Liquidity Measurement Problems in Fast,Competitive Markets: Expensive and Cheap Solutions

Do fast, competitive markets yield liquidity measurement problems when using the popular Monthly Trade and Quote (MTAQ) database? Yes. MTAQ yields distorted measures of spreads, trade location, and price impact compared with the expensive Daily Trade and Quote (DTAQ) database. These problems are driven by (1) withdrawn quotes, (2) second (versus millisecond) time stamps, and (3) other causes, including canceled quotes. The expensive solution, using DTAQ, is first‐best. For financially constrained researchers, the cheap solution—using MTAQ with our new Interpolated Time technique, adjusting for withdrawn quotes, and deleting economically nonsensical states—is second‐best. These solutions change research inferences.     

THE ECONOMICS OF IMPORT PARITY PRICING: A PEDAGOGICAL NOTE

This paper demonstrates that pricing to import parity is not necessarily prima facie evidence of the exercise of market power. It is shown that in the presence of imports both market structures, perfect competition and monopoly, can price to import parity. If markets can be segmented enabling the firm to discriminate between the export and domestic market it is shown that the imperfectly competitive firm can differentially price. Furthermore, as the number of domestic firms is increased, and if these firms are able to segment the market, the differential between domestic and foreign prices is reduced. The import parity price may or may not be charged in the domestic market. A measure of the exercise of market power is therefore the differential between export parity and the domestic price.     

Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition

We develop a multi-period auction model in which multiple privately informed agents strategically exploit their long-lived information. We show that such traders compete aggressively and cause most of their common private information to be revealed very rapidly. In the limit as the interval between auctions approaches zero, market depth becomes infinite and all private information is revealed immediately. These results are in contrast to those of Kyle (1985) in which the monopolistic informed trader causes his information to be incorporated into prices gradually, and, when the interval between auctions is vanishingly small, market depth is constant over time.     

Credit Crunches from Occasionally Binding Bank Borrowing Constraints

We present a model in which banks and other financial intermediaries face both occasionally binding borrowing constraints, and costs of equity issuance. Near the steady state, these intermediaries can raise equity finance at no cost through retained earnings. However, even moderately large shocks cause their borrowing constraints to bind, leading to contractions in credit offered to firms, and requiring the intermediaries to raise further funds by paying the cost to issue equity. This leads to the occasional sharp increases in interest spreads and the countercyclical, positively skewed equity issuance that are characteristics of the credit crunches observed in the data.     

The Links between Early‐Life Cognition and Schooling and Late‐Life Financial Knowledge

Using the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, a sample of Wisconsin high school graduates from the class of 1957, we explore the relationship between late‐life financial knowledge and human capital formed in early life. Specifically, we examine the associations between early‐life cognition and schooling experiences—such as academic performance and coursework—and late‐life financial knowledge. Financial knowledge is measured as individuals' knowledge of their own financial situations, which we argue is a prerequisite for good financial behavior. We find that those with lower early‐life cognitive functioning, especially those without college degrees, have lower levels of financial knowledge in late life. We find more limited evidence for independent associations of academic performance and math course work with late‐life financial knowledge.     

WAGE BARGAINING, HOLDOUT, AND INFLATION

In many countries it is customary that production continuesunder the terms of the old contract during wage negotiations(holdout), unless a work stoppage is initiated This paper analysesa model where the workers deliberately work less efficientlyduring a holdout, while the firm reduces bonus payments If aholdout is more costly to the firm than to the workers, thewage bargaining will result in a nominal wage increase. Themodel implies a Phillips curve that consists of two verticalparts, one with high inflation and low unemployment and onewith low inflation and high unemployment.