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This paper analyzes optimal executive compensation contracts when managers are loss averse. We calibrate a stylized principal‐agent model to the observed contracts of 595 CEOs and show that this model can explain observed option holdings and high base salaries remarkably well for a range of parameterizations. We also derive and calibrate the general shape of the optimal contract that is increasing and convex for medium and high outcomes and that drops discontinuously to the lowest possible payout for low outcomes. Finally, we identify the critical features of the loss‐aversion model that render optimal contracts convex. 相似文献
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Limit Theorems for Estimating the Parameters of Differentiated Product Demand Systems 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We provide an asymptotic distribution theory for a class of generalized method of moments estimators that arise in the study of differentiated product markets when the number of observations is associated with the number of products within a given market. We allow for three sources of error: sampling error in estimating market shares, simulation error in approximating the shares predicted by the model, and the underlying model error. It is shown that the estimators are CAN provided the size of the consumer sample and the number of simulation draws grow at a large enough rate relative to the number of products. We consider the implications of the results for the Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) random coefficient logit model and the pure characteristics model analysed in Berry and Pakes (2002) . The required rates differ for these two frequently used demand models. A small Monte Carlo study shows that the differences in asymptotic properties of the two models are reflected, in quite a striking way, in the models' small sample properties. Moreover the limit distributions provide a good approximation to the actual Monte Carlo distribution of the parameter estimates. The results have important implications for the computational burden of the two models. 相似文献
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司法独立性与投资者保护法律实施-最高人民法院"1/15通知"的市场反应 总被引:4,自引:1,他引:3
本文利用2002年1月15日最高人民法院颁布《关于受理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事侵权纠纷案件有关问题的通知》(简称1/15通知)这一事件,以那些存在虚假陈述或有虚假陈述嫌疑的上市公司为样本,采用事件研究法,实证考察了司法独立性对投资者保护法律实施的影响。我们将样本公司分为司法相对独立和相对不独立的两组公司。我们发现,在1/15通知颁布日前后几个交易日内,样本公司的市场反应显著为负;并且,与司法相对独立组公司相比,司法相对不独立组公司的负向市场反应程度更弱。这说明,投资者倾向于认为,1/15通知及与其相关的民事诉讼法律能够得到一定程度的实施,但地方政府对当地法院的影响降低了这些投资者保护法律得到实施的可能性。 相似文献
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