number of participants. The mechanism we describe benefits from simplicity at the cost of approximate efficiency. We demonstrate that mechanisms in which a linear demand function is announced are supermodular so play will converge to the Nash equilibrium for a range of learning dynamics.     

Schooling and the Intergenerational Transmission of Values

We present a model of the evolution of identity via dynamic interaction between the choice of education and the transmission of values in a community from parents to children, when parents care about the preservation of their traditional community values, different from the values of the host society. We compare the educational and socioeconomic outcomes in different scenarios (melting pot versus multiculturalism). If schooling shifts children's identity away from their parents' values, parents may choose lower levels of education for their children, at the cost of reducing their future earnings. We show how this effect can be attenuated and reversed when the school or, indeed, the host society are willing to accommodate the values of the community and/or to adjust to these values; otherwise the community gradually becomes alienated. This approach may be applied to the analysis of temporal changes in values and attitudes in a community of immigrants, as well as ethnic, religious, or other minority groups.     

Resources,techniques, and strategies south of the Sahara: revising the factor endowments perspective on African economic development, 1500–20001

This article seeks to revise and re‐apply the factor endowments perspective on African history. The propositions that sub‐Saharan Africa was characterized historically by land abundance and labour scarcity, and that the natural environment posed severe constraints on the exploitation of the land surplus, are broadly upheld. Important alterations are suggested, however, centred on the seasonality of labour supply, Ruf's concept of ‘forest rent’, and, for precolonial economies, the role of fixed capital. This revised endowments framework is then applied in order to explore the long‐term dynamics of economic development in Africa, focusing on how the economic strategies of producers and political authorities created specific paths of change which shifted the production possibility frontiers of the economies concerned, and ultimately altered the very factor ratios to which the strategies had been responses.     

TRADE UNIONS, EFFICIENCY WAGES, AND SHIRKING

Efficiency wage models typically study the determination ofwages and effort levels in the context of a labour market wherethe supply side is competitive. In this paper we examine theeffects of unionisation on wages and effort. In addition tothe monitoring technology where a noisy signal of each workersperformance is received, we propose and investigate a spot-checkmonitoring technology where the effort of a fraction of workersis measured exactly. We examine models where the union can bargainover wages alone, and over wages and effort. In all cases weshow that the popular wisdom that unions reduce effort is generallyfalse.     

YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT,FIRM SIZE AND RESERVATION WAGES IN SOUTH AFRICA

The level of youth unemployment in South Africa is much higher than in comparator countries. We investigate whether one of the reasons may be that the wages young people want or need are above those that they could reasonably expect to earn given their characteristics. Unlike previous work on the relationship between reservation wages and unemployment we differentiate between wages in different sizes of firms. Larger firms pay more and thus, even if reservation wages are similar to average predicted wages, they may be above the wages that young people could expect to earn in smaller firms. We find that this is the case.     

The Consequences of Zakat for Capital Accumulation

The payment of zakat by the owners of wealth is one of the five pillars of Islam. Many countries operate with no enforcement of the obligation to pay, making zakat a form of voluntary redistribution. We analyze how zakat affects capital accumulation in a model that explicitly recognizes the voluntary nature of zakat. The voluntary payment is modeled using both warm glow and social custom frameworks. These are embedded within an overlapping generations model with heterogenous consumers and endogenous population growth. The results show that zakat can raise the capital–labor ratio when it is motivated by the warm glow but welfare can be nonmonotonic in the strength of the warm glow. In the social custom model, reduced participation can lead to a reduced capital–labor ratio as the rate of zakat is increased.