基本养老保险筹资权行使主体的确定及其理论依据

基本养老保险筹资权的行使主体的确定问题,应从中央与地方政府财权划分的角度进行分析。我国地方政府行使基本养老保险筹资权存在不合理性,应建立由中央政府统筹的基本养老保险制度。     

国有企业、金融市场改革与养老保险制度改革的互动效应--中国如何解决老年保障问题?

中国政府非常清楚社会保障所面临的危机，决定寻求解决办法。拟议中的社会保障改革的核心是积累制和整合条块分割的体系，计划为每个工人建立个人退休账户，对养老基金进行有效投资。然而，这种改革受阻于三个关键因素。(1)在向积累制的转化过程中必须支付特制成本；(2)现有的社会保障体系条块分割、分散化管理3(3)已经积累的基金尚未取得高收益，也未分配到最有效率的用途上。     

中国养老保险领域的政府七大职能分析

养老日益成为中国走向和谐社会的沉重负担,经济可持续发展要求中国在养老保险制度领域对政府职能进行调整.文章对政府职能和养老保险制度关系作了理论概述,针对当前政府逐渐退出养老保险职能的趋势,论文分析了中国当前混合制养老保险模式下政府的七项职能,结论是均应增强这七项职能,但要科学选择介入领域和介入方式.     

论养老基金平衡机制--基于辽宁试点模式对养老基金平衡的透视

我国处于转轨中的养老模式面临着人口老龄化和转轨成本的双重压力，为此，2001年7月开始在辽宁省进行社保改革试点。本将以试点模式为研究起点，并将养老基金平衡剖析为两个收支平衡：一是横向平衡，二是纵向平衡。就横向平衡而言，笔认为难关的突破在于强化政府的社会保险责任，而纵向平衡的难关在于基金收益率。为此，本提出一些拓展性的社保改革思路，并认为在此基础之上养老基金的平衡是可以实现的。     

Evidence on the Timing and Determinants of Overfunded Pension Plan Termination

This paper examines the factors associated with the timing of overfunded pension plan termination.     

关于企业年金及其发展趋势的思考

论述了企业年金在社会保障体系中的重要性，回顾了上海石化企业年金制度的实施过程，并提出了进一步完善企业年金制度应采取的措施。     

企业年金风险监管的主要环节与政策框架

我国企业年金运营模式复杂,年金市场涉及金融机构类型众多,风险监管尤为重要。首先要加强信用风险监管,保证相关利益主体的相对独立性,注重投资风险和运行的公平。监管机构应当加强主动监管,推动协同监管框架的创新尝试,加强监管主体之间以及其自身部门之间的信息沟通,重点监管关联交易及其可能带来的风险。     

Population,pensions, and endogenous economic growth

We study the effect of a declining labor force on the incentives to engage in labor-saving technical change and ask how this effect is influenced by institutional characteristics of the pension scheme. When labor is scarcer it becomes more expensive and innovation investments that increase labor productivity are more profitable. We incorporate this channel in a new dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous economic growth and heterogeneous overlapping generations. We calibrate the model for the US economy and obtain the following results. First, the effect of a decline in population growth on labor productivity growth is positive and quantitatively significant. In our benchmark, it is predicted to increase from an average annual growth rate of 1.74% over 1990–2000 to 2.41% in 2100. Second, institutional characteristics of the pension system matter both for the growth performance and for individual welfare. Third, the assessment of pension reform proposals may depend on whether economic growth is endogenous or exogenous.     

Life Expectancy Heterogeneity and the Political Support for Collective Annuities

Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker's past earnings) as opposed to the non‐contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.     

Efficiency in overlapping generations economies with longevity choices and fair annuities

When individuals can influence their life-expectancies and save in annuities, suboptimal savings result from the lack of incentives to choose the optimal longevity, even when annuity returns can be made contingent to longevity-related choices. Specifically, the golden rule steady state maximizing the representative agent utility cannot be attained as a competitive equilibrium under laissez-faire, even with actuarially fair annuities contingent to longevity-enhancing choices. In order to decentralize through markets the golden rule, longevity-enhancing expenditures need to be taxed if the steady state old-age consumption exceeds the annuitized capital return, and subsidized otherwise—the government budget being balanced through lump-sum transfers or taxes. Interestingly, with positive population growth the expected net contribution is negative when longevity-enhancing expenditures are taxed, and positive when subsidized.