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In order to explain coexistence of a deductible for low values of the loss and an upper limit for high values of the loss in insurance contracts, we consider the exchange of risk between two rank dependent expected utility maximizers. It is shown that if the insurer (insured) takes more into account the lowest outcomes – hence maximal losses – than the insured (insurer), then the optimal contract has an upper limit (includes a deductible for high values of the loss). If furthermore, the insured (insurer) neglects the highest outcomes while the insurer (insured) does not, the optimal contract includes a deductible (full insurance) for low values of the loss. 相似文献
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Michael Breuer 《The GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review》2006,31(1):5-9
In the literature on optimal indemnity schedules, indemnities are usually restricted to be non-negative. Keeler [1974] and
Gollier [1987] show that this constraint might well bind: insured could get higher expected utility if insurance contracts
would allow payments from the insured to the insurer at some losses. This paper extends Collier’s findings by allowing for
negative indemnity payments for a broader class of insurers’ cost functions and argues that the indemnity schedule derived
here is more appropriate for practical applications (e.g. in health insurance).
JEL Classification D80 · D81 · D89 相似文献
3.
Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then optimal indemnity schedules exist and are monotonic. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solutions (e.g., Huberman et al., 1983). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow (1971) on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule. 相似文献
4.
This paper discusses optimal insurance contract for irreplaceable commodities. To describe the dual impacts on individuals
when a loss occurs to the insured irreplaceable commodities, we use a state-dependent and bivariate utility function, which
includes both the monetary wealth and sentimental value as two arguments. We show that over (full, partial) insurance is optimal
when a decrease in sentimental value will increase (not change, decrease, respectively) the marginal utility of monetary wealth.
Moreover, a non-zero deductible exists even without administration costs. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a positive fixed
reimbursement is optimal if (1) the premium is actuarially fair, (2) the monetary loss is a constant, and (3) the utility
function is additively separable and the marginal utility of money is higher in the loss state than in the no-loss state.
We also characterize comparative statics of fixed-reimbursement insurance under an additively separable preference assumption.
JEL Classification G22 · D86
The author acknowledge funding from National Science Council in Taiwan (NSC93-2416-H-130-020). 相似文献
5.
Hung-Hsi Huang 《The GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review》2006,31(2):91-110
This study develops an optimal insurance contract endogenously under a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint. Although Wang et al.
[2005] had examined this problem, their assumption implied that the insured is risk neutral. Consequently, this study extends
Wang et al. [2005] and further considers a more realistic situation where the insured is risk averse. The study derives the
optimal insurance contract as a single deductible insurance when the VaR constraint is redundant or as a double deductible insurance when the VaR constraint is binding. Finally, this study discusses the optimal coverage level from common forms of insurances,
including deductible insurance, upper-limit insurance, and proportional coinsurance.
JEL Classification G22 相似文献
6.
Liang Hong 《Scandinavian actuarial journal》2018,2018(5):404-411
Mossin’s theorem for deductible insurance given random initial wealth is re-examined. For a fair premium, it is shown that a necessary and sufficient condition, in the spirit of the Generalized Mossin Theorem for coinsurance, is impossible using the notion of expectation dependence. Next, it is established that for a fair premium, full insurance will be optimal for a risk-averse individual if the random loss and the random initial wealth are negative quadrant dependent, improving upon an extant result in the literature. In view of a set of examples given in this paper, such a sufficient condition cannot be obtained using the notion of expectation dependence. Finally, for an unfair premium, it is shown that partial insurance will always be optimal, irrespective of the risk preference of the individual as well as the dependence structure between the random loss and the random initial wealth. 相似文献
7.
This study investigates the optimal insurance when moral hazard exists in loss reduction. We identify that the optimal insurance is full insurance up to a limit and partial insurance above that limit. In case of partial insurance, the indemnity schedule for prudent individual is convex, linear, or concave in loss, depending on the shapes of the utility and loss distribution. The optimal insurance may include a deductible for large losses only when the indemnity schedule is convex. It may also include a fixed reimbursement when the schedule is convex or concave. When the loss distribution belongs to the one dimensional exponential family with canonical form, the indemnity schedule is concave under IARA and CARA, whereas it can be concave or convex under DARA. 相似文献
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