Foreign competition and the durability of US firm investments

How does the exposure to product market competition affect the investment horizon of firms? We study if firms have an incentive to shift investments toward more short‐term assets when exposed to tougher competition. Based on a stylized firm investment model, we derive a within‐firm estimator using variation across investments with different durabilities. Exploiting the Chinese World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, we estimate the effects of product market competition on the composition of US firm investments. Firms that experienced tougher competition shifted their expenditures toward investments with a shorter durability. This effect is larger for firms with lower total factor productivity.     

Exploring the Intensive and Extensive Margins of World Trade

World trade evolves at two margins. Where a bilateral trading relationship already exists it may increase through time (intensive margin). But trade may also increase if a trading bilateral relationship is newly established between countries that have not traded with each other in the past (extensive margin). We provide an empirical dissection of post–World War II growth in manufacturing world trade along these two margins. We propose a “corner-solutions version” of the gravity model to explain movements on both margins. A Tobit estimation of this model resolves the so-called “distance puzzle”. It also finds more convincing evidence than recent literature that WTO-membership enhances trade. JEL no. F12, F15     

Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives

This paper provides a first study of the optimal design of active monitors'exit options in a problem involving a demand for liquidity and costly monitoring of the issuer. Optimal incentives to monitor the issuer may involve restricting the monitor's right to sell her claims on the firm's cash-flow early. But the monitor will then require a liquidity premium for holding such an illiquid claim. In general, therefore, there will be a trade off between incentives and liquidity. The paper highlights a fundamental complementarity between speculative monitoring in financial markets (which increases the informativeness of prices) and active monitoring inside the firm: in financial markets where price discovery is better and securities prices reflect the fundamentals of the issuer better, the incentive cost of greater liquidity may be smaller and active monitoring incentives may be preserved. The paper spells out the conditions under which more or less liquidity is warranted and applies the analysis to shed light on common exit provisions in venture capital financing.     

THE CHANGING VOLATILITY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY

During the last decade economic literature explored the presence of and reasons for what became known as “the great moderation” in the US and other G7 countries. “The great moderation” describes the decrease in economic volatility experienced in many of the G7 countries. This paper finds that in South Africa volatility is also not constant (it even finds that there are autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic effects present) and that volatility also decreased, particularly since 1994. Following the literature, the paper explores several reasons for this decrease and finds that smaller shocks, better monetary policy and improvements in the financial sector that place less liquidity constraints on individuals and allow them to manage their debt better are some of the main reasons for the reduction in the volatility of the South African economy. The literature on the G7 also suggests that better inventory management contributed to the lower volatility. However, this seems not to be true for South Africa.     

Playing the synthesizer with Canadian data: Adding polls to a structural forecasting model

Election forecasting has become a fixture of election campaigns in a number of democracies. Structural modeling, the major approach to forecasting election results, relies on ‘fundamental’ economic and political variables to predict the incumbent’s vote share usually a few months in advance. Some political scientists contend that adding vote intention polls to these models—i.e., synthesizing ‘fundamental’ variables and polling information—can lead to important accuracy gains. In this paper, we look at the efficiency of different model specifications in predicting the Canadian federal elections from 1953 to 2015. We find that vote intention polls only allow modest accuracy gains late in the campaign. With this backdrop in mind, we then use different model specifications to make ex ante forecasts of the 2019 federal election. Our findings have a number of important implications for the forecasting discipline in Canada as they address the benefits of combining polls and ‘fundamental’ variables to predict election results; the efficiency of varying lag structures; and the issue of translating votes into seats.     

Multilateral trade liberalization: Some general equilibrium simulation results for Austria

This paper uses the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade for a quantitative evaluation of the general equilibrium effects of various multilateral trade liberalization scenarios on the Austrian economy. The analysis is motivated by the recent incorporation into the model of an original input-output table for Austria, and by a severe shortage of knowledge on the effects of liberalization on the Austrian economy. In addition to the actual Tokyo-round tariff cuts, the paper concentrates on an almost complete multilateral elimination of post-Tokyo-round protection, including the most important non-tariff trade barriers. The paper also reports on some aggregate price and exchange rate effects, but the primary focus of the analysis will be sectoral adjustment, characterized by changes in employment, per-unit value added, and returns to sector-specific capital.

