PHYSICIANS' COST SHIFTING BEHAVIOR: MEDICAID VERSUS OTHER PATIENTS

Much of the debate about rising health care costs in the United States centers on the notion of "cost shifting." Cost shifting is loosely defined as charging one set of patients a higher price to offset losses on another set of patients. One aspect of the cost shifting debate that the empirical work has ignored is whether or not doctors—as opposed to hospitals—practice cost shifting. The analysis here investigates this question using the Physicians' Practice Costs and Income Survey, 1983–1985 (PPCIS, expanded version)
Using variation across states in Medicaid reimbursements, the analysis finds that lower Medicaid reimbursements tend to lower the fees physicians charge, contradicting the standard cost shifting story. Evidence also suggests that lower Medicaid reimbursements tend to cause physicians to treat fewer Medicaid patients. These results are consistent with profit maximizing behavior for physicians and also with the hypothesis that physicians exert some monopoly power.     

Predicting the Monthly and Annual Current Account Balance from Provisional Data*

This paper uses provisional monthly data to predict the one-month-ahead and one-year-ahead current account balance. Single-equation methods are compared to an eight-equation VAR model that utilizes the Box-Tiao (1977) modifications. It is found that the single-equation model of the current account out-performs the system method for the short- term but the positions are reversed for the annual forecast     

Decomposition of Fraud‐Risk Assessments and Auditors' Sensitivity to Fraud Cues*

Practitioners and regulators are concerned that when auditors perceive management's attitude or character as indicative of low fraud risk, they are not sufficiently sensitive to high levels of incentive or opportunity risks in their overall fraud‐risk assessments. In this study, we examine whether a fraud‐triangle decomposition of fraud‐risk assessments (that is, separately assessing attitude, opportunity, and incentive risks prior to assessing overall fraud risk) increases auditors' sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues when perceptions of management's attitude suggest low fraud risk. In an experiment with 52 practicing audit managers, we find that auditors who decompose fraud‐risk assessments are more sensitive to opportunity and incentive cues when making their overall assessments than auditors who simply make an overall fraud‐risk assessment. However, this increased sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues appears to happen only when those cues suggest low fraud risk. When opportunity and incentive cues suggest high fraud risk, auditors are equally sensitive to those cues whether they use a decomposition or a holistic approach. We discuss and examine potential explanations for this finding.     

Endogenous Group Formation

While the rules governing the formation of groups engaging in collective action may have significant impact on group size and behavior of members, most experiments on public goods have been conducted with the subjects in exogenously fixed groups or of fixed sizes. We study endogenous formation of groups in a public‐goods provision game by allowing subjects to change groups under three sets of rules: free entry/exit, restricted entry with free exit, and free entry with restricted exit. We find that the rules governing entry and exit do have a significant impact on individual behavior and group‐level outcomes.     

Optimum Taxation of Each Year's Income

In this paper, a two‐type, two‐period model of optimum income taxation is investigated. I assume full commitment and that current income determines the agents' tax burden in each period. It is shown that such a tax system does not allow one to implement the optimal long‐term tax contract and that it implies positive marginal tax rates at the upper end of the income distribution.     

CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION, U.S. MONEY DEMAND, AND INTERNATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE

A number of writers have argued in recent years that massive international currency substitution has been a major cause of exchange rate volatility and monetary instability in the United States and other major countries. Such analysis is frequently coupled with recommendations for a return to pegged exchange rates. This paper critically examines the evidence presented for this currency substitution view. It argues that the weight of latest research suggests that direct international currency substitution has not been of major quantitative importance for the U.S. However, empirical evidence supports traditional views that international capital mobility can generate substantial short-run monetary interdependence even under flexible exchange rates. Thus, even though international currency substitution is of little importance to U.S. monetary conditions, a broader range of international considerations may be of considerable importance for the U.S. economy.