Accounting for distress in bank mergers

Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.     

The cyclical effects of the Basel II capital requirements

Capital requirements play a key role in the supervision and regulation of banks. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is in the process of changing the current framework by introducing risk sensitive capital charges. Some fear that this will unduly increase the volatility of regulatory capital. Furthermore, by limiting the banks’ ability to lend, capital requirements may exacerbate an economic downturn. The paper examines the problem of capital-induced lending cycles and their pro-cyclical effect on the macroeconomy in greater detail. It finds that the capital buffer that banks hold on top of the required minimum capital plays a crucial role in mitigating the impact of the volatility of capital requirements.     

Genetic distance,cultural differences,and the formation of regional trade agreements

Review of World Economics - Genetic distance between countries’ populations has been shown to proxy cross-country differences in cultures and preferences. In an unbalanced panel of 133...     

Estimating the effects of non‐discriminatory trade policies within structural gravity models

We propose a simple method to identify the effects of unilateral and non‐discriminatory trade policies on bilateral trade within a theoretically consistent empirical gravity model. Specifically, we argue that structural gravity estimations should be performed with data that include not only international trade flows but also intra‐national trade flows. The use of intra‐national sales allows identification of the effects of non‐discriminatory trade policies such as most favoured nation tariffs, even in the presence of exporter and importer fixed effects. A byproduct of our approach is that it can be used to recover estimates of the trade elasticity, a key parameter for quantitative trade models. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques in the case of most favoured nation tariffs and “time to export” as representative non‐discriminatory determinants of trade on the importer and on the exporter side, respectively. Our methods can be extended to quantify the impact on trade of any country‐specific characteristics as well as any non‐trade policies.     

Is competition from China so special?

Competition from China is perceived as particularly damaging. We study whether this is true for firm performance. Using the universe of Spanish export transactions, we find that an increase in competition from China does not have a more damaging effect on export revenues, prices and number of exported products than an equally sized increase in competition from other countries. We document, though, that Chinese competition raises the probability that a firm ceases to export a good to a destination more than competition from other countries. This effect declines over time. We document an omitted variable bias in studies focusing only on Chinese competition, even when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of destinations for different products within firms.