Institutional dynamics and access to non-farm employment in rural China, 1950–1996

This article examines non-farm employment in the context of Chinese rural institutional change, based on evidence from discrete-time logistic models for event history analysis using the Life History and Social Change survey. We find the transition to non-farm sector rose rapidly during the Great Leap Forward and market reform, while the Cultural Revolution saw it reach the lowest ebb. While male advantage prevailed exclusively during the Cultural Revolution and early marketization, education possessed a stable positive effect in all historical periods. Although the returns to different kinds of political capital vary along with institutional dynamics, intergenerational reproduction was greatly reduced after the Cultural Revolution.     

Cognitive ability and human behavior in experimental ultimatum games

Recent researches have shed light on the effect of cognitive ability on economic decision-making. By measuring cognitive ability applying Raven's progressive matrix test, we obtain two significant results that this effect affects decision-making in two types of experimental ultimatum games. First, the higher the cognitive ability, the larger the amount a sender offers when the offer is smaller than or equal to the half split. Second, the higher the responders’ cognitive ability, the smaller the offer they accept, when they accept it or not with the strategy method. This study not only finds new factors that affect decision-making in experimental ultimatum games, but also provides more evidences that cognitive ability influences economic decision-making.     

Large scale infrastructure investment and economic performance – a case study of Oresund

We analyse the effect of a large scale infrastructure investment, namely the construction of the Oresund bridge, on the local and supra-regional economy. We employ the synthetic control method to construct counterfactual regions that mimic the trajectory of Malmo and Southern Sweden without treatment. Our results point to a positive effect. However, placebo tests in space and time only reveal statistical significance at a larger regional level. The results suggest that spillover effects are eminent.     

Financial development,economic growth and convergence clubs

To study the role of financial development in economic growth, we apply an array of convergence tests designed to capture nonlinear transitional dynamics to real outputs per capita. Strong evidence of multiple convergence clubs is observed, implying that the clubs are formed based on the initial level of real output per capita and average growth rate. Our empirical results show that the stage of economic growth of each country plays an important role for the composition of the convergence clubs. Furthermore, financial development emerges to be a significant determinant, albeit plays differently in the economic growth of each convergence club.     

企业激励机制模型设计中的几个问题

企业激励机制系统的设计必须以产权清晰、资本市场的发展为前提，系统模型的设计者应该是具有专业知识的专门机构，在指标设计中必须处理好数量测度与非数量测度、短期指标与长期指标、静态指标与动态指标之间的关系.     

利用规划放线成果修测城市地形图

一种根据规划放线验线成果修测地形图的方法——内业修测法，它可以及时反映城市地形地物的变化，保持地形图的现势性，较之传统的修测方法省时、省力、经济。     

简析会计专业学生的职业规划

职业规划是指导个人职业发展的一种重要手段。通过阐述职业规划的意义、会计职业规划与会计考试、个人发展的关系、会计职业规划的方法等，以期引起社会对会计职业规划的重视。     

票据无权代理追认制度微探

票据行为是一种法律行为，自然也可以以代理方式为之。民法上有关代理制度的规则一般也都可以适用于票据代理行为。但由于民法与商事法的立法旨趣各有侧重，为促进票据流通、保障交易安全，票据代理不能照搬民法上关于代理制度的规定。票据的无权代理是票据代理中一个非常典型的问题，与民法上的无权代理区别很大，其中存在的问题很多。对于票据的无权代理中是否应当赋予本人以追认权，多数大陆法系国家的立法例与英美法系国家之立法例有所不同。     

国家行为与产权：一个新制度经济学的分析框架

早期的产权理论侧重于微观层次的分析，较少考虑中观（利益集团）及宏观层次（国家）对产权结构形成的影响及不同层次产权的交互作用的机制。文章从新制度经济学关于国家的定义入手，通过对个体权力与国家、集体行动与国家以及法治化社会与国家的三个层次的分析，提出建立产权制度分析的国家模型，从而论证国家与产权制度变迁的关系。     

Free cash flow, debt-monitoring and managers' LIFO/FIFO policy choice

This paper explores the explanatory power of Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis in managers' choice of LIFO versus FIFO. The association between FCF, and choice of inventory methods is based on the assumption that there is a potential conflict of interest between managers and shareholders when LIFO is the tax minimization method and that non-value-maximizing managers of firms with the FCF problem have incentives to choose FIFO, an income increasing method, in order to increase their compensation. However, since debt can act as a monitoring device and mitigate the agency problems of FCF, managers of firms with high FCF and high debt are less likely to choose FIFO than managers of firms with high FCF and low debt. The evidence is consistent with this expectation.