Irving Fisher's debt deflation analysis: From the Purchasing Power of Money (1911) to the Debt-deflation Theory of the Great Depression (1933)

Abstract

In 1933, Irving Fisher proposed an explanation for the Great Depression based on the distinction between the price level and price change effect of deflation in a context of over-indebtedness. This paper compares the debt-deflation theory of Fisher (1933 Fisher, I., 1933. The debt-deflation theory of great depressions, Econometrica 1 (1933), pp. 337–57. DOI: 10.2307/1907327[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) with the dynamic depression process he had expounded almost 20 years earlier in the Purchasing Power of Money (1911). The role played by both price level and price change effects in the analyses of Fisher (1933, 1911) are clarified in the context of the disequilibrium model of Tobin (1975 Tobin, J., 1975. Keynesian models of recession and depression, American Economic Review 65 (1975), pp. 195–202.[Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). More precisely, we show that the stationary equilibrium is assumed to be locally unstable according to Fisher's 1911 insights and globally unstable according to his 1933 analysis.     

不一样的杠杆——从国际比较看杠杆上升的现象、原因与影响

本文以次贷危机前美欧国家的杠杆率上升为参照,比较了中国2009-2016年期间中国杠杆率上升的现象、构成、原因及其对实体经济的影响。较高的货币增速、地方政府和国有企业预算软约束、高储蓄率等旧原因难以解释中国近年来杠杆率的快速上升。从制造到服务的经济结构转型特定背景下,债务扩张带来的真实GDP增速和通胀增速边际效力下降,带来杠杆率上升。应对中国式高杠杆,宏观层面重点是避免通缩,结构层面重点是放松服务业管制、平衡中央和地方关系并推动相关投融资机制改革、以及其他释放经济增长活力的改革措施避免政府被动加杠杆。     

Debt deflation effects of monetary policy

We assess the role that monetary policy plays in the decision to default using a General Equilibrium model with collateralized loans, trade in fiat money and production. The monetary authority extends long-term credit against risky collateral along with its traditional monetary operations. The value of collateral depends on traditional monetary policy and agents can optimally choose to default depending on the relative value of the collateral to the face value of the loan. Default results in foreclosure, higher borrowing costs, inefficient investment and a decrease in total output. We show that pre-crisis contractionary monetary policy interacts with Fisherian debt-deflation dynamics and can increase the probability that a crisis occurs.