Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

The economic burden of depression among adults with rheumatoid arthritis in the United States

Aims: Depression is the most frequent comorbidity reported among patients with rheumatoid arthritis (RA). Comorbid depression negatively impacts RA patients’ health-related quality-of-life, physical function, mental function, mortality, and experience of pain and symptom severity. The objective of this study was to assess healthcare utilization, expenditures, and work productivity among patients with RA with or without depression.

Materials and methods: Data from adult patients who had at least two visits each related to RA and depression over a 1-year period were extracted from the Truven Health MarketScan research databases. Outcomes comprised healthcare resource utilization, work productivity loss, and direct healthcare costs comparing patients with RA with depression (n?=?3,478) vs patients with RA without depression (n?=?43,222).

Results: Patients with RA and depression had a significantly greater relative risk of hospitalization and number of all-cause and RA-related hospitalizations, utilization of emergency services, days spent in the hospital, physician visits, and RA-related surgeries compared with RA patients without depression. Patients with RA and depression had a higher risk of and experienced more events and days of short-term disability compared with patients without depression. The incremental adjusted annual all-cause and RA-related direct costs were $8,488 (95% CI = $6,793–$10,223) and $578 (95% CI = –$98–$1,243), respectively, when comparing patients with RA and depression vs RA only.

Limitations: The current analysis is subject to the known limitations of retrospective studies based on administrative claims data.

Conclusions: This study suggested increased healthcare utilization, work productivity loss, and economic burden among RA patients due to comorbid depression. These findings emphasize the importance of managing depression and including depression as a factor when devising treatment algorithms for patients with RA.     

军民融合协同创新驱动产业园区高质量发展研究

军民融合产业园区高质量发展对于推进军民深度融合、在全国形成可复制可推广经验具有重要意义。军民融合协同创新通过促进新知识涌现、推进新产业集聚发展，最终汇聚经济发展新动能，驱动园区高质量发展。在提出军民融合协同创新驱动园区高质量发展的机理与组织框架基础上，将发展模式归纳为以分享经济为背景的资源共享模式、以新型研发机构为核心的第三方模式、以产业联盟为核心的产业链拓展模式和以交易平台为核心的“PPP”模式，最后提出相关对策建议。     

管理层权力制衡强度、债务约束与企业创新投资

企业创新是国家经济可持续增长的关键，受到管理层意愿的影响，因而需要对内部经营者的权力进行制衡。以2010-2018年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验管理层权力制衡强度对企业创新投资的影响，以及不同债务约束情境下高商业信用配置、高负债水平的调节效应，此外，还考察了产权性质的差异化影响。研究表明，管理层权力制衡强度越大，企业创新投资水平越高；高商业信用强化了该促进作用，而高负债水平弱化了该促进作用。进一步研究发现，管理层权力制衡强度与企业创新投资的关系在民企中更显著；国企能够更好地获得和运用商业信用，使其高商业信用对该关系的强化效应更显著；民企具有更强的债务约束，其高负债水平对该关系的弱化效应更明显。     

The heterogeneous relationship between board social ties and corporate environmental responsibility in an emerging economy

Firms in emerging economies are faced with multiple, incompatible institutional forces in their environmental activities. Which of these forces will be dominant and instantiated within an organization is partly determined by the social relationships that a firm maintains with external actors. This paper investigates the relationship between board social ties and the level of environmental responsibility undertaken by firms in China, an emerging economy, by categorizing board social ties into three types in terms of the three isomorphic forces in the institutional field (coercive, normative and mimetic). Drawing on institutional and agency theories, using a sample of listed firms in environmentally sensitive industries, and a generalized least squares regression method, the results provide empirical evidence that ties that are linked to coercive and normative forces (i.e., political organizations and universities) are related to a higher level of environmental responsibility; however, those that are linked to mimetic forces (i.e., industrial peers) have a negative association with environmental responsibility, which is mitigated by CEO power. These findings suggest that the heterogeneous effects of board social ties on environmental responsibilities experienced by firms in a context of environmentalism are at an early stage.     

Factor Heterogeneity,Factor Market Imperfection and Trade

This paper develops a tractable model of examining how factor heterogeneity and imperfect factor market interact for determining a pattern of trade. Institution plays a crucial role for the interaction. In my work, firm productivity is defined as a composition of factor productivity and technology. Thus, input selection should affect the pattern of Melitz’s intra-industry allocation due to the incurring transaction cost. For a simple model, I assume two factors (labor and capital) and two sectors, which are relatively less institution-dependent and relatively more institution-dependent. When the economy is open, effect of the transaction cost on income distribution is more drastic for an institutionally underdeveloped country. Depending on institutional quality, the economic openness reallocates resource across countries through job creation or job destruction. The job turnovers redistribute income between heterogeneous labors within countries. The income redistribution is catalyzed by international mobility of capital. As a result, income disparity is widened between the institutionally developed country and the institutionally underdeveloped country. This paper can contribute to the literature of institution and international trade.     

组织遗忘、组织即兴与环境动态性视角下企业原始性创新构建路径

原始性创新是企业获得核心竞争力的关键，但当前对企业如何获得原始性创新的研究严重不足。为此，以我国环渤海经济带179家高技术企业为样本，从组织遗忘和即兴角度研究原始性创新形成问题，并进一步分析环境动态性在组织遗忘和原始性创新间的作用。结果发现：组织遗忘和组织即兴对原始性创新具有积极效应；组织即兴在组织遗忘和原始性创新间发挥着部分中介作用；环境动态性对组织遗忘和原始性创新的关系具有正向调节效应。     

The effect of corporate real estate ownership on R&D innovation: credit relief vs. resource replacement in China

Against the background of supply-side structural reform and the real estate financialisation in China, this study investigates the impact of real estate holdings on R&D investment using data of enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Our empirical results yield five main findings. First, enterprises holding more real estate assets face more serious financial constraints, thus restraining corporate innovation efficiency. Second, when the profit margin gap between entity enterprises and the real estate industry is larger, enterprises are more inclined to transfer industrial capital into the real estate industry, thus reducing R&D investment. Third, when the degree of marketisation is high, intensified market competition, the optimal allocation of factor and product markets, and stronger patent protection will weaken the restraining effect of corporate real estate holdings on R&D investment. Fourth, monopoly enterprises obtain potential profits more than undertaking risks from the real estate industry, they are more willing to hold real estate, thus strengthening the restraining effect of real estate holdings on innovation. Finally, investors' regional preference intensifies the restraining effect of corporate real estate holdings on R&D investment. Our empirical evidence can guide entity enterprises on how to effectively balance short-term (non-productive) and long-term (productive) capital investment.