Parallels between US and UK cost accountancy in the World War I era

Both the US and UK governments attempted desperate measures during World War I in an effort to maintain wartime production levels of necessary commodities and to allow for their economical purchase by the military. Loft (1986a, 1986b, 1990) has studied the British experience in depth, concluding that UK cost accountancy 'came into the light' as a result. It might be expected that similar developments would have occurred in America with the activities of the War Industries Board. In both countries, national associations were established in the immediate aftermath of the war to promote the professional standing of cost accountants. This paper utilizes archival materials in an effort to investigate whether US cost accountancy was developing more sophisticated costing techniques as Loft has claimed for the UK, or whether practitioners in this country were left 'still cursing the darkness'. Our findings suggest that cost accountancy developed in parallel fashion in both countries. US and UK cost accounting professionalism was dominated by the presence of leading financial accounting practitioners, and in both countries the movement towards more sophisticated costing techniques was gradual rather than dramatic.     

Can Mergers to Monopoly,Price Fixing,and Market‐Division Agreements Raise Welfare?

Naked market division, price fixing agreements and mergers which result in dominant positions have long been opposed by the courts and the government because of the high likelihood that they will result in a reduction in output and an increase in price. We show that the opposite may be true if the market is characterized by marketing spillovers. When marketing investment is required to educate consumers about the general capabilities or qualities of a product, marketing efforts by one producer will benefit rival producers. A theoretical model of these types of markets shows that marketing spillovers can forestall entry altogether or force incumbent firms to engage in ‘limit marketing’ that leaves the market underserved from a welfare‐maximizing perspective. Under these circumstances, market output and social welfare are potentially raised not only through horizontal agreements among competitors, but also through cost‐raising strategies and commitments to predatory behavior by incumbent firms.     

Reply to Connor and Lande on Cartel Overcharges

John Connor and Robert Lande have written a detailed critique of my review article, “The Empirical Basis for Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers, and Remedies,” published in this Journal earlier in the year. Connor and Lande apparently misunderstand the purpose of my review article and some of my conclusions. This reply is intended to clear up some of the misunderstandings, and to shed light on an apparent disagreement.     

线性面板数据模型建模思想——假设、思路与局限

面板数据建模可谓是计量经济分析方法的集大成者,而线性面板模型建模思想是面板数据建模理论和应用的基准(Benchmark Model)。文章旨在对简单静态线性面板模型建模思想进行梳理,并对其建模思想、假设前提及其应用局限等问题进行讨论和评述。     

Comment on “The Empirical Basis for Antitrust: Cartels,Mergers, and Remedies”

In this journal, James Langenfeld critically reviewed four of the present authors’ articles that analyze the size of cartel overcharges and their antitrust policy implications. In this comment, we explain why we believe Langenfeld errs in his criticism of our work. In particular, this comment discusses the variation in research quality of the sources used to compile a large sample of historical cartel overcharges; the advisability of trimming outliers or large estimates from the sample; alleged publication bias; why our 25% median estimate is much more likely to be correct than the US Sentencing Guideline’s 10% presumption; and the implications of the average cartel overcharges results for optimal deterrence and antitrust policy.     

国有股流通过程中两种定价模式的比较

近期国有股流通又成为市场关注的焦点,中国股市国有股一股独大的现实让人们不得不担忧国有股流通对市场产生的巨大压力。为此,本着公正、公平的原则,从历史的角度出发提出了同股同权同价的定价模式,并分析和评价了本方法对市场将产生的影响,同时比较地分析了近期讨论较多的净资产的定价模式存在明显缺陷。     

The Empirical Basis for Antitrust: Cartels,Mergers, and Remedies

There have been a number of studies attempting to quantify the impact of cartels and mergers on prices. The state of the art of empirical analysis related to antitrust is best illustrated by the research of John Connor and John Kwoka. Connor summarizes the existing empirical research that estimates the magnitude of the impact of cartels on prices. He estimates that cartels increase prices by >20% on average, and concludes that fines and damage awards do not sufficiently deter cartels and should be larger. Kwoka summarizes research estimating the impact of mergers on prices and other market outcomes, and recommends tighter merger regulation. Since the works of both have been used to support more aggressive antitrust enforcement, it is important to understand the basis for their research and how it is best weighed. This article critiques their substantial efforts to add more empirical content as the basis for antitrust policies.