Re‐assessing the long‐term underperformance of UK Initial Public Offerings

Previous work has identified that IPOs underperform a market index, and the purpose of this paper is to examine the robustness of this finding. We re‐examine the evidence on the long‐term returns of IPOs in the UK using a new data set of firms over the period 1985–92, in which we compare abnormal performance based on a number of alternative methods including a calendar‐time approach. We find that, using an event‐time framework, there are substantial negative abnormal returns to an IPO after the first 3 years irrespective of the benchmark used. However, over the 5 years after an IPO, abnormal returns exhibit less dramatic underperformance, and the conclusion on negative abnormal returns depends on the benchmark applied. Further if these returns are measured in calendar time, we find that the (statistical) significance of underperformance is even less marked.     

Motives and consequences of IPOs in cold periods

We analyze the motives and long-term stock price performance of firms that pursue IPOs in cold IPO periods. We find that firms are more likely to engage in an IPO during a cold period when their earnings are relatively high and are expected to decline in the future. We also find that IPO firms during a cold period are more likely to have managed their earnings prior to the IPO. Furthermore, we find that cold IPO firms experience significantly weaker stock price performance than hot IPO firms, and results are robust to different criteria for defining hot and cold IPO periods, different measures of stock price performance, and different investment holding periods. We find that investment opportunities, the backing of a venture capitalist, and an increase in earnings in the year of the IPO lead to significantly higher long term stock price performance of IPO firms. Our multivariate models confirm the adverse cold IPO period effect on stock price performance even after controlling for the IPO motives and the firm's earnings performance. Our results also hold within the post-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) era.     

The Pricing of Property Trust IPOs in Australia

Following Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) this paper adds to the international literature investigating the underpricing of REIT initial public offerings (IPOs), with a study into Australian property trusts. This study finds that initial day returns can in part be explained by forecast profit distributions (or dividends) and the market sentiment towards property trusts from the date of the prospectus to the date of listing. There is some support for the “winners curse” explanation of underpricing with evidence that large investor or institutional involvement at the outset of the IPO also has some explanatory power.     

上市公司股权再融资效率研究的分析框架

股权分置条件下,中国一些上市公司通过盈余管理或业绩造假,以达到股权再融资目的,股权再融资效率低下。政策变化所带来的股权再融资“阵热”现象,使这一证券市场基本功能,在中国证券市场发生严重扭曲。作为衡量中国证券市场有效性和检验相关政策是否有效的基础,本文为研究上市公司股权再融资效率问题,提供一个分析框架。     

董事高管责任保险、权益资本成本与上市公司再融资能力

基于公司治理角度,使用2002~2012年沪深引进董事高管责任保险的上市公司为样本,考察了董事高管责任保险、权益资本成本和上市公司再融资能力三者之间的相互关系。研究表明：董事高管责任保险与上市公司的再融资能力负相关,与权益资本成本呈显著正相关关系;权益资本成本在董事高管责任保险和上市公司再融资能力影响机制中发挥中介作用。具体地,投资者因规避责任保险机制庇护下公司高管自利行为可招致的风险,导致上市公司权益资本成本增加,从而降低了公司再融资能力。     

Behavioral Timing,Valuation and Postissue Performance of UK Initial Public Offerings

Using a sample of 1,926 UK initial public offerings (IPOs) launched from 1987 to 2007, this study introduces a new angle on testing the behavioral timing hypothesis in the context of UK IPOs via investigating relationships between the magnitude of IPOs misvaluation and postissue stock price and operating performance. IPO misvaluation is measured using (i) an intrinsic value of the firm estimated using residual income valuation model and (ii) intensity of IPO issuance activity. The findings show that stock price and operating underperformance in the postissue are directly linked to the degree of IPOs' misvaluation. Specifically, the stock price and operating performance are found to be significantly and robustly different between hot markets IPOs and cold market IPOs 3 years postissue. We also show that overvalued IPOs have lower long-run stock returns, but outperforming operating performance, than undervalued IPOs do. Our findings are broadly consistent with the behavioral explanations of the poor stock price and operating performance, supporting the U.S. results of Purnanandam and Swaminathan [2004 Purnanandam, A. and B. Swaminathan. “Are IPOs Really Underpriced?” Review of Financial Studies, 17, (2004), pp. 811–848.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] and Loughran and Ritter [2000 Loughran, T. and J. Ritter. “Uniformly Least Powerful Tests of Market Efficiency.” Journal of Financial Economics, 55, (2000), pp. 361–389.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]].     

投资者是否被上市公司的盈余管理行为所误导?——来自配股融资的证据

为了获得配股资格和提高配股价格，上市公司具有通过调整异常应计利润来提升报告盈余的强烈动机。本文使用横截面修正的Jones模型研究了配股公司盈余管理的时间序列分布特征．并分析了异常应计利润与配股后运营业绩和股票长期收益的关系。研究结果表明，配股公司在配股前3个年度和配股当年都具有较高的异常应计利润，而配股后运营业绩和股票长期收益趋于下降，异常应计利润与配股后的股票长期收益具有显著的负相关关系。投资者由于没有能够及时“看穿”配股公司的盈余管理行为而暂时高估了股票价值，从而被上市公司的盈余管理行为所误导。     

IPO承销费用的特征及券商的政治联系——来自中国IPO市场的证据

承销费用在世界各国普遍呈现出"集聚"的现象,我们对2004年-2009年通过发审委审核的上市公司的IPO承销费用进行研究,发现我国IPO承销费用也存在集聚现象,小规模IPO公司的承销费率主要集中在2%-6%之间,大规模IPO公司的承销费率集中在4%以下。另外,我们检验了券商的政治联系与承销费用的关系,研究发现有政治联系的券商比没有政治联系的券商收取了更高的承销费用。     

Corporate Political Activities and the SEC's Oversight Role in the IPO Process

We study how a regulator (Securities and Exchanges Commission; SEC) responds to IPOs that have a higher political profile. We find that IPOs with issuers (intermediaries) that actively pursue political strategies receive more (less) SEC comment letters than IPOs without such actors. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that the IPO's political environment moderates the relationship between social pressure for more corporate transparency and SEC scrutiny. Additional tests indicate that the political activities of issuers (intermediaries) contribute to a less (more) efficient IPO process. Overall, our findings suggest that politically active intermediaries have stronger incentives to accurately portray the IPO financial reporting environment than politically active issuers because they have greater reputational and political capital at stake; quite simply, the former have more to lose. We draw out the implications for theory, in terms of agency and reputation.