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Zusammenfassung In Österreich besteht ein gewisses Defizit an systematischen quantitativen Analysen der bestehenden Handelsprotektion bzw. der Effekte, die eine Beseitigung dieser Protektion — etwa im Rahmen der laufenden GATT-Verhandlungsrunde — haben kann. In dieser Arbeit wird das an der University of Michigan (USA) entwickelte Welthandelsmodell für eine solche Analyse verwendet. Mit Hilfe dieses viele Länder umfassenden und empirisch implementierten allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodells werden die Auswirkungen verschiedener Szenarien der multilateralen Liberalisierung des internationalen Handels, einschließlich der Beseitigung nichttarifärer Handelshemmnisse, auf die österreichische Volkswirtschaft untersucht. Diese Untersuchung wurde möglich durch die mittlerweile erfolgte Aufnahme der österreichischen Input-Output-Daten in das Michigan-Modell. Sowohl aggregierte als auch sektorale Effekte werden berechnet, wobei die letzteren Aufschluß geben können über allenfalls zu erwartende Anpassungsschwierigkeiten.

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All simulations reported on in this paper were carried out while I was visiting scholar at the University of Michigan in 1987–88. I am deeply indebted to Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern for having me participate in their ongoing research project on General Equilibrium Trade Policy Modeling, for offering me unlimited use of their computational model, and for their continuous support and encouragement. I am also grateful to John Alfaro and Jon Haveman for computational assistance. Thanks are due to Josef Richter and Gottfried Tappeiner for their cooperation in providing the Austrian input-output table in machine readable form.     

General equilibrium impact of an energy-saving policy in the public sector

We analyse a disregarded environmental policy instrument: a switch in government expenditure away from energy (or other natural resources) and toward a composite good which includes energy-saving expenditure. We first develop two variants of an analytical general equilibrium model. A composite good is produced with constant returns to scale, and energy is imported or produced domestically with diminishing returns, yielding a differential rent to its owners. The government purchases energy and composite goods from private firms. Such a policy unambiguously increases employment. It also raises private consumption and welfare under two conditions: (i) it is not too costly and (ii) the initial share of the resource is smaller in public spending than in private consumption, or the difference is small enough. We then run numerically a model featuring both importation and domestic production of energy (oil, gas and electricity), for the OECD as a whole. Simulations show that employment, welfare and private consumption rise. We provide magnitudes for different parameter values. Earlier versions of this paper have benefited from conference participants at the European Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, International Society for Ecological Economics World Congress, CIRED seminar and EUREQua environmental economics seminar. We especially thank Michèle Sadoun and two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information

Summary We consider a simple model of incomplete information in location theory. Two firms compete in a two stage framework: a sequential location stage and a price competition stage. Firm 1 knows both its own constant marginal cost technology and that of Firm 2, whereas the latter has incomplete information about firm 1's technology. The location stage turns out to be a monotonic signaling game and theunique D1 equilibrium is a pure strategy separating equilibrium if firm 1's cost advantage is below some bound, and otherwise a pooling equilibrium if the prior probability that Firm 1 is of the low cost type is high, or a semi-pooling equilibrium if it is low. This surprising result is due to the fact that the location gap between the two types of Firm 1 is bounded because of natural economic reasons, which may prevent the separation of the two types. Hence, incomplete information matters: the equilibrium locations differ quite significantly from the full information equilibrium locations.We would like to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and also the participants in seminars at GREQE (Marseille), Université de Montréal, UBC, HEC (Paris), in the Location Theory session of the World Congress of the Econometric Society (Barcelona) and in the Game Theory Conference at the University of Western Ontario for their comments. We remain, of course, solely responsible for the content of the paper. Financial support from FCAR (Québec), SSHRCC (Canada) and CNRS (France) is gratefully acknowledged.