Capital gains lock-in and governance choices

Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.     

Board directors with foreign experience and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

This study examines the impact of board directors with foreign experience (BDFEs) on stock price crash risk. We find that BDFEs help reduce crash risk. This association is robust to a series of robustness checks, including a firm fixed effects model, controlling for possibly omitted variables, and instrumental variable estimations. Moreover, we find that the negative association between BDFEs and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with more agency problems, weaker corporate governance, and less overall transparency. Our findings suggest that the characteristics of board directors matter in determining stock price crash risk.     

Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.     

The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors around the world

We study the role of institutional investors around the world using a comprehensive data set of equity holdings from 27 countries. We find that all institutional investors have a strong preference for the stock of large firms and firms with good governance, while foreign institutions tend to overweight firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. and members of the Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index. Firms with higher ownership by foreign and independent institutions have higher firm valuations, better operating performance, and lower capital expenditures. Our results indicate that foreign and independent institutions, with potentially fewer business ties to firms, are involved in monitoring corporations worldwide.     

Independence and the State Auditor in Britain: A Constitutional Keystone or a Case of Reified Imagery?

The principles of state audit, in particular conceptions of independence, adhered to today in the major Westminster democracies originated in the British state audit reforms of the nineteenth century. State auditors prior to the nineteenth century were not expected to be independent of the executive. Instead, state audit was recognized as an executive function to be under the direct control of the executive. For a brief period in the mid-nineteenth century, parliament was able to take advantage of a succession of weak governments to redirect the loyalties of state audit from the executive to the legislature. Although parliament wanted to be served by a state auditor who would keep it informed of executive spending, it did not alter the dominance of the Treasury over state audit. The executive sought to sustain through a discourse of independence the perception that the controls exercised by the executive over the state auditor did not constitute either a threat to audit independence or result in capture of state audit by the executive. The discourse constructed the image of state audit as a function which was able to work unimpeded and independent of the executive despite a legislative framework which contained significant financial, procedural and staffing controls.     

DS-optimal designs in one way ANOVA

Characterization and construction of optimal designs using the familiar optimality criteria, for example A-, D- and E-optimality are well studied in the literature. However the study of the Distance Optimality (DS-) criterion introduced by Sinha (1970) has very recently drawn attention of researchers. In the present article, we consider the singularly estimable full rank problem of estimating the full set of elementary treatment contrasts using the DS optimality criterion in the set up of a one way ANOVA model. Using a limit argument it turns out that a CRD in which difference between any two allocation numbers is at the most unity is uniquely DS-optimal. Acknowledgement. We are thankful to Prof. B. K. Sinha for suggesting the problem to us and many helpful discussions with him. We are also thankful to the referees for drawing our attention to the reference of Bischoff (1995) and many helpful comments.     

Regulation And The Rise In Asset-Based Mutual Fund Management Fees

In this article I explain why asset‐based fees are common for mutual fund management companies and why the average fee has increased recently. I argue that Securities and Exchange Commission fee regulations make alternative fee types illegal or unattractive. Management companies can maintain higher fees because regulations and brand‐name capital partly insulate them from competition and because investors cannot easily distinguish between performance‐oriented and marketing‐oriented fund companies. Index funds and unit investment trusts may offer competition to mutual funds in the future because they are designed to minimize management fees.     

Auditor conservatism and voluntary disclosure: Evidence from the Year 2000 systems issue

This study further examines the phenomenon of conservative auditor behaviour by considering the level of voluntary disclosure of Year 2000 remediation information in company annual reports. Previous studies have provided evidence of conservative auditor behaviour by examining the link between Big 6 auditor choice and accruals (Francis and Krishnan 1999; Becker et al ., 1998; Defond and Subramanyam 1998). Protecting their reputation capital increases Big 6 auditor incentives to act conservatively to avoid litigation risk. We propose and find that Big 6 auditor clients disclose more Year 2000 remediation information than non–Big 6 auditor clients.     

Initial Public Offerings: CFO Perceptions

We examine four issues pertaining to initial public offerings (IPOs) using a survey of 438 chief financial officers (CFOs). First, why do firms go public? Second, is CFO sentiment stationary across bear and bull markets? Third, what concerns CFOs about going public? Fourth, do CFO perceptions correlate with returns? Results support funding for growth and liquidity as the primary reasons for IPOs. CFO sentiment is generally stationary in pre‐ and post‐bubble years. Managers are concerned with the direct costs of going public, such as underwriting fees, as well as indirect costs. We find a negative relation between a focus on immediate growth and long‐term abnormal returns.     

The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Information Asymmetry and Trading: An Intraday Analysis

This study examines the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on liquidity, information asymmetry, and institutional and retail investors trading behavior. Our main findings suggest three conclusions. First, Regulation FD has been effective in improving liquidity and in decreasing the level of information asymmetry. Second, retail trading activity increases dramatically after earnings announcements but there is a significant decline in institutional trading surrounding earnings announcements, particularly in the pre‐announcement period. Last, the decline in information asymmetry around earnings announcements is closely associated with a lower participation rate in the pre‐announcement period and more active trading of retail investors after earnings releases.