Ownership concentration and corporate governance practices: substitution or expropriation effects?

The objective of this study is to analyze the relation between ownership concentration and corporate governance practices of a group of Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. We rely on the corporate governance index developed by the Report on Business (ROB) in 2002. Our empirical results are consistent with the expropriation effect argument that predicts a negative relation between deviation from the one share‐one vote rule and corporate governance best practices. In this context, the dominant shareholder has incentives to maintain weak internal controls in order to facilitate expropriation. In addition, consistent with prior research, our results give partial support to the substitution effect argument by showing a negative impact of ownership concentration on the board composition subindex. Copyright © 2007 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Geography and capital structure

We investigate the impact of geographic location on firms’ capital structure decisions. We find strong evidence that location of a firm influences its capital structure. In particular, we find that centrally located firms have lower leverage ratios than do remotely located ones. Moreover, consistent with the hypothesis that those remotely located firms face more severe adverse selection problems, the effect of geographic location on capital structure is more pronounced when information asymmetry is higher. We further examine alternative explanations of the negative relation between firm geographic proximity and capital structure and show that the financial constraint effect and industry clustering effect do not explain our results. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does corporate diversification create value in emerging markets? New evidence from Chile

Using a sample of 85 Chilean firms listed in the Santiago Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2013, we analyze the impact of corporate diversification on firm value. We consider voting rights of the main shareholder and institutional investors’ influence on firm value. We report firm‐value destruction for diversified firms. Regarding ownership concentration, we report a negative relation between the largest shareholder ownership and firm value. Separation between voting rights and cash flows rights of this shareholder is negatively related to firm value. While Pension Fund Administrators (AFP) mitigate firm value destruction in diversified firms, other institutional investors do not play an active role in controlling value destruction. Finally, if the largest owner is a family, we report firm‐value creation in diversified firms. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sustainability Northwest: An Integrative Case of a Not‐for‐Profit Organization

Sustainability Northwest (SNW) is a fictional not‐for‐profit organization (NPO) that seeks to develop thought leaders for a sustainable future. This instructional case allows professors to assign students with up to six different roles, including SNW's chair of the board, executive director, volunteer treasurer, and the external auditor. Unique learning objectives include (i) the application of the CPA Canada Handbook, Accounting—Part III to prepare an NPO's financial statements using fund accounting, (ii) the development of recommendations to improve an NPO's board of directors, (iii) the analysis of system flow documents to identify control weaknesses, and (iv) the preparation of an audit planning memo. Instructors can use this case in several milieus. First, professors can foster a student's ability to integrate technical knowledge by (i) assigning students all six roles in a capstone course to promote integration within an individual course or (ii) assigning multiple roles across multiple courses to promote integration across a program of studies. Second, instructors can focus on a particular technical skill by assigning specific roles. This case is ideal for senior‐level undergraduate students or graduate students.     

The Effects of Strategy–Management Control System Misfits on Firm Performance

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of misfits between business strategy and management control systems on performance. We address the following research question: Do firms that align their management control systems with the specific requirements of their business strategy perform significantly better than those that do not achieve the required match? We define a misfit as the degree to which management control systems deviate from empirically derived optimal configurations for a given type of business strategy. We use the two‐stage approach proposed by Ittner and Larcker (2001) to measure misfit and to investigate the impacts of misfit on performance. Based on a questionnaire survey of executives from 109 banks, we hypothesize and find that the strategy–control systems misfit has a significantly negative correlation with both self‐rated and publicly available performance measures.     

What constrains firms from divesting their legacy business?

This study focuses on a unique business phenomenon, legacy divestitures, which refers to the sale or spinoff of a firm's original business. I argue that firms may be prevented from engaging in legacy divestiture by organizational inertia, which become increasingly stronger as the legacy business gets older. I also examine factors that help firms overcome the constraints of inertial forces on firms' legacy divestitures. Hypotheses are tested using a sample of 108 diversified American companies, 27 of which divested legacy businesses between 1980 and 2017. Firms are less likely to divest their legacy businesses as the legacy units get older. The negative relationship is weakened by two factors, performance–aspiration gaps and R&D intensity.     

Investor Attention and Earnings Management around the World

This study examines the determinants of earnings management in an international setting using the limited investor attention model of Hirshleifer and Teoh ( 2003 ). The model predicts that investor attention reduces earnings management. I use analyst following, institutional ownership, and Big N auditor choice to proxy for investor attention. I have four key findings. First, I document that financial analysts curb earnings management in U.S. firms but not in non‐U.S. firms. Second, I document that institutional block‐holdings curb earnings management across the world. Third, Big N auditors reduce earnings management in U.S. firms but not in non‐U.S. firms. Fourth, I document that corporate governance mechanisms reduce earnings management in U.S. firms but not in non‐U.S. firms.     

The Role of Pension Business Benefits in Institutional Block Ownership and Corporate Governance*

We investigate whether potential pension contracting benefits lead institutions that provide pension services to acquire ownership blocks in firms and the implications of such blockholdings on the firms' corporate governance. We use the 2006 Pension Protection Act, which expanded pension participation in certain states, as a quasi-exogenous shock and find an increase in block ownership by pension-providing institutions in firms with substantial operations in affected states. Further, we find that the acquisition of a large block increases the likelihood that the institution will provide future pension services to the firm. With regard to corporate governance, we find that the acquisition of large pension blockholdings is associated with higher CEO pay and lower CEO turnover following poor financial performance. However, contrary to the prediction of the private benefits hypothesis, we do not find consistent evidence that large pension blockholdings are associated with declining firm profitability, suggesting that pension institutions are incentivized to exert monitoring to preserve the investment value of their blockholdings. Overall, our evidence is consistent with pension service institutions acquiring ownership blocks to obtain pension contracts, but our evidence does not support the prediction that they use their influence to compromise shareholder value.     

Corporate Social Responsibility,Tax Aggressiveness,and Firm Market Value

This paper examines the relationship of corporate social responsibility (CSR), tax aggressiveness, and firm market value. An economic model has been developed to show that profit‐maximization firms are willing to incur additional costs in CSR, such as paying more taxes, as long as they can differentiate their products from non‐CSR firms, and that socially conscious consumers will buy products from CSR firms at prices higher than those of non‐CSR firms. The empirical study in this paper indicates that the higher the CSR ranking of a firm, the less likely a firm is to engage in tax aggressiveness. It also indicates that a reputation of higher CSR will enhance firm market value. Using Canadian companies listed in the S&P/TSX 60 index, I find that both firms’ five‐year effective tax rates and annual effective tax rates are positively associated with their overall CSR scores as well as with their social scores. Firms’ five‐year effective tax rates are also positively associated with their governance index. I also find that firms’ overall CSR ranking and governance scores are positively associated with their market value.     

Competitor identification,perceived environmental uncertainty,and firm performance

To create a competitive advantage and generate superior performance, firms must first identify rivals. However, there is little understanding of how perceived environmental uncertainty affects competitor identification, why some firms are better at identifying domestic versus foreign rivals, or how competitor identification is related to firm performance. In this paper we theorize that perceived environmental uncertainty is an important antecedent of competitor identification; it influences how many competitors a firm identifies. Our theory also suggests that different firm characteristics influence domestic/foreign competitor identification and that there is an inverted‐U shaped relationship between under/overidentification of competitors and firm performance. Based on a large sample of Taiwanese firms, we find support for each of these ideas. Our study helps reinforce the importance of competitor identification for firm success. Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.