Mandatory IFRS adoption and management forecasts: The impact of enforcement changes

We examine how concurrent enforcement changes affect the positive relationship between mandatory IFRS adoption and firms’ voluntary disclosure. We show that the increase in the issuance of management forecasts after IFRS adoption is smaller for firms from IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes than for those from countries without such changes. We find no difference in the increase of forecast informativeness between firms from IFRS-mandating countries without concurrent enforcement changes and firms from non-IFRS-mandating countries; however, firms domiciled in IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes exhibit a significantly smaller increase in forecast informativeness. Our findings suggest that better IFRS enforcement distinctly weakens (strengthens) the positive effect of IFRS adoption on voluntary (mandatory) disclosure.     

Audit Firm Attributes and Auditor Litigation Risk

This study examines the association between auditors' litigation risk and audit firm attributes. Using professional liability insurance premiums as a proxy for auditors' litigation risk, we present evidence that the risk is lower in audit firms having: (1) separate non-audit and audit divisions; (2) a higher proportion of partners; and (3) a higher annual growth in number of CPAs employed. Additionally, we find that the risk is higher in audit firms having: (1) operating losses; and (2) high revenue growth. Our results are consistent with the idea that audit firms' financial condition and organizational structure affect their independence/ expertise, and, in turn, their litigation risk. Our results are broadly supportive of the PCAOB's (2015) and US Department of Treasury's (2008) views that investors, audit committees, management, and other regulators could benefit from having access to financial and organizational information about audit firms.     

The Effects of Auditor Social and Human Capital on Auditor Compensation: Evidence from the Italian Small Audit Firm Market

Abstract

This study examines whether social and human capital influence the compensation of individual auditors in the small audit firm market. We employ a sample of Italian auditors and use measures from the network and auditing literatures to capture their professional connections, representing social capital, and their industry expertise, representing human capital. Our findings show a positive and economically meaningful association between these individual attributes and auditor compensation. We run several tests to address potential endogeneity issues in our research design. Our results suggest that, in the small audit market, clients perceive as valuable those auditors with higher social and human capital, and as a result, are willing to pay a premium for these specific auditor attributes.     

基层财政解困:一个财政体制变迁的分析框架

基层财政困难已影响到部分地方经济发展与社会稳定,是迫切需要解决的问题.基层财政陷入困境的最直接根源是财政体制不规范,事权与财权高度不对称.解困的根本出路在于规范政府间财政关系,进行财政体制创新.但财政体制变迁不能局限于边际微调,须考虑政府财政级次问题.本文提出推行"省管县"体制与撤消乡镇级政府两项改革,将政府层级由五级简化为三级,对应形成三级财政.并以这三级财政为架构,重新设计财政体制,合理配置政府间事权财权,以推动基层财政彻底解困.     

试论审计独立性概念框架的构建

由于独立性关系到审计质量,关系到资本市场的效率,关系到注册会计师行业的生存。注册会计师的独立性问题是一直受到广泛关注的问题。各国及有关的国际组织都试图对独立性问题做出明确的规定。其中美国ISB及IFAC分别构建了独立性概念(原则)框架,对独立性问题作了较全面的规定。而我国对独立性问题的相关规定还很不系统,本文借鉴ISB及IFAC的相关规定阐述了独立性概念框架的主要内容,以期能够提供参考。     

大股东资金占用与审计师的监督

本文研究审计师对大股东占用上市公司资金行为的监督作用。通过对1997年到2002年间的上市公司进行分析,我们发现随着大股东资金占用程度的加大,审计师更加倾向于出示非标准意见。在大股东占用资金最多的10%的公司年度中,审计师出示非标准意见的概率高达近50%。在控制了其他影响审计师意见的变量以后,大股东资金占用程度仍然是决定审计意见的一个非常显著的因素。这说明我国的审计师对中国资本市场出现的大股东资金占用问题有一定的认识,并且将其反映到审计师意见中去。我们进一步的分析发现: (1)被审计师出具了非标准意见的公司,其大股东占用资金反而更加持续。这说明审计师意见对公司的监督意义不大,公司并没有因为审计师的意见而减轻占用程度。(2)被审计师出具了非标准意见的公司,其大股东占用对未来的股票收益的负影响与其他公司并没有区别。这说明投资者对审计师的意见并没有给予足够的重视。本文的研究结果说明,审计师对大股东盘剥中小股东的现象进行了监督、对大股东资金占用严重的公司出示了更多的非标准意见,然而这些非标准意见并没有引起各方面的重视,一方面公司的治理并没有改善,另一方面投资者也没有因审计师的意见而避免更多的损失。     

