Assessing time-varying stock market integration in Economic and Monetary Union for normal and crisis periods

In this paper, we examine the stock market integration process amongst 17 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries from January 2002 to June 2013 over a normal period as well as for the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and Eurozone Debt Crisis (EDC) periods. We classify the economies in three groups (A, B and C) based on their GDP to examine whether the economic size influences financial integration. Seven indicators are used for the purpose, namely, beta convergence, sigma convergence, variance ratio, asymmetric DCC, dynamic cointegration, market synchronisation measure and common components approach. The results suggest that large-sized EMU economies (termed as Group A) exhibit strong stock market integration. Moderate integration is observed for middle-sized EMU economies with old membership (termed as Group B). Small-sized economies (termed as Group C) economies seemed to be least integrated within the EMU stock market system. The findings further suggest presence of contagion effects as one moves from normal to crisis periods, which are specifically stronger for more integrated economies of Group A. We recommend institutional, regulatory and other policy reforms for Group B and especially Group C to achieve higher level of integration.     

Supra-National Money and the Euro Crisis: Lessons from Karl Polanyi

The paper seeks to examine some of the key features of Karl Polanyi’s ideas explaining the collapse of the pre-Great Depression unregulated market system by using his broad framework of analysis, as developed in The Great Transformation and published over 70 years ago, to explain the present Eurozone crisis. Emphasis is placed on the two key institutions of the pre-Depression era, namely haute finance and the gold standard, as well as his heterodox views on the nature and origin of money to shed light on the evolving crisis within the Eurozone. On the basis of Polanyi’s insights, the paper concludes that the cause of the latter crisis is similar and it lies primarily in the adoption of stateless or supra-national money that is even more restrictive on the behaviour of national authorities than the conditions imposed under the gold standard. The current situation of quasi-permanent austerity in the Eurozone is the inevitable consequence of its monetary architecture, and it will remain a long-term feature of Europe, unless significant institutional changes are put in place to bridge the gap between money and the state.     

‘An Incomplete Contract Approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance’ – Commitment vs. Flexibility

In this paper, we take an incomplete contract approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance between the European Commission (EC) and any heavily debt member state, Greece in particular. Incomplete contract approach makes possible to put a long process of Eurozone Fiscal Governance into an extensive form game in which a renegotiation procedure is incorporated. We theoretically reveal the conflict of interests between the EC (Germany) and Greece over the Greek debt repayment plan proposed in 2015. We show that the Greek’s position is consistent with incomplete contract theory, but that the EC (Germany) does not allow the renegotiation for restructuring for growth-oriented debt repayment program proposed by the Greek government because the EC (Germany) judges that the commitment effect (on fiscal austerity) is greater than the flexibility one (pro-growth effect). This will undoubtedly provide a novel and interesting approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance.     

‘Whatever it takes’ and the role of Eurozone news

This letter shows that the ‘Whatever it takes’ speech by ECB President Draghi on 26 July 2012 and the ensuing installation of the Outright Monetary Transactions’ framework are associated with a reduction in the domestic and cross-border effect of Eurozone news on absolute yield changes in Eurozone sovereign debt. These results are consistent with the popular view that these actions helped to avoid a collapse of the Eurozone.     

Social expertise: a new view to explain spatial divergences in personal consumer loan prices

The objective of this paper is to explain geographical divergences in interest rates on personal loans to households using aggregated consumer knowledge-related metrics as predictors. The researchers quantitatively test their approach in countries in the Eurozone and in the Italian and Spanish regions. Social expertise explains between 69% and 84% of variance in household loan market prices at an international and inter-regional level. The approach taken is tested using real market data established after real service encounters and not published or recommended prices.     

National politics and bank default risk in the eurozone

We study the impact of national politics on default risk of eurozone banks as measured by the stock market-based Distance to Default. We find that national electoral cycles, the power of the government as well as the government’s party ideological alignment significantly affect the stability of banks in the eurozone member countries. Moreover, we show that the impact of national politics on bank default risk is more pronounced for large as well as weakly capitalized banks.     

Bank use of sovereign CDS in the Eurozone crisis: Hedging and risk incentives

Using a comprehensive dataset from German banks, we document the usage of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008–2013. Banks used the sovereign CDS market to extend, rather than hedge, their long exposures to sovereign risk during this period. Lower loan exposure to sovereign risk is associated with greater protection selling in CDS, the effect being weaker when sovereign risk is high. Bank and country risk variables are mostly not associated with protection selling. The findings are driven by the actions of a few non-dealer banks which sold CDS protection aggressively at the onset of the crisis, but started covering their positions at its height while simultaneously shifting their assets towards sovereign bonds and loans. Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for derivatives exposure in building a complete picture and understanding fully the economic drivers of the bank-sovereign nexus of risk.     

Factors influencing bank risk in Europe: Evidence from the financial crisis

We use a dynamic panel data model to analyze bank-specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank risk for a large sample of commercial banks operating in the euro area. The selected time span, from 2001 to 2012, considers the impact of the on-going financial and economic crisis on the Eurozone banking system. Our results indicate that capitalization, profitability, efficiency and liquidity are inversely and significantly related to bank risk. However, the recourse to wholesale funding by banks seems to increase their risk. We also find that less-concentrated markets, lower interest rates, higher inflation rates and a context of economic crisis (with a falling GDP) increase bank risk.