Does local government competition aggravate haze pollution? A new perspective of factor market distortion

Haze pollution has become a new threat to China's sustainable development, but it may be that local government behaviour can play an important role in the prevention and control of pollutants. A dynamic spatial autoregressive (SAR) model is used to study the relationship between local government competition and haze pollution. To further explore the indirect impact of factor market distortion on haze pollution and control potential endogeneity problems, a newly developed intermediary effect model that incorporates the characteristics of the generalized method of moments (GMM) is utilized to explore how factor market distortion indirectly affects haze pollution. The research results show that regional haze pollution in China is characterized by significant spatial correlation, and local government competition has a positive impact on haze pollution; that is, local government competition exacerbates haze pollution. In general, local government competition not only directly leads to an increase in haze pollution but also further intensifies it by distorting the local factor market, and the intermediary role of factor market distortion is approximately 7.04%. The results of the regional inspection found that competition among local governments in the eastern region did not lead to haze pollution, and distortion of the factor market did not exist as an intermediary effect. However, both direct and intermediary effects are significant in the central and western regions. Therefore, an official performance appraisal system that includes ecological constraints should be established to guide the benign transformation of local government competition, and an environmental management mechanism must be developed for joint prevention and control to reduce haze pollution. In addition, the free flow of factors and marketization are equally important.     

Policy induced increases in private healthcare financing provide short-term relief of total healthcare expenditure growth: Evidence from OECD countries

Healthcare reforms have long been advocated as a cure to the increasing healthcare expenditures in advanced economies. Nevertheless, it has not been established whether a market solution via private financing, rather than public financing, curb aggregate healthcare expenditures. To our knowledge, this paper is the first that quantifies the impact of reforms that significantly increases (decreases) the private (public) share of healthcare financing on total healthcare expenditures relative to income in 20 OECD countries. Our reform measure is based on structural break testing of the private share of total expenditures, and verification using evidence of policy reforms. To quantify the effect of these reforms we apply Propensity Score Matching and Inverse Probability Weighted regression analysis. Over a 5-year evaluation period the reforms lead to an accumulated cost saving 0.45 percentage points of GDP. The yearly effects of the reforms are largest in the first years in the post-reform period and decreases in size as a function of time since the reform. Our findings suggest that the investigated healthcare reforms have a relatively short-lived effect on aggregate health spending relative to GDP. The findings are robust to various sensitivity tests.     

浙江省民营企业集群式营销探讨

民营企业集群已成为浙江省区域经济快速发展的主流模式之一。与大型企业、跨国公司一起,已成为参与市场竞争的主角。因此,市场营销理论应用领域已从单个企业营销逐步延伸到民营企业集群式营销。民营企业集群式营销是民营企业集群成长的关键,浙江省民营企业集群的快速发展与其营销管理创新是分不开的。为了提高浙江省民营企业集群营销管理水平,本文着重探讨了浙江省民营企业集群营销战略、策略制定及组织实施问题。     

Income and substitution effects of fiscal policy on work effort

The focus of this paper is twofold. First, it examines the impact on work effort of changes in government purchases financed with lump‐sum taxes, in a neoclassical framework, with respect to four industrialised countries. Second, it reconsiders the expenditure–work effort relationship in a broader conceptual context that allows for distortionary taxation and a disaggregation of the income and substitution effects. Our findings are shown to cast doubt on the empirical plausibility of the prevailing (neoclassical and New Keynesian) models which seem to rely heavily on the lump‐sum tax notion, thus ignoring the substitution effects of distortionary taxation.     

Hedging,Financing and Investment Decisions: A Simultaneous Equations Framework

We empirically investigate the interactions among hedging, financing, and investment decisions. We argue that the way in which hedging affects a firm's financing and investing decisions differs for firms with different growth opportunities. We find that high growth firms increase their investment, but not leverage, by hedging. However, we also find that firms with few investment opportunities use derivatives to increase their leverage.     

The Long-run Effects of the Italian Pension Reforms

The paper analysesthe reforms of the Italian mandatory pension scheme for employeeslegislated in the 1990s. To assess the effects of the reforms,a microsimulation model calibrated on cross-section data is developed.The model is aimed at estimating the average income of a memberof a cohort, as well as the average per capita income of allindividuals alive in a given year. The long-run effects of thereform are analysed, comparing the characteristics of alternativefinancing schemes. A substantial improvement of the equity aswell as the long-run sustainability of the Italian public pensionschemes emerges. However, the dreary demographic scenario callsfor further tightening of eligibility rules sometime in the nextdecades if long-run sustainability of public debt is to be achieved.On the basis of sensitivity analysis, some changes aimed at hedgingthe system against unexpected shocks are suggested.     

广东本地服装品牌的市场培育

本地原创品牌的发展塑造需要坚持,也需要本地市场的支持。品牌经营者必须充分了解市场需求,有针对性地进行市场培育,同时结合自身条件进行品牌营销,才能在市场上取胜。文章基于服装品牌消费者层次分析,提出以差异性的品牌推广方式来培育忠诚顾客的若干策略,从而提升原创品牌的市场竞争力。     

财政补贴改革刍论

财政补贴是国家宏观调控的杠杆之一,但是,目前补贴不规范,财政补贴数额大、项目繁杂,补贴效果‘异化’,加大了社会不公。为了强化财政补贴杠杆功能,提高财政补贴效益,必须按照建立公共财政的要求,本着满足公共需要原则、弹性补贴制度原则和补贴方式间接化原则,改变“一刀切”和补贴刚性的局面,确保采暖费收支合理化,取消肉食、副食品、粮食等价格补贴,改革国有企业的亏损补贴制度。     

Bureaucratic integration and regional specialization in China

Fiscal decentralization introduced as part of China's economic reform since 1979 has unleashed strong incentives for China's local governments to pursue economic development, but the same incentives have also led to local protectionist policies inhibiting the process of regional specialization. This paper focuses on the constraints or freedom with which local governments can implement their protectionist policies. Using a panel data of 29 China's regions over the time period of 1985–1997, we find that China's political system of bureaucratic integration (specifically, concurrent appointment of local government officials in the central government) imposes constraints on the local governments from practicing protectionism. We also find that the effectiveness of local protectionist policies is limited by market competition, specifically, competition from foreign-invested firms operating in China and foreign imports. Our results on the role of local protectionism remain robust to controls for the regional variations in the size of the economy and the stage of economic development.     

Indonesian Local Government Spending,Taxing and Saving: An Explanation of Pre‐ and Post‐decentralization Fiscal Outcomes*

As a result of Indonesia's decentralization program, local governments have gained significantly more responsibility for service delivery, considerably larger fiscal resources, and much greater authority over the use of those resources than before. The present paper develops a simple budget model to describe and explain the substantial differences in pre‐ and post‐decentralization local government fiscal behavior related to spending, taxing and saving. During the post‐decentralization period special attention is paid to the fiscal behavior of natural resource rich regions. Among other things, the evidence suggests that: post‐decentralization local government spending is partly responsive to increasing needs and partly the subject of elite capture; local government taxation has become more aggressive under decentralization and appears to be mostly driven by local bureaucratic expectations related to routine overhead budgets; and the increased savings of local governments during the post‐decentralization period is determined to a large degree by delayed central government transfer payments.