The effect of mandatory auditor assignment and non-audit service on audit fees: Evidence from Korea

In Korea, regulators could assign auditors to firms. We investigate the relationship among audit fees, mandatory auditor assignment, and the joint provision of non-audit and auditor services in Korea. We find that assigned auditors charge significantly higher audit fees than freely selected auditors. We also find that the joint provision of non-audit and audit services does intensify the relation between auditor assignment and audit fees. Combined with the results of other studies that have shown that firms audited by assigned auditors report smaller amounts of discretionary accruals than firms audited by freely selected auditors, our results suggest the possibility that mandatory auditor assignment may improve auditor independence.     

Audit Firm Tenure and Audit Quality in a Constrained Market

We examine the relation between audit quality and audit firm tenure in the Iranian audit market, which is constrained by government policies that create intense competition for clients among many small audit firms. We develop arguments that these circumstances create cost pressures that entrench low audit quality and render auditors' plans more predictable to managers wishing to misstate their accounts. Using publicly available data for the audits of listed companies in Iran prior to mandatory audit firm rotation and the incidence of misstated financial reports identified by the Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants Inspection Office, we find that the likelihood of a misstatement is lowest in the first two years of audit firm tenure. We also find that the likelihood of misstatement is not associated with the year preceding a mandatory audit firm rotation, suggesting outgoing auditor effort is not sensitive to the prospect of subsequent revelations of deficiencies. Although our results from a pre-mandatory rotation period show that frequent rotations appear to improve the financial reporting quality in our sample, we are wary of interpreting these results as support for the mandatory audit firm rotation policy in Iran. Rather, we suggest this is a peculiar consequence of deficiencies in audit quality inherent in the Iranian market.     

How do “gatekeepers” affect credit risk?

This study investigates the relationship between auditor tenure and credit default swap (CDS) spreads of U.S. firms based on quantile regression. After allowing for common determinants of CDS spreads, auditor tenure exerts both statistically and economically significant additional impacts on the CDS market. Furthermore, there are differential effects of common CDS spread determinants and auditor tenure. While common determinants of CDS spreads (e.g., leverage, volatility, risk free rate, credit ratings, and earnings) have monotonically increasing impacts when CDS spreads (and their changes) are increasingly higher, auditor tenure primarily has the impact when CDS spreads are of low or median levels for less risky firms.     

The influence of auditor narcissism and moral disengagement on risk assessments of a narcissistic client CFO

Global capital markets rely heavily on independent and skeptical auditors as gatekeepers to provide assurance that corporate financial reports are free of material fraud. The rise of narcissism among the ranks of both client and audit professionals challenge this gatekeeper function. In addition, auditor moral disengagement may undermine auditor skepticism, further eroding public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting and the audit process. We conduct a quasi-experiment with 118 auditors from three international audit firms. In a simulated interview with a client CFO, we examine whether auditors underestimate risks of fraudulent financial statements due to the interactive effects of (1) client narcissism (manipulated verbally and nonverbally) and (2) auditor narcissism. We also examine the influence of auditor moral disengagement on client risk assessments. Results indicate that CFO verbal and nonverbal narcissism significantly influenced auditors’ assessment of management-related client risk. Moreover, auditor narcissism was found to interactively influence client risk inferences such that auditors higher in narcissism exhibited narcissistic tolerance (lower risk assessments) when the hypothetical CFO displayed high verbal narcissism. Auditor moral disengagement was negatively associated with client risk assessments. We discuss the implication of these findings on future audit judgment research, audit firm policy and training on maintaining auditor skepticism, and the audit oversight role of standard-setters.