为什么日中需要货币合作——经济上的要求和地缘政治含义

东亚汇率稳定机制的必要性 在东亚,民间企业活动推动了经济一体化.一体化的经济要求汇率的稳定.但是,目前东亚地区仍不存在构筑汇率稳定机制的政治意愿.目前仍在扩大的世界经济不平衡导致新一轮货币危机时,将有可能迫使东亚构筑汇率稳定机制.     

How do Scores of DIT and MJT Differ? A Critical Assessment of the Use of Alternative Moral Development Scales in Studies of Business Ethics

The construct of Cognitive Moral Development (CMD) has drawn much attention in the study of business ethics for over two decades. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) has made a significant contribution to the literature as an easy-to-administer CMD instrument, and the Moral Judgment Test (MJT), an alternative scale, has also been used widely especially in Europe. The two scales differ in their approaches to measuring CMD, focusing on stage preference (DIT) and stage consistency (MJT), yet empirical comparisons have been scarce. The present research empirically compares the two scales in terms of their correspondence with ethical ideology as a reference scale, and it demonstrates a clear distinction between the DIT and the MJT. Although they both aim to measure CMD, their dissimilar approaches lead to distinctly different implications.     

On Persistent Demand Shortages: A Behavioural Approach

We incorporate two sets of behavioural assumptions, fairness concerns and insatiable desire for money, into a dynamic optimization model to illuminate how they can generate persistent aggregate demand shortages. We obtain the conditions for persistent unemployment and temporary unemployment. Policy implications differ significantly between the two cases. A monetary expansion raises private consumption under temporary unemployment but not under persistent unemployment. A fiscal expansion may or may not increase short‐run private consumption but crowds out long‐run consumption under temporary unemployment. Under persistent unemployment, however, a fiscal expansion always increases private consumption. The “paradoxes of toil and flexibility” also appear.     

The effects of fishery harbor-based brands on the brand equity of shore fish: An empirical study of branded mackerel in Japan

In Japan, some fishery cooperative associations use their fishery harbor names as a brand to differentiate their own shore fish. Most notable is the branding of mackerel. In this paper, we analyze the effects of branding using a discrete/continuous model. The results are as follows. First, there is first-mover advantage in the branding of mackerel. For instance, unlike other brands of mackerel, Seki-saba as the pioneering brand can increase its brand equity. Second, other brands have opposing effects that increase and decrease the brand equity of the pioneering brand. We find the former is strongest in the early stages of fishery branding when there are few competing brands of mackerel, while the latter becomes stronger in later stages when many other brands emerge.     

Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior

We explore the inductively derived views obtained by players with partial temporal (short-term) memories. A player derives his personal view of the objective game situation from his accumulated (long-term) memories, and then uses it for decision making. A salient feature that distinguishes this paper from others on inductive game theory is partiality of a memory function of a player. This creates a multiplicity of possibly derived views. Although this is a difficulty for a player in various senses, it is an essential problem of induction. Faced with multiple possible views, a player may try to resolve this using further experiences. The two-way interaction between behavior and personal views is another distinguishing feature of the present paper.     

A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang

We consider an international financial problem called debt overhang, by which we mean a situation where a sovereign country has borrowed money from foreign banks and has been unable to fulfill the scheduled repayments for some period. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game withn lender banks as players where each decides either to sell its loan exposure to the debtor country at the present price of debt on the secondary market, or to wait and keep its exposure. This game has many pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We show, however, that in any Nash equilibrium, the resulting secondary market price remains almost the same as the present price for a large number of banks. We also obtain the comparative statics result that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, a bank with a smaller loan exposure has a greater tendency to sell than one with a larger loan exposure. We discuss the implications of these results for the functioning of the secondary market and the resolution of debt overhang.We thank J. Crémer, H. Haller, S. Mendes, and the referees of this Journal for helpful comments on earlier drafts.     

The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

An economic model of the allocation process with public goods is presented. We define a concept of equilibrium and prove the existence. Next we present a voting game in which a level of the public goods to be produced is decided. We prove that the core of the voting game and the equilibria exist simultaneously, and that they coincide.     

Symposium: logic and economics—interactions between subjective thinking and objective worlds

This is the second symposium of the same title “Logic and Economics” in this journal and has four papers studying the issues expressed in the subtitle. In this introduction, the guest editor first describes a general perspective for this symposium and then explains each paper from this perspective. Finally, a few remarks are given.